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The Light of Conscience: Jean Barbeyrac on Moral, Civil and Religious Authority 
Thesis Summary 
 
Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744) is best known for his annotated French translations of the 
natural law treatises of Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and Richard Cumberland and 
has generally been understood through the prism of his interpretations of these. 
However, not only was he in fact an independent natural law thinker, who drew 
eclectically from a vast array of authors, synthesising their ideas to construct his own 
distinct theory; he also wrote extensively on morals and politics in other genres, works 
that have received very little attention and never been seen in their coherence with his 
natural law ideas. This thesis considers Barbeyrac as a thinker in his own right, drawing 
together all of his major and many of his minor works and situating them within a 
number of the wider contexts Barbeyrac inhabited: namely, as a Huguenot refugié, a 
member of the Republic of Letters and a professional academician.  
 
Barbeyrac’s central concern was the relationship between moral, civil and religious 
authority, and the core of his solution was a comprehensive concept of conscience that 
unified and naturalised man’s moral and religious duties and served as the source of 
authoritative moral judgement. The first three chapters of the dissertation focus on the 
structure of his natural law theory, arguing that the attempt to establish conscience as a 
comprehensive faculty of moral judgement caused intractable philosophical tensions, 
reflected in his innovative but inchoate theory of permissive natural law. The final two 
chapters extend this analysis beyond Barbeyrac’s natural law, arguing that despite his 
efforts to balance the potentially competing demands that arise when the authority of 
conscience comes into conflict with other sources of moral authority, namely 
ecclesiastical and civil, Barbeyrac had to insist that, ultimately, individuals must uphold 
the first and principal duty of natural law to follow the light of conscience. 
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Abbreviations 
 
DGP Hugo Grotius, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix, trans. and ed. J. 
Barbeyrac, 2 Volumes, (Amsterdam, 1724; facsimilie, Caen, 1984). 
DHC Samuel Pufendorf, Les devoirs de l’homme et du citoyen, tels qu'ils lui sont 
prescrits par la loi naturelle, trans. and ed. J. Barbeyrac, 2 Volumes, 
(London, 1741; facsimilie, Caen, 1989). 
DNG  Samuel Pufendorf, Le droit de la nature et des gens, ou système général 
des principes les plus importants de la morale, de la jurisprudence, et de la 
politique, trans. and ed. J. Barbeyrac, 3 Volumes, (London, 1740). 
TJ Jean Barbeyrac, Traité du jeu, où l’on examine les principales questions de 
droit naturel et de morale qui on rapport à cette matiere, 3 Volumes, 
(Amsterdam, 1737). 
TMP Jean Barbeyrac, Traité de la morale des peres de l'eglise: où en défendant 
un article de la préface sur Pufendorf, contre l'apologie de la morale des 
pères du P. Ceillier… on fait diverses reflexions sur plusieurs matieres 
importantes, (Amsterdam, 1728). 
TPLN Richard Cumberland, Traité philosophique des loix naturelles, ou l’on 
recherche et l’on établit, par la nature des choses, la forme des ces loix, 
leurs principaux chefs, leur ordre, leur publication & leur obligation: on y 
refute aussi les elémens de la morale & de la politique de Thomas Hobbes, 
trans. and ed. J. Barbeyrac, (Amsterdam, 1744; facsimilie, Caen, 1989). 
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A Note on References 
 
The research presented in this thesis is based on the original French editions of 
Barbeyrac’s works. For that reason, even where English translations are available, all 
references are taken from the relevant French edition. For works that Barbeyrac revised 
and augmented during his scholarly career, an edition has been used that includes all 
final revisions. The use of earlier editions of these texts is indicated in the footnotes 
where appropriate.  
 
All English translations included within this thesis are my own, unless otherwise stated. 
The intention has been to stay as faithful as possible to Barbeyrac’s original French, 
both in his own notes and writings and in the translations of his principal natural law 
authors: Pufendorf, Grotius and Cumberland. Barbeyrac’s notes and other works were 
translated into English – if at all – during the early modern period and these translations 
reflect the particular interests of the translators. A study of these interests is a serious 
scholarly desideratum, but it cannot be met in the present work.1 For the sake of 
consistency, I make my own translations even where modern ones are available.2  
 
Barbeyrac’s ‘Préface’ to Le droit de la nature et des gens is referred to as his Pufendorf 
‘Préface’ in order to stress that all references are taken from the original French. The 
commonly used English title was invented by the English translators, who renamed the 
work ‘An Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality’.3  
 
The spelling, punctuation and presentation of the text (including all capitalisation and 
italics) are preserved in quotations from the original French texts. Minor modifications 
have been made in some of the English translations for ease of reading.  
 
Full bibliographical details, including title, for all references, both primary and 
secondary, are given in the first instance that a work is cited within the main body of the 
thesis and in the bibliography at the end. All subsequent references use a shortened title. 
Finally, individuals are generally referred to by their full name in the first instance and 
their surname thereafter.
                                                
1 David Saunders and Ian Hunter address this issue in ‘Bringing the State to England: Andrew Tooke’s 
Translation of Samuel Pufendorf’s De Officio Hominis et Civis’ in History of Political Thought 24:2 
(2003).  
2 The only modern translations of Barbeyrac’s works are David Saunders’s translations – ‘The Judgement 
of an Anonymous Writer on the Original of this Abridgement’, ‘Discourse on What is Permitted by the 
Laws’ and ‘Discourse on the Benefits Conferred by the Laws’ – in The Whole Duty of Man, According to 
the Law of Nature, ed. I. Hunter and D. Saunders, (Indianapolis, IN, 2003). 
3 Cf. Barbeyrac, ‘Préface du traducteur’ [hereafter simply ‘Préface’], DNG, and Barbeyrac, ‘An Historical 
and Critical Account of the Science of Morality’, trans. G. Carew, in The Law of Nature and Nations: or, 
a General System of the most important Principles of Morality, Jurisprudence, and Politics… To which is 
prefix’d M. Barbeyrac’s Prefatory Discourse… To which are now added, all the large Notes of M. 
Barbeyrac, trans. B. Kennet, (London, 1749). 
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Introduction 
 
I 
Barbeyrac: Contexts of Study 
 
Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744) claimed that all individuals are subject to an indispensable 
moral duty to follow the light of conscience. His theory of natural law is an attempt to 
vindicate the truth of this maxim. To this end, he imbued individual conscience with 
considerable moral authority commensurate with the moral authority possessed by civil 
and ecclesiastical powers. Convinced that these potentially competing sources of moral 
authority could be harmonised within a properly conceived juridical framework, 
throughout his scholarly career Barbeyrac remained preoccupied with the task of 
establishing the legitimate bounds of these different sources of moral authority. The 
intention of the present thesis is to determine how far this central concern confers a 
coherency on Barbeyrac’s thought across his different texts and to consider Barbeyrac’s 
response to the philosophical tensions that arise in the development of his thought, 
above all, those that follow from the unity of religious belief and moral knowledge that 
grounds his concept of conscience. It will be argued that this unity of purpose shapes his 
response to these tensions. It may not resolve the philosophical issues at stake, but it 
does express a rationale that follows from his wider theory of natural law.   
 
The dissertation adds to current scholarship in two specific ways. First, it focuses on 
Barbeyrac’s theory of natural law in its own right and in distinction from the those of 
the more famous authors on whom he comments at length in his great translations of 
their works. In order to do so, it situates his thought in a number of different intellectual 
contexts. Although by no means an exhaustive study, in these regards the thesis goes 
beyond the existing literature, where most studies are brief and concentrate on particular 
issues, mostly relating to the major thinkers. Second, the study goes beyond 
Barbeyrac’s natural law work in order to show an overall coherence in his intellectual 
enterprise as a whole, something that has not been attempted on a serious scale before. 
The key to this attempt at a comprehensive interpretation of his thought is a distinctive 
reading of his idea of a permissive natural law. Barbeyrac’s contribution to the early 
modern debate on permissive natural law has been treated as marginal in previous 
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scholarship on the topic.1 However, it is notable for the clarity with which he faces up to 
its inherent problems, and, of particular importance to the current interpretation, for the 
manner in which it connects natural law with ecclesiology and political theory. 
Barbeyrac’s theory of permissive natural law is essential to assessing the coherence of 
his overall thought and, by virtue of the importance that he ascribes to the concept, it 
also represents a worthy case study within the history of the topic.  
 
One reason why scholarship on Barbeyrac – with a few exceptions to be acknowledged 
– is limited to brief studies of particular topics, proceeds from the nature of the man 
himself and his works. An erudite academician and well-connected man of letters, 
Barbeyrac inhabited a number of overlapping intellectual and physical contexts from the 
shifting geographical localities of the Huguenot communities in Berlin, Lausanne and 
Groningen to the continuity offered by the intellectual fellowship of the Republic of 
Letters. His works cover a number of different genres from the natural law translations 
and commentaries that made his name, to his own independent writings which range 
from short public discourses to substantial moral and historical treatises. Despite this 
diffusion of both works and situations, it seems clear that Barbeyrac himself had a basic 
unity of practical purpose and intellectual means. The present study undoubtedly 
privileges the latter, the intellectual coherence, but it is hoped that it pays sufficient 
attention to the different contexts to make Barbeyrac’s purposes clear. And it provides a 
framework for answering further questions surrounding the development of his thought 
across the course of his scholarly career.  
 
Interest in Barbeyrac’s thought in recent decades has primarily focused on his role 
within the post-Grotian early modern natural law tradition and the history of moral 
philosophy more generally.2 Scholars in the field have debated two questions in 
particular. First, whether there is a core set of beliefs or ideas that brings together a 
diverse group of early modern natural law theorists within a reasonably coherent school 
                                                
1 Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 80-81. 
2 Major contributions to this field of study include: Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origins 
and Development, (Cambridge, 1979); Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From 
Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment, (Cambridge, 1996); J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: 
A History of Modern Moral Philosophy, (Cambridge, 1998); Tim Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in 
the Early Enlightenment, (Cambridge, 2000); Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical 
Philosophy in Early Modern Germany, (Cambridge, 2001). The arguments presented in these texts are 
discussed in more detail where relevant within the main body of this thesis. The same is true of other 
works referred to in this overview.   
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of thought. Second, how to interpret the various lines of influence that run between 
different natural law theorists, above all, the relationship between major thinkers such 
as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-
1694) and John Locke (1632-1704). Within these debates, Barbeyrac emerges as minor 
figure in the history of early modern natural law but, as the translator and interpreter of 
both Grotius and Pufendorf, he has in fact had an influence beyond what he is credited 
with. Through his self-conscious efforts to construct his own vision of the beliefs and 
ideas that defined the early modern school of natural law in his Pufendorf ‘Préface’, 
Barbeyrac has exerted considerable influence on how his authors, above all Pufendorf, 
were perceived by future generations, including modern scholars.3  
 
More recently, the interpretation of early modern natural law bequeathed, in part, by 
Barbeyrac’s activities as a translator and commentator has come under close scrutiny. 
Fiammetta Palladini has emphasised the intellectual affinities between Hobbes and 
Pufendorf, insisting that the latter obscured his Epicurean heritage for prudential 
reasons, preferring instead to ally himself to Grotius, an effort that was reinforced by 
Barbeyrac.4 While scholarship such as this helps to reinvigorate the study of Pufendorf 
and other prominent thinkers within the history of early modern natural law, it also 
reveals, indirectly at least, the difficulties that arise from approaching Barbeyrac’s 
thought through the prism of his authors. Much of the recent work focusing on 
Barbeyrac from within the natural law tradition has viewed him as inexorably tied to his 
authors, with his thought labelled as Pufendorfian or Grotian by turns and the coherence 
of his own theory of natural law standing or falling with that of his authors.5 The present 
thesis, while building on previous scholarship, seeks to go beyond it by establishing the 
extent to which Barbeyrac constructs a theory of natural law in his own right, one that is 
illuminated by but not derived from his authors. 
 
                                                
3 On the influence of Barbeyrac’s Pufendorf ‘Préface’ in shaping the history of early modern natural law, 
cf. Chapter 1, p. 26, esp. fns. 10-11.  
4 Fiammetta Palladini, ‘Pufendorf Disciple of Hobbes: The Nature of Man and the State of Nature: The 
Doctrine of Socialitas’, in History of European Ideas 34 (2008), see esp. pp. 59-60.  
5 For example, in the only monograph dedicated to the study of Barbeyrac, apart from an older biography, 
Petter Korkman interprets his theory as an attempt to transform Grotian and Pufendorfian natural law into 
a coherent rights-based theory: Barbeyrac and Natural Law, (Helsinki, 2001). This study represents an 
important step forward in the study of Barbeyrac’s place within the history of natural law, but it does not 
disentangle Barbeyrac’s own theory of natural law from that of his authors, nor did it aim to do so.  
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Barbeyrac has also attracted the interest of scholars from other quarters, most notably as 
a refugié within the Huguenot Diaspora. The relatively few studies that mention him at 
all take him to represent a late contribution to the post-Revocation debates that reached 
their pinnacle in the heated exchange between the Huguenot philosophers Pierre Bayle 
(1647-1706) and Pierre Jurieu (1673-1713). The exceptions here are Tim Hochstrasser’s 
two articles on the political thought of the Huguenot Diaspora. In ‘The Claims of 
Conscience’, Hochstrasser establishes the close relationship between the development 
of Huguenot political thought and the early modern natural law school from the time of 
Bayle and Jurieu to that of Barbeyrac and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694-1748).6 
Barbeyrac emerges here as an influential figure in the mediation and disseminating of 
natural law ideas shaped in response to the concerns of ‘second’ generation refugees.7 In 
‘Conscience and Reason’, Hochstrasser focuses exclusively on Barbeyrac’s natural law 
theory, arguing that its distinctive character comes from its amalgam of Pufendorfian 
foundations, Lockean epistemology and a Huguenot inspired concept of conscience.8 
This thesis extends Hochstrasser’s argument through a more comprehensive study of 
Barbeyrac’s natural law theory that remains indebted to the analysis of some of 
Barbeyrac’s most important concepts, above all, his concept of conscience.  
 
By focusing on Barbeyrac not only as natural law theorist but also as a thinker located 
within the wider Huguenot Diaspora, this study responds to the growing literature on 
the relationship between enlightenment ideas and religious beliefs. In a series of case 
studies, David Sorkin challenges the traditional idea, often attributed to Peter Gay in his 
seminal study of the Enlightenment, that the building blocks of modern secular thought 
and the roots of orthodox religious belief are necessarily antithetical to one another.9 
Barbeyrac presents an interesting – although not unusual – character within this picture. 
Wary of the dangers of bestowing an undue authority on the church and its ministers, 
whether Catholic or Reformed, Barbeyrac insists upon the separation of church and 
                                                
6 Tim Hochstrasser, ‘The Claims of Conscience: Natural Law Theory, Obligation and Resistance in the 
Huguenot Diaspora’, in New Essays on the Political Thought of the Huguenots of the Refuge, ed. J.C. 
Laursen, (Leiden, 1995). 
7 Hochstrasser, ‘The Claims of Conscience’, pp. 38-39.  
8 Tim Hochstrasser, ‘Conscience and Reason: The Natural Law Theory of Jean Barbeyrac’, in Historical 
Journal 36:2, (1993). 
9 David Sorkin, The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna, 
(Princeton, 2008). For a critique of Gay’s thesis and a review of the wider literature, see also: Knud 
Haakonssen, Enlightenments and Religions, (Athens, 2010) and Jonathan Sheehan, ‘Enlightenment, 
Religion and the Enigma of Secularization: A Review Essay’, in American Historical Review 108:4 
(2003). Cf. Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation [1966], 2 Volumes, (New York, 1995).  
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state. But his purpose in doing so is not to uphold modern, secular ideals. Instead, 
possessed of a latitudinarian but nonetheless distinctly Calvinist faith, Barbeyrac’s 
theory of natural law constitutes a genuine effort to establish the authority of individual 
conscience as a moral and religious faculty. Barbeyrac’s rationalist religious convictions 
and his experiences of religious persecution may have made him into a critic of 
orthodox theology but he was undoubtedly a man of faith; a context of upmost 
importance to any interpretation of his thought.   
 
Other works have singled out Barbeyrac for particular mention with respect to specific 
topics. John Dunkley’s study on the history of gambling and Alfred Dufour’s analysis 
of the idea of marriage within the Swiss ‘Romande’ school of natural law are good 
examples of the insights that may be garnered from situating Barbeyrac’s thought 
within the history and development of a specific set of ideas.10 Likewise, Joris van 
Eijnatten’s articles on Barbeyrac, mostly concentrating on his anticlerical critique but 
offering a rare insight into Barbeyrac within the Dutch context, in particular 
emphasising his role as an academician, must also be acknowledged for the contribution 
that they make to the wider field of study.11 The Barbeyrac that emerges from these 
studies, whether focusing on his thought from within the early modern school of natural 
law, as a contribution to the life of the Huguenot Diaspora, or in relation to a particular 
subject matter is a figure who straddles a number of different contexts. He may not be 
of the same stature as his authors and better known contemporaries, but as an erudite 
and eclectic thinker his particular significance lies in the novelty of his synthesis of 
different traditions of thought and styles of argument.  
 
Barbeyrac operated in several cultural and academic locales, as his biography shows; he 
published in a variety of genres, as we have seen; and he was an avid correspondent on 
a European scale; in short, he was a prominent citizen of the Republic of Letters. 
Several of the scholarly contributions already mentioned take up this theme, and it is 
developed at some length by Anne Goldgar, who takes Barbeyrac as an example of 
                                                
10 John Dunkley, Gambling: A Social and Moral Problem in France (1685-1792), (Oxford, 1985); Alfred 
Dufour, Le mariage dans l’école romande du droit naturel au XVIIIe siècle, (Geneva, 1976).  
11 Joris van Eijnatten, ‘Gerard Noodt’s Standing in the Eighteenth-Century Dutch Debate on Religious 
Freedom’, in Dutch Review of Church History 79:1 (1999), ‘Swiss Anticlericalism in the United 
Provinces: Jean Barbeyrac's Oratio De Magistratu, Forte Peccante, E Pulpitis Sacris Non Traducendo 
(1721)’, in La Formazione Storica Della Alterità. Studi Di Storia Della Tolleranza Nell’età Moderna 
Offerti a Antonio Rotondò, ed. H. Méchoulan et. al., (Florence, 2001) and ‘The Church Fathers Assessed. 
Nature, Bible and Morality in Jean Barbeyrac’, in De Achttiende Eeuw 35 (2003). 
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proper scholarly conduct within the Republic, noting the praise he received for the style 
of his Grotius commentary.12 There is scope for more work on Barbeyrac along these 
lines, but although this cannot be the main focus of the present thesis, it does contribute 
to these considerations by, wherever required, outlining the important aspects of 
individual relationships. The individuals concerned may be divided into four broad 
groups: (i) senior figures within the Republic or Diaspora whose works had a formative 
influence on the development of Barbeyrac’s own ideas, above all, Locke and Bayle; 
(ii) fellow translators and commentators with whom Barbeyrac engages in his natural 
law commentaries, in particular here, Gottlieb Gerhard Titius (1661-1714) and Gershom 
Carmichael (1672-1729); (iii) immediate contemporaries that Barbeyrac considered 
close friends and intellectual allies, figures such as the latitudinarian theologian and 
scholar Jean Le Clerc (1657-1736) and the Genevan theologian and scholar Jean-
Alphonse Turrettini (1671-1737) but many more besides; (iv) major opponents with 
whom Barbeyrac entered into heated intellectual debates, in particular here, Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and Father Rémi Ceillier (1688-1763).13  
 
                                                
12 Anne Goldgar, Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters, 1680-1750, 
(New Haven, CT, 1995), pp. 161-162 and 167-168. Goldgar’s work offers the most detailed insight 
available into the social composition of the Republic of Letters and the unwritten rules that governed 
proper conduct within it.  
13 (i) The relationship between Barbeyrac and the intellectual heavyweights that preceded him, Locke and 
Bayle, is a central theme of the two articles by Tim Hochstrasser cited above. Ross Hutchison has also 
offered an account of the influence of Locke on Barbeyrac, but his study focuses on specific references to 
Locke within Barbeyrac’s works rather than offering the kind of contextualised study proposed here. It 
must also be noted that while Hutchison’s list of Lockean references is strong in some areas, it is not 
comprehensive: Ross Hutchison, Locke in France 1688-1734, (Oxford, 1991); (ii) Barbeyrac engages 
with his fellow commentators in all of his natural law translations, but it is most illuminating in his 
Pufendorf translations, often providing insights into the development of his own thought. The literature 
on natural law commentaries is only used to the extent demanded by the specific discussion in this thesis, 
especially Barbeyrac’s relationship with the Scottish Pufendorf commentator Carmichael, which has 
received some attention recently. See Chapter 2, p. 76, fn. 121; (iii) There are few studies that discuss 
Barbeyrac in relation to his immediate contemporaries in detail. The two general studies of importance 
are Goldgar’s analysis of the social composition of the Republic of Letters in Impolite Learning and 
Philippe Meylan’s biographical study Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744) et les débuts de l’enseignement du 
droit dans l’ancienne académie de Lausanne, (Lausanne, 1937). Meylan provides an overview of the 
whole of Barbeyrac’s career, but takes particular interest in the periods spent in Lausanne and 
Barbeyrac’s relationship with his various correspondents, including Turrettini. For a near comprehensive 
list of Barbeyrac’s correspondence, see Meylan, Jean Barbeyrac, pp. 6-8. Barbeyrac’s letters to Turrettini 
remain the best source of information regarding the relationship between the two. The literature on the 
relationship between Barbeyrac and Le Clerc is even more scant, despite their close links: both were 
engaged in disseminating Lockean ideas within the Republic, with Le Clerc being responsible for 
Barbeyrac’s introduction to Locke himself. The principal study of Le Clerc’s thought remains Annie 
Barnes’s Jean Le Clerc (1657-1736) et la République des Lettres, (Paris, 1938) where direct reference to 
Barbeyrac is made only briefly; (iv) The relationship between Barbeyrac, Leibniz and Pufendorf has 
received considerable attention within recent scholarship. See Chapter 2, p. 73, fn. 108. Barbeyrac’s 
exchange with Ceillier focuses on the moral philosophy of the church fathers, a less well documented 
aspect of his thought. It is taken up briefly by Eijnatten in his article, ‘The Church Fathers Assessed’.  
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The present study has been limited in other regards so as to keep it manageable. In order 
to keep the focus on Barbeyrac’s own theory of natural law, as distinct from that of his 
authors, attention has only been paid to Barbeyrac’s performance as a translator where 
directly relevant to the subject under discussion. The purpose here has not been to 
evaluate the accuracy of his particular reading of his authors, Grotius, Pufendorf and 
Cumberland, but rather to consider how he makes use of his interpretation of these 
thinkers to build his own theory of natural law. I fully accept the point made by David 
Saunders in his article on Barbeyrac as translator, that ‘adjustment via translation can be 
a strategic art’, and that Barbeyrac exploited the full potential of this art.14 My concern 
is with the resulting work of art. 
 
As Meri Päivärinne points out, Barbeyrac saw his task of translation as essential to the 
dissemination of knowledge, making his translations the cornerstone of his pedagogic 
enterprise.15 As Barbeyrac himself says in the Pufendorf ‘Préface’, the purpose of these 
translations was to open the texts up to a learned but non-Latinate audience.16 This 
activity was also important in establishing his reputation as a scholar within the 
Republic of Letters. As recent scholarship on the translation of Locke’s works into 
French during the early modern period has emphasised, it was a task that was taken up 
with particular enthusiasm by members of the Huguenot Diaspora, many of whom were 
keen not only to make texts available to the wider reading public but also to draw out 
aspects of these texts that were relevant to the Huguenot cultural and political 
experience.17  
 
In pursuing the coherence that Barbeyrac himself strove for I am trying to avoid 
reducing it to the question of what label his thought deserves, for example, whether he 
is a ‘liberal’ thinker or a ‘rights’ theorist and measuring the success of his ideas in these 
terms. As a man of his times, Barbeyrac’s thought is eclectic in nature rather than 
                                                
14 David Saunders, ‘The Natural Jurisprudence of Jean Barbeyrac: Translation as an Art of Political 
Adjustment’, in Eighteenth-Century Studies 36:4 (2003), p. 473.  
15 Meri Päivärinne is currently undertaking a PhD at Helsinki University that focuses on Barbeyrac as a 
translator. An early article stemming from that research is ‘Enlightened Translations: Knowledge 
Mediation and Jean Barbeyrac’, in Translation and the (Trans)formation of Identities: Selected Papers of 
the CETRA Research Seminar in Translation Studies 2008, ed. D. de Crom, (2009). Accessed via: 
www.arts.kuleuven.be/info/bestanden-div/Paivarinne.pdf.  
16 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §32.  
17 See: S.-J. Savonius, ‘Locke in French: The Du Gouvernement Civil of 1691 and its Readers’, in The 
Historical Journal 47:1 (2004) and Delphine Soulard, ‘Anglo-French Cultural Transmission: The Case of 
John Locke and the Huguenots’, in Historical Research 85:227 (2012).  
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systematic. Moreover, some of its most interesting aspects are those with which he may 
be furthest out on a limb in the eyes of contemporary philosophy. He is certainly 
grappling with innovative and complex concepts that he does not always satisfactorily 
resolve, as indicated in the amendments that he makes across different editions of his 
texts. I do not always shy away from raising issues about the validity of Barbeyrac’s 
reasoning that may be seen as anachronistic, but I do so mainly in an attempt to keep 
faith with the modern reader. My main concern has been to read Barbeyrac on the 
premises of his own life and time – to which we now turn for a brief overview.  
 
II 
Barbeyrac: Life and Works18 
 
Barbeyrac was born on the 15th March 1674 in Beziers, a small French town in the 
Languedoc region of the country. The son of a pastor in the Reformed church, Antoine 
Barbeyrac, the young Jean was ‘destined for study’ from infancy and, in keeping with 
‘the ordinary custom’, intended for the church like his father before him.19 His life, 
however, did not follow this traditional path. Repeatedly coming up against the forces 
of religious intransigence, instead of joining the church, Barbeyrac became a lifelong 
critic of unbridled ecclesiastical authority and religious dogmatism. Ever the erudite 
scholar, however, he elected to become an academician, dedicating himself to the study 
and dissemination of both natural law and moral philosophy. The pedagogic nature of 
his enterprise is evident not only in his project to translate some of the most important 
natural law treatises of his day and in his various other writings, a number of which 
were first delivered as academic orations, but also in the broad desire to educate the 
young men in his charge in their basic moral, religious and civil duties.  
 
Barbeyrac’s first experience of religious intolerance came in October 1685, when the 
fortunes of the Barbeyrac family were irreversibly altered following the Edict of 
Fointainebleau, usually referred to as the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which 
                                                
18 The two principal sources of information on the biographical and bibliographical details of Barbeyrac’s 
life are his own, relatively short, ‘Mémoire sur la vie et sur les écrits de Mr. Jean de Barbeyrac, écrit par 
lui-même’, in Écrits de droit et de morale, ed. Simone Goyard-Fabre, (Caen, 1996) and the longer 
account provided in Philippe Meylan, Jean Barbeyrac. Meylan also offers a comprehensive list of 
Barbeyrac’s published works: pp. 244-248. The brief account presented here draws on both these sources, 
emphasising those aspects of his life and works of particular relevance to my analysis.    
19 Jean Barbeyrac, ‘Mémoire sur la vie’, p. 81: ‘destiné aux Lettres’ and ‘la Coutume ordinaire’.  
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officially ended the limited toleration granted by that Edict to the French Reformed, or 
Huguenots, in 1598. Under the terms of the new Edict, Reformed ministers (unlike lay 
persons) were legally allowed to go into exile rather than recant their faith, but had to 
leave behind all property and children over the age of seven.20 Like many of his 
Huguenot compatriots, this forced the eleven-year-old Jean to take a clandestine route 
out of the country to join his exiled family in Lausanne. A journey, he claimed, that was 
‘not without great danger’.21  
 
Once settled, Barbeyrac enrolled at the local lower school, later going on to become a 
student at the Académie de Lausanne, where he ‘devoted himself to the study of Greek, 
Hebrew, philosophy and, finally, theology’.22 It was also during this period that he lost 
both his mother and father, leaving him to care for his younger brother and two sisters at 
a young age. Initially leaving Lausanne in early 1693 to study theology at Geneva, the 
instability of the Huguenot situation in Lausanne and the lack of prospects for the young 
Barbeyrac, led him to move to Berlin at the end of the year, taking his siblings with 
him, in the hope of securing a more favourable stipend for himself.23 With his siblings 
safely settled in the Maison des orphelins in Berlin, Barbeyrac continued his studies at 
the university in Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, returning to Berlin in 1694 and taking up a post 
teaching ancient languages at the Collège français in 1697.  
 
During his time in Berlin, Barbeyrac again experienced the effects of religious 
intolerance, this time at the hands of his own Reformed church. In 1699, still harbouring 
hopes of following in his father’s footsteps, a decree from the Elector Frederick 
presented Barbeyrac with the opportunity to be examined for ordination by the 
consistory of the French church in Berlin.24 However, drawing their evidence from 
Barbeyrac’s early writings, his detractors within the consistory accused him of 
Socinianism; a charge often levied against those advocating a minimalist religious creed 
and emphasising the authority of natural reason. John Marshall describes the charge of 
Socinianism as ‘one of the most commonly used accusations in the seventeenth 
                                                
20 Elisabeth Labrousse, ‘Calvinism in France, 1598-1685’, in International Calvinism, 1541-1715, ed. M. 
Prestwich, (Oxford, 1985), p. 311.  
21 Barbeyrac, ‘Mémoire sur la vie’, p. 82: ‘non sans de grand dangers’.  
22 Barbeyrac, ‘Mémoire sur la vie’, p. 82: ‘s’attacha à l’Etude du Grec, de l’Hebreu, de l Philosophie, & 
enfin à celle de la Theologie.  
23 Meylan, Jean Barbeyrac, pp. 40-45.   
24 Meylan, Jean Barbeyrac, p. 48.  
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century… employed polemically to associate many thinkers with heresy, or to identify 
heretical tendencies in their thought’.25 Forced to abandon his long held aspirations, 
Barbeyrac became a lifelong opponent of religious dogmatism. 
 
With one door closed to him, Barbeyrac concentrated his efforts on opening another by 
devoting himself to jurisprudence; a field of study that he claimed to ‘have had a strong 
interest in since his more tender years’ and, more importantly, a field of study that 
attracted a high degree of interest amongst the leading intellectuals of the Huguenot 
community in Berlin.26 The result of these endeavours were his early natural law 
translations, characterised by an ongoing commentary in his notes to the text, a 
development of the preceding commentator literature in the genre. Published in short 
succession, Barbeyrac’s translations of Pufendorf’s two natural law treatises appeared in 
1706 and 1707 under the French titles, Le droit de la nature et des gens and Les devoirs 
de l’homme et du citoyen.27 The former work also included his Pufendorf ‘Préface’, a 
substantial history of moral thought, renowned in its own right. The year 1707 also saw 
the publication of his translations of two discourses written by the Dutch academician 
and jurist Gerard Noodt (1647-1725): ‘Des droits de la puissance souveraine’ and 
‘Discours sur la liberté de conscience’.28  
                                                
25 John Marshall, ‘Locke, Socinianism, “Socinianism”, and Unitarianism’, in English Philosophy in the 
Age of Locke, ed. M.A. Stewart, (Oxford, 2000), p. 112. Although this article focuses almost exclusively 
on Locke and the British context, its provides a valuable analysis of the subtleties of the different 
theological positions available to thinkers such as Locke and Barbeyrac and the genuine concern felt 
surrounding charges of religious unorthodoxy.    
26 Barbeyrac, ‘Mémoire sur la vie’, p. 82: ‘en pleine liberté de suivre son penchant’ and ‘avoit fort aimé 
dès sa plus tender jeunesse’. On the Huguenot interest in natural law within the Berlin context, see Sandra 
Pott, ‘“Gentle, Refined, Cultivated, Witty People”: Comments on the Intellectual History of the Berlin 
Refuge and on Relevant Research’, in The Berlin Refuge 1680-1780: Learning and Science in European 
Context, ed. S. Pott et. al., (Leiden, 2003), p. 16. Fiammetta Palladini’s monumental study of Barbeyrac 
in the Berlin Refuge came too late to be considered in this dissertation: Die Berliner Huguenotten und der 
Fall Barbeyrac: Orthodoxe und Sozinianer im Refuge (1685-1720), (Leiden, 2011). 
27 There were a number of different editions of both texts produced during Barbeyrac’s lifetime. Le droit 
de la nature et des gens first appeared in 1706 (Amsterdam), a revised and augmented edition followed in 
1712 (Amsterdam), two pirated editions in 1712 and 1732 (Amsterdam and Basle, respectively) and a 
final revised and augmented edition in 1734 (Amsterdam), subject of a further reprint in 1740 (London). 
Les devoirs de l’homme et du citoyen first appeared in 1707 (Amsterdam), a pirated edition followed in 
1708 (Luxembourg) and revised and augmented third, fourth and fifth editions in 1715, 1718 and 1734-
1735 respectively (all Amsterdam), and a final amended sixth edition in 1741 (London). For full 
bibliographical details of the principal edition of each text used here, see ‘A Note on References’ and 
‘Abbreviations’.  
28 Gerard Noodt, ‘Des droits de la puissance souveraine, & du vrai sense de la loi roiale du peuple 
Romain’ and ‘Discours sur la liberté de conscience: où l’on fait voir, que, par le droit de la nature, & des 
gens, la religion n’est point soûmise à l’autorité humaine’. First published in 1707 (Amsterdam), revised 
and augmented in 1714 (Amsterdam) and later included within Barbeyrac’s 1731 Recueil de discours, 
Vol. 1. (see fn. 38 below for full bibliographical details). All references in this thesis are taken from this 
latter edition.  
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Barbeyrac followed these early translations with his own treatise on the subject of 
gaming, the Traité du jeu, a text that he proudly declared to be held in high esteem by 
Prince Eugene of Savoye.29 It was also during his Berlin period that Barbeyrac began on 
his enterprise to translate the sermons of the late Archbishop of Canterbury, John 
Tillotson (1630-1694), after having learnt the English language from an English Bible 
and dictionary gifted to him by Locke.30 However, having always constituted ‘an 
exception, rather than the rule, of the Berlin Refugees’ and considering himself 
underappreciated as a man of letters, Barbeyrac decided to bid farewell to Berlin in 
1710, accompanied by his wife Hélène Chauvin, whom he had married in 1702. He had 
been offered the chair of law and history at the Académie de Lausanne, a position that 
he officially took up in early 1711.31 For Barbeyrac, the move represented something of 
a homecoming to a place where he always considered himself among kindred spirits.32 
 
During his time in Lausanne, Barbeyrac produced only a handful of new publications. 
These were mostly short discourses, originally delivered as academic orations, intended 
for the edification of both public officials and young students. Of these, it is his public 
addresses as Rector of the Académie that are of greatest interest to this thesis: namely, 
his 1714 ‘Discours sur l’utilité des lettres et des sciences par rapport au bien de l’état’, 
his 1715 ‘Discours sur la permission des loix’ and his 1716 ‘Discours sur la bénéfice 
des loix’.33 This period also saw Barbeyrac produce his 1716 ‘Jugement d’un anonyme 
                                                
29 Barbeyrac, ‘Mémoire sur la vie’, p. 83. Barbeyrac’s Traité du jeu first appeared in 1709 (Amsterdam), 
later revised and augmented, including the addition of a number of important appendices, in 1737 
(Amsterdam). For full bibliographical details of the edition used here, see the ‘A Note on References’ and 
‘Abbreviations’.  
30 Barbeyrac’s enthusiasm for the task of translating Tillotson’s sermons – the last volume of which he 
merely supervised – waned over the years. John Tillotson, Sermons sur diverses matieres importantes, 
par feu Mr. Tillotson, 6 Volumes, (Amsterdam, 1708-1744). Barbeyrac conducted a brief correspondence 
with Locke towards the end of the latter’s life. In the second of three surviving letters, Barbeyrac thanks 
Locke for the offer of an English Bible and dictionary. Barbeyrac to Locke (Berlin 06.01.1703). Accessed 
via: The Electronic Enlightenment (www.e-enlightenment.com), ID: lockjoOU0070727_1key001cor.  
31 Martin Muslow, ‘Views of the Berlin Refuge: Scholarly Projects, Literary Interests, Marginal Fields’, 
in The Berlin Refuge 1680-1780, p. 27; Fiammetta Palladini, ‘Farewell to Berlin: Two Newly Discovered 
Letters by Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744)’, in History of European Ideas 33 (2007), p. 309.  
32 Barbeyrac, ‘Mémoire sur la vie’, p. 84.  
33 The former discourse, first published in 1714 (Geneva), was subsequently reprinted in 1715 
(Amsterdam) and in the 1731 Recueil de discours, Vol. 2. The latter two discourses were first published 
(respectively) in 1715 and 1716 (Geneva) and reprinted in 1715 and 1716 (Amsterdam). Both discourses 
were included in an appendix to the 1718 edition of Les devoirs (and all subsequent editions thereafter). 
This thesis refers to the modern reprints available in Barbeyrac, Écrits de droit et de morale. 
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avec des réflexions du traducteur’, a critical engagement with Leibniz in defence of the 
Pufendorf’s theory of natural law.34  
 
In Lausanne, Barbeyrac once again fell foul of the ecclesiastical authorities, becoming 
entangled in the affair over the signing of the Formula Consensus. The Formula 
Consensus, a confession of faith that all members of the Académie were required to 
subscribe to, had long been a point of controversy. As Rector of the Académie, 
Barbeyrac allowed those in his charge to qualify their signature with the words 
‘quantenus Scripturae consentit’, that is to say, ‘insofar as Scripture agrees’. Once 
again, Barbeyrac came under fire from powerful opponents, this time for licensing 
religious heterodoxy. Writing to Turrettini, his long time friend and one of the most 
significant opponents to the Formula Consensus in this period, Barbeyrac defended his 
decision, claiming that ‘unless one renounces Protestantism, every signature, to 
whatever Human Document that it may be, carries this restriction’.35 For Barbeyrac, at 
stake was ‘the honest liberty to follow the light of one’s Conscience’ free from the 
‘tyrannical reign’ of orthodox theologians.36 In 1717, frustrated by the doctrinal 
intransigence he came up against in Lausanne, Barbeyrac decided to leave a town for 
which he professed a great love in order to take up the chair of law at the University of 
Groningen in the Netherlands.  
 
Settled in Groningen, Barbeyrac resumed the labour that he had begun in Lausanne, his 
translation of Grotius’s seminal natural law treatise. Entitled Le droit de la guerre et de 
                                                
34 Barbeyrac’s ‘Jugement d’un anonyme’ was originally appended to the 1718 edition of Les devoirs, 
together with the two discourses on laws mentioned in the previous footnote. References to Barbeyrac’s 
commentary are to the reprint in Écrits de droit et de morale. For the sake of clarity and consistency 
within the footnotes and the main body of the text, all references to Leibniz’s ‘Opinion on the Principles 
of Pufendorf (1706)’, as well as other relevant works by Leibniz, are taken from the English translations 
in Leibniz: Political Writings, ed. and trans. P. Riley, (Cambridge, 1988). For further context to the 
publication and reception of this essay, see Chapter 2, pp. 68-70.  
35 Barbeyrac to Turrettini, (Lausanne, 24.11.1715), Ms. 484 (n. 192), in the archives at the Bibliothèque 
de Genève: ‘à moins que de renoncer au Protestanisme, toute signature, de quelque Ecrit Humain que ce 
soit, emporte cette restriction’. For a detailed summary of the contents of the letter see: Maria-Cristina 
Pitassi, Inventaire critique de la correspondance de Jean-Alphonse Turrettini, Volume III: Inventaire 
Chronologique 1714-1726, (Paris, 2009), pp. 130-131. On Barbeyrac’s involvement with the affair of the 
Formula Consensus and its effects on his prospects in Lausanne, see Meylan, Jean Barbeyrac, pp. 104-
108. On the wider Swiss debate over the Formula Consensus and Turrettini’s role as one of its key 
opponents, see Martin I. Klauber, Between Reformed Scholasticism and Pan-Protestantism: Jean-
Alphonse Turretin (1671-1737) and Enlightened Orthodoxy at the Academy of Geneva (Selinsgrove, 
1994), Chapter 5, pp. 143-164. 
36 Barbeyrac to Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, (Groningen, 15.01.1718), Ms. IS 2024/XIV/7, in the archives of 
the Bibliothèque Cantonale et Universitaire Lausanne: ‘honnête liberté de suivre les lum. de sa 
Conscience’ and ‘régne tyranniquement’. 
  
21 
 
la paix, it was published in 1724, shortly after his annotated Latin edition of Grotius’s 
original text, published in 1720.37 Barbeyrac produced a number of other translations 
during this period, mostly at the behest of influential personages. A number of these 
translations were collated together with several of his own works and his earlier 
translations of Noodt’s two discourses in the 1731 Recueil de discours.38 In 1744, these 
efforts were followed by his last major natural law translation, Cumberland’s Traité 
philosophique des loix naturelles, although Barbeyrac’s own commentary to the text 
was far sparser than in his previous natural law translations.39  
 
In Groningen, just as in Lausanne and in Berlin, Barbeyrac remained a vociferous 
opponent of ecclesiastical intolerance and religious dogmatism. Intervening in a debate 
over the baptism ceremony, Barbeyrac opposed both the Groningen civil authorities and 
the consistory of the Flemish church by insisting on the respect owed by public 
ministers of religion to civil magistrates.40 He chose to take up this topic in his first 
public address as Rector of the University in 1721; an address originally delivered and 
published in Latin as ‘Oratio de magistratu forte peccante’, later translated into French 
and included in his Recueil de discours as ‘Discours sur la question, s’il est permis 
d’echaffauder en chaire le magistrat, qui a commis quelque faute?’.41 It was also during 
his Groningen period that Barbeyrac wrote a systematic account of his objections to the 
authority wielded by intolerant and avaricious ecclesiastics, both through history and in 
his own time. The resulting work, Traité de la morale des peres de l'eglise (1728), 
provided his most extensive treatment of the dangers of doctrinal instransigence and the 
imposition of a strict orthodoxy by the dominant church, whether Reformed or Catholic.  
 
Barbeyrac’s Groningen years also marked an upsurge in his activities as a journalist. He 
wrote a considerable number of reviews and commentaries, submitted anonymously, on 
                                                
37 For full bibliographical details of Barbeyrac’s French translation of Grotius, Le droit de la guerre et de 
la paix, see ‘Abbreviations’. The Latin edition was Hugo Grotii de Jure belli ac pacis libri tres, 
(Amsterdam, 1720).  
38 Jean Barbeyrac, Recueil de discours sur diverses matieres importantes; traduits ou composez par Jean 
Barbeyrac, 2 Volumes, (Amsterdam, 1731). 
39 For full bibliographical details of Barbeyrac’s translation of Cumberland, Traité philosophique des loix 
naturelles, see ‘Abbreviations’. 
40 Meylan, Jean Barbeyrac, p. 131 
41 Jean Barbeyrac, ‘Discours sur la question, s’il est permis d’echaffauder en chaire le magistrat, qui a 
commis quelque faute?’, in Recueil de discours, Vol. 2. The Latin ‘Oratio de magistratu forte peccante, e 
pulpitis sacris non traducendo’ was first published in 1721 (Groningen), reprinted in 1723 (Erfurt) and 
1724 (Tubingen), and finally appended to the fifth edition of Le droit de la nature et des gens (1734).  
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both his own works and those of his contemporaries for various European journals, 
above all, for the Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savants de l’Europe. Bruno 
Lagarrigue has recently documented Barbeyrac’s involvement as one of the most 
prolific journalists of this journal in its early phase.42  
 
Although Barbeyrac spent the longest period of his career in Groningen – 27 years – it 
is probably the least well known part of his life. Philippe Meylan tells us that Barbeyrac 
was an isolated figure in the Netherlands, refusing to learn Dutch and making few 
friends amongst his colleagues or within the local Huguenot community. During the 
later years, Barbeyrac lost some of his oldest and closest colleagues within the Republic 
of Letters, in particular Turretini, Noodt and Le Clerc. The esteem and affection that 
Barbeyrac felt for all three scholars is evident in his letter ‘A Monsieur Turrettin’ and 
his ‘Eloges historiques’ of Noodt and Le Clerc.43  
 
Withdrawing into the safe haven provided by his private library, a collection that he had 
lovingy built since his early days in Berlin, his final years became a ‘long and dreary 
effort to write’.44 He also lost his wife, his son Antoine and his daughter Esther during 
this period, leaving only his granddaughter Henriette-Hélène when he himself passed 
away on the 3rd May 1744. 
                                                
42 Bruno Lagarrigue, Un temple de la culture européenne (1728-1753): l’histoire externe de la 
Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savants de l’Europe, (Nijmegen, 1993), esp. pp. 49-59. For 
Meylan’s list of Barbeyrac’s journal articles, including journals other than the Bibliothèque raisonnée, see 
Jean Barbeyrac, pp. 247-248.  
43 Jean Barbeyrac, ‘A Monsieur Turrettin’, in Sermons sur diverses matieres importantes, Vol 1; ‘Eloge 
historique de Mr. Noodt’, in Recueil de discours, Vol. 2; ‘Eloge historique de feu Mr. Jean Le Clerc’, 
(Amsterdam, 1736) [published anonymously].  
44 Meylan, Jean Barbeyrac, p. 152: ‘un long et morne effort de plume’.  
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Chapter One 
The Foundation of Natural Law 
 
I 
Introduction 
 
‘The most common experience of Life, and a little reflection on ourselves and the 
objects that surround us on all sides, are sufficient to furnish even the most simple 
people with the general ideas of Natural Law and the true foundations of all our 
Duties’.1 For those of learning and insight, natural morality should be studied as a 
science whose principles ‘may be readily deduced by following a series of inferences in 
a demonstrative manner’.2 This basic idea, that morality is self-evident and consists of 
basic duties accessible to every individual capable of reasoned reflection, lies at the 
heart of Barbeyrac’s theory of natural law. There is no need, he claims, for any 
individual to ‘seek after the impenetrable secrets of nature’, nor to ‘descend into 
Metaphysical speculations’, nor to ‘consult any other Master than his own Heart’.3 
Alluding here to the Pauline idea of the moral law written on the heart and borne 
witness to by conscience, Barbeyrac sets out to establish that not only is morality self-
evident but it also goes hand in hand with true religion.4 To this end, quoting the words 
of the neo-Stoic classicist translators M. and Mme. Dacier (1651-1722; 1647-1720), 
Barbeyrac claims that: ‘It is certain that Morality is the daughter of Religion, that one 
follows the same path as the other, and that the perfection of the former is the measure 
of the perfection of the latter’.5 The second basic idea of Barbeyrac’s theory of natural 
law, therefore, is that an essential harmony exists between the truths of morality and 
religion; a harmony that an attentive conscience cannot fail to apprehend.  
                                                
1 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §1: ‘L’experience le plus commune de la Vie, & un peu de réflexion sur 
soi-même & sur les objets qui nous environnent de toutes parts, suffisent pour fournir aux personnes les 
plus simples, les idées de la Loi Naturelle, & les vrais fondemens de tous nos Devoirs’.  
2 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §2: ‘on en déduira aisément, par des consequences liées les unes avec les 
autres d’une maniere démonstrative’.  
3 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §1: ‘de rechercher les secrets impénétrables de la Nature’ and ‘de 
s’enfoncer dans les spéculations Métaphysiques’ and ‘consulter d’autre Maître que son propre Coeur’.  
4 Barbeyrac alludes here to Romans 2.15, a passage that he frequently cites in his writings. See, for 
example, Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.1.4, Note 2. Cf. Chapter 4, pp. 120-121.  
5 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §6: ‘Il est certain, que la MORALE est la fille de la RELIGION, que elle 
marche d’un pas égal avec elle, & que la perfection de celle-ci est la mesure de la perfection de celle-là’. 
Cf. M. and Mme. Dacier, ‘Préface’, in Reflexions morales de l’Empereur Marc Antonin, 2nd Edition, 2 
Volumes, (Amsterdam, 1691), Vol. 1, p. 2. M. and Mme. Dacier claim that this principle follows from the 
idea of natural law as an immutable, divine law.   
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Taking these ideas as a starting point, the current chapter elucidates the premises and 
structure of Barbeyrac’s theory of natural law: namely, (i) that these basic ideas had 
been obfuscated in the history of moral teaching; (ii) that the principles of natural 
religion underpin both natural law and revealed religion; (iii) that individual conscience 
is the moral conduit between man and God and the source of authoritative moral 
judgements; (iv) that natural law has three parts, one of which brings individual duties 
to God to the fore. Barbeyrac develops these arguments mainly in the commentaries to 
his two Pufendorf translations, Le droit de la nature et des gens and Les devoirs de 
l’homme et du citoyen, together with his Pufendorf ‘Préface’, a substantial work in its 
own right where he establishes the principles necessary for his own theory of natural 
law and offers an account of the history of morality.  
 
It was these works that originally established his reputation as a ‘savant’ within both the 
Huguenot Diaspora and the Republic of Letters. But what prompted the young refugié 
to launch his scholarly career and present his own theory of natural law by translating 
an author whose own natural law theory purposefully excluded the fundamental ideas 
that Barbeyrac himself was so keen to establish? A number of circumstantial reasons 
may have contributed to his early interest in Pufendorf: his engagement with 
Pufendorf’s texts as a young student in Lausanne; his residence in Berlin, where 
Pufendorf’s influence was already well-established among Germanic and Latinate 
audiences; the enduring interest in natural law among the leading intellectuals of the 
wider Huguenot Diaspora; the perceived need for an ‘enlightened’ Pufendorf translation 
for a Francophone audience; and finally and no doubt most importantly, Barbeyrac’s 
personal conviction that ‘Pufendorf had taken the right path in his explication of natural 
law, and one could hardly do better than building on his principles’.6  
 
The appeal of Pufendorf’s natural law theory for Barbeyrac, and the Huguenot Diaspora 
more generally, lay in Pufendorf’s powerful statement of a desacrilised civil authority, 
the latter having no right or need to interfere in individual religious belief beyond the 
                                                
6 Meylan, Jean Barbeyrac, p. 39; Hochstrasser, ‘The Claims of Conscience’, p. 17; Sandra Pott, 
‘Préface’, in The Berlin Refuge 1680-1780: Learning and Science in European Context, ed. S. Pott et. al. 
(Leiden, 2003), p. x; Barbeyrac in a letter to Desmaizeaux, Berlin 7th May 1707, in Bulletin historique et 
littéraire, Vol. 15, (Paris, 1866), p. 244: ‘Pufendorf a pris le bon chemin dans l’explication de droit 
naturel, et qu’on pourra guère que bâtir sur ses principes’.  
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requirements of social peace. In effect, for Barbeyrac, Pufendorf had disentangled the 
different spheres of human authority: civil, religious and moral. Barbeyrac seizes on the 
basic structure offered by Pufendorf in this regard, but argues for a very different 
balance between these potentially competing spheres of authority, above all in granting 
more extensive rights and duties to individual conscience than Pufendorf’s original 
theory allowed for. Thus, from the very outset, within his Pufendorf commentaries and 
in the ‘Préface’ Barbeyrac ‘builds’ a theory of natural law quite different from the one 
that he was originally bequeathed; and it is this Barbeyracian vision of natural law that 
is subsequently developed across the different genres of his scholarly writings. His 
stated intention to ‘build’ on Pufendorf’s principles and his claims that he is merely 
drawing out implications already present in Pufendorf’s texts are thus quite 
disingenuous. It is these differences, however, that demand that we look at Barbeyrac as 
more than just an interpreter of Pufendorf, that is, as a theorist of natural law in his own 
right.  
 
II 
Barbeyrac’s History of Morality 
 
Barbeyrac’s theory of natural law begins with the history of morality in his Pufendorf 
‘Préface’. ‘It must be admitted’, Barbeyrac claims there, ‘that, to the shame of Mankind, 
this [Moral] Science, which ought to be the utmost concern of Men, and the object of all 
their studies, has found itself, in all times, very much neglected’.7 Barbeyrac considers 
this state of affairs to be all the more reprehensible given that the basic principles of 
morality are ‘easy to discover, and proportionate to the capabilities of all sorts of 
Intellects’, evidenced by the fact that even the most simple minded people show in their 
daily conduct that they possess ‘sufficiently just and sufficiently extended ideas in 
matters of Morality’.8 Drawing heavily on Lockean epistemology, Barbeyrac argues that 
these self-evident moral precepts are capable of demonstration by virtue of the 
necessary correlation between certain ideas, for example, property and injustice, that in 
turn gives rise to certain rules, e.g., that ‘there can be no injustice where there is no 
                                                
7 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §5: ‘Il faut l’avouer, à la honte du Genre Humain, cette Science qui devoit 
être la grande affaire des Hommes, & l’objet de toutes leurs recherches, se trouve de tout tems 
extrêmement negligée’.  
8 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §1: ‘faciles à découvrir, & proportionnez à la portée de toutes sortes 
d’Esprits’ and ‘des idées assez droites & assez étenduës en matiere de Morale’.  
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property’.9 Individual moral reasoning, in turn, establishes the relationship that 
necessarily arises between these moral precepts and particular human actions. For those 
of greater learning and insight, it should therefore be easy to deduce all the duties of 
man through demonstrative reasoning.  
 
Rejecting what he takes to be the principal sceptical challenges to this idea of morality 
as a demonstrative science, Barbeyrac argues that, on the contrary, the reason why the 
proper study of morality has floundered so much through the ages does not come from 
the uncertainty or obscurity of moral science itself, but rather is the result of the 
prejudice of engrained customs, poor education and the passions.10 Yet the 
demonstrative character of morality ensures that it may also be recovered. The 
possibility for its recovery consists in the reforming power of a proper education, the 
institution of proper customs and temperance of the passions. The idea that lies behind 
this claim is that the natural light of morality may be corrupted or obscured but in itself 
it is always clear and true. The task that Barbeyrac sets himself is to elucidate the proper 
foundations of this natural morality, in part by laying bare the reasons for its 
obfuscation at the hands of others through history. As Tim Hochstrasser has shown, by 
the time that Barbeyrac composed his Pufendorf ‘Préface’, the use of histories of 
morality as polemical interjections in arguments about ‘true’ morality was already well-
established within the natural law tradition.11 
 
                                                
9 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §2: ‘Il ne sauroit y avoir de l’Injure où il n’y a point de Proprieté’. Cf. John 
Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding [hereafter Essay], ed. P. Nidditch, (Oxford, 1975), 
4.3.18. The discussion here owes a considerable debt to Tim Hochstrasser’s argument concerning 
Barbeyrac’s use of Lockean epistemological premises and the connection in Barbeyrac’s thought between 
these premises and his concept of conscience: ‘Conscience and Reason’, p. 294. 
10 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §3-5. It is important to note here that the question of whether the attempt to 
rebut ethical scepticism constituted the defining feature of Barbeyrac’s history of morality – and modern 
natural law in general – has been hotly debated in recent scholarship. See, on the one hand, James Moore, 
‘Natural Law and the Pyrrhonian Controversy’, in Philosophy and Science in the Scottish Enlightenment, 
ed. P. Jones, (Edinburgh, 1988) and Richard Tuck, ‘The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law’, in The 
Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. A. Pagden, (Cambridge, 1990) and, on the 
other hand, Knud Haakonssen, ‘The Moral Conservatism of Natural Rights’, in Natural Law and Civil 
Sovereignty, ed. I. Hunter and D. Saunders, (Basingstoke, 2002) and Petter Korkman, Barbeyrac and 
Natural Law, Chapter 1, pp. 81-115. Haakonssen’s rejection of Tuck’s interpretation of Grotius and the 
foundation of ‘modern’ theory of natural law represents a development in his own thought on the matter. 
Cf. Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, pp. 61-62. 
11 Tim Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, Chapter 1, esp. pp. 14-23. On the self-conscious creation of 
histories of morality in the early modern period, see also J. B. Schneewind, ‘No Discipline, No History: 
The Case of Moral Philosophy’, in History and the Disciplines: The Reclassification of Knowledge in 
Early Modern Europe, ed. D.R. Kelley, (Rochester, 1997) and Martin Muslow, ‘Gundling vs. Buddeus: 
Competing Models of the History of Philosophy’, trans. C. Metheun, also in History and the Disciplines.   
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Barbeyrac identifies public ministers of religion and laic savants as lying under a 
particular duty to devote themselves to the study of morality and to educate others in its 
basic principles.12 Yet the basic idea that runs through his history of morality is that 
while some small kernel of truth may be found in the writings of almost all moral 
philosophers through the ages, for the most part, both lay and ecclesiastical thinkers 
alike have proved to be poor moral guides in this vital enterprise. He reserves his 
strongest invectives for the early church fathers. However, even where he finds much 
that is praiseworthy, his survey of the moral teachings of many lay pagan philosophers 
of both the Orient and Occident also sees him take up a critical stance to those ideas that 
he considers to contribute to the corruption and obfuscation of morality: for example, 
the abstract metaphysics that are mixed in amongst the many excellent precepts found in 
Plato’s writings, the absence of religion in Aristotle’s nonetheless commendably 
systematic moral philosophy and the abhorrent materialist principles of Epicurus that 
made utility the cornerstone of his morality.13  
 
In constructing the narrative for both his own and for Pufendorf’s ‘recovery’ of ‘true’ 
morality, Barbeyrac retains this critical stance and refrains from wholly subscribing to 
the moral system of particular lay philosophers, both pagan and modern. Nonetheless, 
Barbeyrac draws a trajectory within which he commends Socrates’s method of inquiry, 
‘the wisest Philosopher of all Pagan Antiquity’; the Stoic school in general, of whom he 
says that ‘nothing is more beautiful than their Morality, considered in itself’; Cicero, 
whose Offices is ‘the best Moral Treatise left to us from the whole of Antiquity’, along 
with the writings of the other Roman ‘Stoics’ and Roman jurisconsults; Francis Bacon, 
who initiated ‘the re-establishment of the Sciences’; Grotius, who ‘broke the ice’ as the 
first modern natural lawyer worthy of repute; and Pufendorf, who finally succeeded in 
‘shaking off the tyrannical yoke’ of Scholasticism to provide a systematic account of the 
fundamental principles of natural morality, lauded by all men of learning and 
penetration, above all the ‘illustrious’ Locke and the ‘enlightened’ Le Clerc.14 Yet 
                                                
12 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface, DNG, §6.  
13 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface, DNG, §9-10, §21, §24, §26. For an extended discussion of Barbeyrac’s critique of 
the early church fathers, in which he lays responsibility for the corruption of both ‘true’ religion and 
‘true’ morality at their door, see Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
14 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface, DNG, §20 ‘le plus sage Philosophe de toute l’Antiquité Payenne’; §27 ‘rien n’est 
plus beau que leur Morale, considérée en elle-même’; §28 ‘le meilleur Traité de Morale que nous ayïons 
de toute l’Antiquité’; §29 ‘le rétablissement des Sciences’ and ‘a rompu la glace’; §30 ‘secouer le joug 
tyrannique’. For the influence of Stoicism on Barbeyrac’s thought and his interpretation of Stoic thought, 
see Christopher Brooke, ‘How the Stoics became Atheists’, in The Historical Journal 49:2 (2006). This 
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Barbeyrac reserves his highest esteem for the ‘purity’ of the moral philosophy of Jesus 
Christ, which stands alone as the sole moral system ‘wholly conformed to Reason, and 
the true interests of Mankind’.15 At the heart of Barbeyrac’s system of natural morality 
is thus the idea that morality and religion, reason and revelation, stand together in 
perfect harmony and reciprocity.16 
 
III 
Natural Religion 
 
The perfect harmony that Barbeyrac argues for between morality and religion, 
specifically the Christianity of the Gospel, rests upon his system of natural religion: ‘In 
essence, the fundamental principles of Natural Religion, which ought to be the basis of 
all Religions, are also the most solid, or rather the sole foundation of the Science of 
Morality’.17 For Barbeyrac, doctrinal religion in all its diverse instantiations and true 
morality, i.e., natural law, share the same foundation and thus, to a certain extent, the 
same purpose; namely, to inspire men to virtue and lead them away from vice.18 By 
explicitly grounding his theory of natural law in the principles of natural religion, 
Barbeyrac was indicating his adherence to the Stoic belief that there are a certain 
number of common beliefs, comprising the essentials of religion, that may be found at 
the heart of the vast number of diverse – and prima facie conflicting – religious 
doctrines.19 For Barbeyrac, it follows from this that the truths of natural religion must be 
accessible to human reason and thus capable of rational demonstration. Since the 
principles of natural religion provide the foundation for both morality and revealed 
religion, reason gives individuals access to both, an unorthodox belief closely 
associated, in Barbeyrac’s times, with the charge of Socinianism. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
article, following minor revisions, has been recently reprinted in Brooke’s more extensive survey of Stoic 
thought in the early modern period: Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to 
Rousseau, (Princeton, 2012).  
15 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’ DNG, §8: ‘entirement conformes à la Raison & aux véritables intérets du Genre 
Humain’.  
16 Cf. Chapter 4, p. 119.   
17 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §6: ‘En effet, les principes fondamentaux de la Religion Naturelle, qui doit 
être la base de toutes les Religions, sont le plus ferme, ou plûtôt l’unique fondement de la Science des 
Moeurs’.  
18 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.4.3, Note 4.  
19 B. A. Gerish, ‘Natural and Revealed Religion’, in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century 
Philosophy, ed. K. Haakonssen, (Cambridge, 2006), p. 647.  
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For Barbeyrac, the principles of natural religion may be discovered by ‘sincere lovers of 
the Truth’ who seek ‘a just medium between the simple minded presumption of a 
resolute Dogmatist… and the false modesty of an excessive Pyrrhonian’.20 First 
amongst these truths is the knowledge that all rational persons have of ‘a Creator 
infinite in Power, Wisdom and Goodness’.21 This is a necessary truth, Barbeyrac claims, 
because ‘without the Divinity, there would be nothing that could impose the 
indispensible necessity of acting or not acting in a certain manner’, that is to say, there 
could be no genuine moral obligation without which, in turn, there could be no morality 
and no religion.22 To establish that this is also a self-evident truth, Barbeyrac turns to 
Locke, who he credits, together with Le Clerc, with offering ‘the strongest and most 
natural proofs’ that God exists and that He is a providential God.23 The Lockean 
argument that Barbeyrac refers to here is the claim that the existence of cogitative 
beings, such as man, logically entails the ‘necessary Existence of an eternal Mind’ upon 
whom ‘all other knowing Beings that have a beginning’ necessarily depend, both for 
their power and their knowledge; thus establishing the omniscience, power and 
providence of God.24  
 
The claim that the idea of a providential God is self-evident, i.e., a demonstrative truth 
accessible to reason because of its logical necessity, is indicative of its common 
acceptance at the time. A much more hotly contested issue was the limit of natural 
knowledge of God, that is to say, how extensive is the distance between God and man in 
the postlapsarian state? In this debate, Barbeyrac wanted to position himself between, 
on one hand, Pufendorf’s claim – and thus implicitly Hobbes’s – that this is a gulf 
which precludes any certain natural knowledge of God beyond the fact of his existence 
and, on the other, Leibniz’s claim that man and God form a moral community such that 
the difference between human and divine reason is one of degree not kind. Rejecting the 
idea that man and God form a moral community, Barbeyrac nonetheless wants to argue 
that human reason is capable of securing a more comprehensive idea of the divine 
nature than Pufendorf allows for; a move that is essential for his subsequent arguments 
                                                
20 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §3: ‘Les amateurs sinceres de la Vérite’ and ‘un juste milieu entre la sotte 
présomption d’un Dogmatique decisive… & la fausse modestie d’un Pyrrhonien outré’.  
21 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §3: ‘un Créateur infini en Puissane, en Sagesse & en Bonté’.  
22 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §6: ‘Sans la Divinité, on ne voit rien qui impose une necessité 
indispensible d’agir ou de ne pas agir d’une certaine maniere’. This argument is developed at length in the 
subsequent chapter.  
23 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.20, Note 1: ‘les preuves les plus fortes & les plus naturelles’.  
24 Locke, Essay, 4.10.12.  
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concerning the authority of conscience and thus a theory of natural law that comprises 
duties to God as well as to oneself and others.25  
 
Barbeyrac takes it for granted that, in speaking of the divine nature, it is impossible 
knowingly to attribute the slightest imperfection to God. Yet, he adds, this is ‘relative to 
the lights of each individual’.26 People often lack the penetration necessary to appreciate 
the profundity of divine nature, even those of greatest learning, who apply themselves 
with the greatest care to this question; a state of affairs exacerbated by the imperfections 
of human language, which make it poorly suited to the task of expressing the divine 
nature.27 Moreover, all efforts to understand the divine nature derive from reasoned 
reflection on God’s actions within the human forum, thus the essential, profound nature 
of God necessarily remains beyond human cognition. Setting aside such subtleties, 
Barbeyrac alleges that there are certain gross imperfections that it is always 
reprehensible to attribute to God: namely, pagan superstitions that attribute ‘to God, not 
only the needs, but also the Weaknesses and even the Vices of Men’, and those 
contemporaries that ‘make God the author of Sin… or those who suppose that He 
requires them to do things that they cannot do without sin, such as being party to 
Persecution in the name of Religion’.28 For Barbeyrac, the former is a fault of ignorance, 
arising from a lack of penetration and the absence of any special revelation, whereas the 
latter constitutes a vincible error, contrary to both natural law and Christian revelation.  
 
In his most considerable departure from Pufendorf, Barbeyrac also claims that, while 
Pufendorf is right that the certain hope of salvation and the distinct knowledge of the 
means that God has establish to achieve it may only be known through special 
revelation, human reason alone is sufficient to establish ‘an indefinite persuasion of a 
                                                
25 On debates over the nature of God in the early modern period, see Thomas M. Lennon, ‘Theology and 
the God of the Philosophers’, in The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, ed. D. 
Rutherford, (Cambridge, 2006); on the implications of these debates for theories of natural law in the 
early modern period, see Knud Haakonssen, ‘Divine/Natural Law Theories in Ethics’, in The Cambridge 
History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy, ed. M. Ayers and D. Garber, (Cambridge, 2003).  
26 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.4.5, Note 1: ‘relative aux lumieres de chacun’.  
27 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.4.5, Note 1; DNG, 2.1.3, Note 3.  
28 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.4.5, Note 1: ‘à la Divinité non seulement les besoins, mais encore les Foiblesses & 
les Vices mêmes des Hommes’ and ‘font DIEU auteur du Peché… ou de ceux qui le conçoivent comme 
voulant que les Hommes fassent des choses qu’ils ne peuvent faire sans peché, tels que sont les partisans 
de la Persécution pour cause de Religion’.  
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Life to come, where the Good will be rewarded, and the wicked punished’.29 For 
Barbeyrac, Pufendorf is guilty of improperly excluding the latter ‘indefinite persuasion’ 
from the province of natural law, where the high probability of divine judgement is an 
essential motive for fulfilling one’s duty.30 The authority of reason is supplemented here 
by the testimony of the historical record. For, Barbeyrac alleges, the widespread 
recognition not only of the existence of a providential divinity, or divinities, amongst 
the pagans, but also a belief in the rewards and punishments of an afterlife indicate that 
these truths constitute the universal principles of natural religion. In one of his most 
extensive notes to Le droit de la nature, Barbeyrac argues against Bayle, therefore, that 
a society of idolaters, for example the pagans, who recognised ‘the true principles of 
Natural Religion, despite mixing them with many falsities’, is always preferable to a 
society of atheists.31 This is because without these basic principles of natural religion, 
there can be no morality and thus no compelling reason to observe one’s moral duties.  
 
In emphasising and considerably expanding upon the principles of natural religion that 
Barbeyrac found already established in Pufendorf’s original texts, Barbeyrac intended to 
show that natural law could not be restricted to the human forum alone, as Pufendorf 
had claimed. Barbeyrac had thus brought the divine forum back in to the picture. The 
consequences of this for his own system of natural law were far-reaching. For one, it 
allowed him to insist that natural law cannot be restricted to exterior actions alone, but 
that it also necessarily comprises the internal movements of the soul.32 Of these, God 
alone is judge, just as He is judge of the observance or non-observance of all duties of 
natural law within the divine forum. It was also from this augmented perspective of 
natural law that Barbeyrac was able to develop his comprehensive concept of 
conscience as a naturalised moral link between man and God and thus as the source of 
authoritative moral judgement within the human forum.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
29 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.4.8, Note 1: ‘une persuasion vague qu’il y a une Vie à venir, où les Gens-de-bien 
seront récompensez, & les Méchans punis’.  
30 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface de l’auteur’, DHC, §6. Cf. Chapter 2, pp. 66-67.  
31 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.4.3, Note 4: ‘principes véritables de la Religion Naturelle, tout mêlez qu’ils étoient 
parmi bien des faussetez’.  
32 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.1.2, Note 2. 
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IV 
Conscience 
 
It is generally acknowledged that the distinctive character of Barbeyrac’s natural law 
theory derives from the central role that he accords to the concept of conscience as a 
comprehensive moral faculty. Yet precisely because of the extensive and varied use of it 
throughout his writings, it is a complex concept, at times difficult to clearly and fully 
elucidate. Conscience was one of the defining ideas of the Protestant Reformation and 
came to occupy a place of particular prominence not only as a theological concept but 
also as a moral and political one amongst the leading intellectuals of the Huguenot 
Diaspora both before and after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.33 The role that 
Barbeyrac ascribes to conscience is thus deeply rooted in his intellectual and religious 
heritage as a member of the Huguenot Diaspora, where conscience, as the voice of God 
in the heart of each individual, was commonly looked upon as a direct moral bond 
between the man and God; hence the potential for conscience to act as an independent 
and, if attentively followed immutable, faculty of moral judgement.  
 
The position that Barbeyrac adopted in the debate over the nature of conscience 
represents a particular, sustained effort at naturalising the concept, that is to say, 
establishing its veridical character without recourse to the theological principles of 
confessional religion. He does this, as Tim Hochstrasser has shown, by treating 
conscience as coterminous with reason, attributing the same authority to right 
conscience that was traditionally attributed to right reason.34 Conscience is thus both a 
form of knowledge or truth, i.e., natural law itself, and the means of acquiring that same 
knowledge or truth, i.e., a deliberative faculty by virtue of which certain truths become 
known to us and once known become ineluctable principles of action.35 But while 
conscience may be a natural ‘light’ with the immutable principles of natural law 
                                                
33 For the development of the concept of conscience amongst the Huguenot Diaspora, with particular 
attention paid to the influence of natural law on this development, see Tim Hochstrasser, ‘The Claims of 
Conscience’. For a more general overview of the concept of conscience in the Protestant Reformation, 
albeit with a particular focus on the British context, see Edward G. Andrew, Conscience and its Critics: 
Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason and Modern Subjectivity, (Toronto, 2001) and Kevin T. 
Kelly, Conscience: Dictator or Guide A Study in Seventeenth-Century English Protestant Moral 
Theology, (London, 1967).  
34 Hochstrasser, ‘Conscience and Reason’, p. 290.  
35 On the complexities surrounding the concept of reason, see Michel Malherbe, ‘Reason’, in The 
Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy. 
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constituting its content, for Barbeyrac, each individual must acquire this content as a 
form of knowledge or truth through rational reflection. At every turn, Barbeyrac 
therefore vehemently rejects the idea that conscience possesses innately given moral 
knowledge.36  
 
This ties in closely to Barbeyrac’s insistence that morality, i.e., natural law, is a 
demonstrative science. For conscience to be the source of authoritative moral 
judgements, but for the moral principles that these judgements are grounded in to be 
naturally acquired, these truths must be both necessary and self-evident in order that 
they may both be acquired in the first place and will also be recognised by others as 
morally legitimate (and actually be so in the eyes of God too). While reason fulfils this 
same role to a certain point, conscience differs from reason because of the direct moral 
continuity that it implies between man and God; evidenced by the fact that it is God not 
man who remains the master of individual conscience.37 In this way, Barbeyrac imparts 
to conscience a special kind of authority that derives from the divine authority of God’s 
will, expressed in the precepts of natural law. This is conceptually quite distinct from 
the idea of conscience as a self-sufficient faculty of moral judgement subject to the will 
of the individual alone. Hence conscience is only right conscience insofar as it 
unerringly apprehends and adheres to the laws of nature, understood as precepts of the 
divine will. Its purpose is to ensure obedience to these precepts.  
 
There is an important distinction that needs to be made here, however, between the idea 
of right conscience as a criterion of truth and the actual manifestations of individual 
conscience where the veridical character of right conscience must necessarily 
accommodate the fact of human fallibility. Barbeyrac thus identifies the faculty of 
conscience within the individual first and foremost as a faculty of properly reasoned 
moral judgement:  
 
Conscience is the judgement that each individual forms concerning his 
own actions, compared with the idea that he has of a certain Rule, namely 
Law; so that he may determine whether the former are or are not in 
conformity to the latter. I say: compared to the idea that he has of the Law, 
                                                
36 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §3-4 and DNG, 2.3.13, Note 3-5; ‘Discours Préliminaire de l’Auteur’, 
TPLN, §2, Notes 1-3 and §5, Notes 1-2 
37 Cf. Chapter 4, p. 140, fn. 105. 
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and not with the Law itself; because Law can only be the Rule of our 
actions insofar as it is known.38 
 
As Barbeyrac makes clear here, individuals primarily experience conscience through 
their own moral deliberations about whether a particular action accords with the general 
precepts of natural law, that is to say, for individuals, conscience concerns the 
application of the precepts of natural law to the diverse circumstances of individual life. 
Hence, Barbeyrac claims, pace Pufendorf, that while law alone may determine what 
constitutes rightful action, ‘this does not prevent Conscience from being the immediate 
rule of our Actions’.39  
 
In recognising within his definition of conscience the imperfect or incomplete 
knowledge that individuals may posses of the law of nature, where the law is only the 
rule of action insofar as it is known, Barbeyrac implicitly recognises that the 
judgements of individual conscience are always susceptible to the effects of human 
ignorance and fallibility. This is no license, however, for moral imprudence. To guard 
against the danger of such imprudence, Barbeyrac establishes two principles that all 
individuals ought to take into consideration before following what they believe to be the 
determinations of right conscience. First, individuals must consider whether they 
possess ‘the necessary lights and assistance to judge the matter in hand’ and, secondly, 
supposing that they do, whether they have actually made use of them in this instance ‘so 
that one may follow what one’s Conscience suggests without further deliberations’.40 
The individuals that most often fall foul of these conditions in Barbeyrac’s mind are 
men of religion and politics, above all the perpetrators of religious persecution, whose 
judgement is clouded in such matters by their worldly interests. Yet it also seems clear 
that, generally speaking, few individuals beyond a small number of wise and judicious 
moral philosophers such as Barbeyrac and his compatriots in the Republic of Letters 
                                                
38 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.1.5, Note 1: ‘la CONSCIENCE est le júgement que chacun porte de ses propres 
actions, comparées avec les idées qu’il a d’une certaine Régle nommé Loi; ensorte qu’il conclut en lui 
même que les premieres sont ou ne sont pas conformes aux dernieres. Je dis: comparées avec les idées 
qu’il a de la Loi, & non pas avec la Loi même; parceque la Loi ne sçauroit être la Régle de nos actions, 
qu’autant qu’on la connoît’.  
39 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.3.4, Note 3: ‘cela n’empêche pas que la Conscience ne soit la régle immediate de 
nos Actions’.  
40 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.1.5, Note 1: ‘les lumieres & les secours nécessaires pour juger de la chose dont il 
s’agit’ and ‘ensorte qu’on puisse se porter sans autre examen à ce que la Conscience suggére’. Barbeyrac 
offers a nearly identical definition of these principles in DNG, 1.3.4, Note 3.  
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would fulfil these conditions. The principles of natural law may be universally 
applicable and self-evident to all, but moral reasoning itself remains a rarefied art. 
 
Barbeyrac acknowledges the complexities surrounding individual moral judgement, 
above all how closely such judgements approach the criterion of right conscience, in his 
classification of the different forms that these judgements may take, whether prior to or 
subsequent to particular actions. For Barbeyrac, conscience must first be divided into 
decisive or doubtful ‘according to the degree of persuasion that one possesses regarding 
the quality of the proposed action’. Decisive conscience may be further divided into 
demonstrative and probable; demonstrative conscience is founded on demonstrative 
reasoning and thus is ‘always right, or conformed to the Law’, whereas probable 
conscience is founded on credible reasoning, frequently drawn from authority or 
example, that may be ‘either right, or erroneous’ depending on its conformity to the 
law.41 Moreover, Barbeyrac claims that following the movements of decisive conscience 
is a mark of good conscience, and acting against them, bad conscience, regardless of 
whether the moral reasoning itself is right or erroneous; following bad conscience 
always constitutes a sin and ‘indicates a great depth of malice’. Finally, doubtful 
conscience may be either hesitant or scrupulous, both of which require considerable 
caution before any action may be legitimately carried out.42  
 
What we see here in Barbeyrac’s classification of conscience, therefore, is him 
emphasising the idea that it is not erroneous judgement as such that is condemnable in 
the eyes of God but rather an indefensible failure to observe the moral judgements of 
conscience, once apprehended. Erroneous conscience is thus qualitatively different from 
bad conscience. For, while errors in the judgements of conscience may be either 
‘vincible’ or ‘invincible’, both may still reflect a sincere effort to determine the truth. It 
follows from Barbeyrac’s claim that morality is a demonstrative science that individuals 
cannot fall into invincible error about the basic precepts of the law of nature because of 
their self-evident and necessary character. But when the question at hand requires a long 
chain of reasoning, Barbeyrac claims that most people, whether from lack of insight or 
                                                
41 On the different forms of credible evidence for determining justified probabilities in the early modern 
period, see Lorraine Daston, ‘Probability and Evidence’, in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth 
Century Philosophy, esp. pp. 1116-1122.  
42 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.1.5, Note 3: ‘selon le degré de persuasion où l’on est au sujet de la qualité de 
l’action à faire’ and ‘toûjours droite, ou conforme à la Loi’ and ‘ou droite, ou erronée’ and ‘marque un 
grand fonds de malice’.  
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education, will ‘fall without doubt into invincible error; and if they do alight on the 
truth, it is only by chance’. Insofar as it concerns the human forum, however, it does not 
matter whether the error is vincible or invincible because, either way, each individual is 
obliged to follow the light of his (erroneous) conscience, or else ‘directly violate the 
respect owed to the Legislator’, i.e., God. Yet, Barbeyrac says by way of clarification, 
while an individual may be obliged to follow an erroneous conscience, ‘it does not 
follow from this, that it is always excusable to follow the movements of an erroneous 
conscience’ in the eyes of God.43  
 
The conclusion that Barbeyrac is driving towards here is that the moral deliberations of 
conscience, including those of erroneous conscience, can only truly be subject to 
judgement in the divine forum. To this end, Barbeyrac claims that while each individual 
labours under a particular duty to avoid falling into vincible error and to suspend all 
proposed action until greater certainty can be achieved, other individuals, including 
those possessed of religious or civil authority, may only intervene in the moral 
deliberations of conscience through peaceful and solid moral instruction, unless some 
direct harm to society is threatened. This is because the knowledge that any man has of 
the inner moral deliberations of another individual is necessarily limited: ‘It belongs to 
God alone properly and directly to punish vincible error or ignorance, as He alone may 
truly know it’.44 Behind Barbeyrac’s argument here lies the claim that the moral 
judgements of individual conscience, even when erroneous, constitute authoritative 
moral acts within the human forum. This idea is essential to his subsequent defence of 
the rights of erroneous conscience, particularly in matters of religious belief within the 
civil sphere, a contribution to the ongoing debate recently reignited within the Huguenot 
Diaspora by Pierre Bayle.45  
 
                                                
43 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.1.7, Note 1: ‘tombent sans doute dans l’erreur invinciblement; & s’ils rencontrent la 
vérité, ce n’est que par hazard’ and ‘viole directement le respect dû au Législateur’ and ‘il n’ensuit pas de 
là, que l’on soit toûjours excusable en suivant les mouvemens d’une Conscience erronée’.  
44 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.1.7, Note 1: ‘Il n’appartient qu’à DIEU de punir proprement & directement l’erreur 
ou l’ignorance vincible, comme il n’y a que lui qui puisse la bien connoître’.  
45 For a brief overview of both Bayle’s original defence of the rights of erroneous conscience and the 
debate that ensured, see G. Cerny, Theology, Politics and Letters at the Crossroads of European 
Civilization: Jacques Basnage and the Baylean Huguenot Refugees in the Dutch Republic, (Dordrecht, 
1987), pp. 297-306. For the further development of this argument, see Chapter 4, Sections V-VI, esp. pp. 
141-142 on Barbeyrac’s response to Bayle.  
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By establishing the faculty of conscience as the source of authoritative moral 
judgements, Barbeyrac rejects the Pufendorfian idea that natural law ought to be treated 
purely as the moral precursor to civil law. Instead, bringing conscience to the fore, he 
indicates his intention to develop a theory of natural law that puts as much emphasis on 
considerations relating to the divine forum as the human forum. For Barbeyrac, this 
means that the quality of an individual’s inner moral deliberations becomes one of the 
principal concerns of natural law: ‘for intention… is the most essential circumstance’ 
before God, i.e., in the divine forum.46 To this end, individuals are required to 
demonstrate an inner conformity to the law of nature through sincere fidelity to the 
moral judgements of conscience. Barbeyrac thus constructs a moral framework in which 
the authority of individual judgements of conscience, even erroneous ones, may be 
defended within the human forum as duties to God.  
 
The difficulty that Barbeyrac faced was to ensure that the authority that he wanted to 
attribute to the moral judgements of conscience could not subsequently be used to 
justify judgements arising from individual caprice, above all religious enthusiasm and 
unjustified political dissent. By ascribing to conscience considerable moral authority, 
Barbeyrac asserted the primacy of man’s relationship to God; but by insisting that 
conscience must always be constrained by the dictates of natural law, Barbeyrac 
emphasised man’s dependence on God. In the end, the judgements of conscience take 
on a morally authoritative character if and only if they are true expressions of the divine 
will, i.e., natural law. Barbeyrac assumed here that only the foolhardy would risk 
showing contempt for the divine will and putting their hopes for the life to come in 
jeopardy by knowingly disobeying or perverting the dictates of conscience. Hence, also, 
Barbeyrac’s emphasis on moral education and instruction for those without the 
necessary lights to undertake complex moral reasoning. Barbeyrac considered the 
development of his own theory of natural law as a part of this vital pedagogic 
enterprise, helping to enlighten his readers and prevent them falling into error or 
ignorance with respect to their moral rights and duties, apprehended and acted upon 
according to the judgements of conscience.   
 
 
                                                
46 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.7.4, Note 1: ‘Car l’intention… est la circonstance la plus essentielle’.  
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V 
The Three Principles of Natural Law 
 
The preceding discussion has sought to elucidate the foundations of Barbeyrac’s claim 
that morality and religion necessarily unfold together within the framework of natural 
law. From this perspective, natural law becomes a comprehensive moral framework that 
specifies the necessary rights and duties both for individuals’ terrestrial existence in this 
life and in the hope of salvation in the life to come. His idea of conscience, as a moral 
conduit between man and God and the source of authoritative moral judgements, 
establishes natural law as a moral theory concerned with individuals’ inner conduct as 
much as their external acts. Despite his protestations to the contrary, Barbeyrac’s 
reformation of the foundations of natural law marks a clear departure from Pufendorf. 
Barbeyrac’s own theory of natural law arises from his rejection of Pufendorf’s single 
principle of sociability in favour of a triumvirate of principles with the duties owed to 
God – rather than to others – as the primary one.  
 
Barbeyrac’s three principles of natural law follow from the purpose and character of 
natural law itself. For Barbeyrac, natural law may be distinguished from all forms of 
positive law, both human and divine, because it alone is comprised of immutable moral 
principles. This means that natural law must be ‘agreeable to the interests of all Men, in 
all times and in all places, applicable to the infinite difference of individual genius, 
situation and circumstance’ and thus conform ‘to the constitution of human Nature in 
general’. Rebutting Grotius’s claim that there is a separate universal, positive divine law 
revealed to mankind on three separate occasions (immediately after the Creation, after 
the flood and under the Gospel), Barbeyrac argues that any divine law laying claim to a 
universal (and thus immutable) character must, first, fulfil the condition of being 
applicable to all and, second, must be either discoverable by the light of reason alone or 
have been clearly revealed to all peoples. Yet, he argues, however great the moral truth 
contained within the Christian revelation may be, it is an empirical fact that ‘many 
Peoples still do not have knowledge of that Revelation’.47  
                                                
47 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.8.6, Note 1: ‘convenable aux interêts de tous les Hommes, en tout tems & en tout 
lieu, vû la différence infinie de ce que demandent la génie, la situation, & les circonstances particulieres’ 
and ‘conforme à la constitution de la Nature Humaine’ and ‘un grand nombre de Peuples n’ont encore 
aucune connoissance de la Revelation’. See also Grotius, DGP, 1.1.15 and Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.15, 
Notes 3-5.   
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Natural law thus occupies the unique role of specifying the rights and duties incumbent 
on all individuals and applicable to all individuals. It must include all rights and duties 
that are universal, immutable and discoverable by reason alone. It follows from this that 
it must include not only duties owed to others, but also duties to oneself and to God. 
Barbeyrac develops this argument in response to Pufendorf’s claim that all duties of 
natural law can be reduced to a single principle, the sociability principle, according to 
which ‘each individual ought to endeavour to form and to preserve, insofar as it depends 
on him, a peaceful Society with all others’.48 Barbeyrac claims that for Pufendorf the 
duties owed to God and to oneself only enter into the sphere of natural law as 
derivatives of the sociability principle; in the case of the former, as the ‘the most firm 
cement of Human Society’.49 Barbeyrac amended his interpretation of Pufendorf’s 
sociability principle in each of his revised editions of Le droit de la nature, only fully 
parting company with his fellow Pufendorf commentator Titius in the 1734 edition. 
Titius had claimed that lying behind Pufendorf’s sociability principle was an antecedent 
principle of self-love, with Barbeyrac eventually adopting the contrary position and 
defending Pufendorf against an interpretation that would have brought the latter’s 
natural law theory dangerously close to Hobbesian individualism.50 
 
Barbeyrac’s principal concern, however, is to rebut Pufendorf’s claim that there is a 
separate field of natural theology comprised of duties to God, distinct from the field of 
natural law. To this end, Barbeyrac claims that natural law is more extensive than 
Pufendorf allowed for in Le droit de la nature; a truth, he argues, implicitly recognised 
by Pufendorf in other works, above all in Les devoirs, where he devoted a whole chapter 
to the duties of natural religion.51 Barbeyrac’s argument is based on the idea, previously 
established, that natural law comprises all duties discoverable by the light of natural 
reason alone and applicable to all individuals in all particular circumstances. This 
requires not one but three fundamental principles: religion, enlightened self-love and 
sociability. For Barbeyrac, this triumvirate of natural law principles is not only more 
                                                
48 Pufendorf, DNG, 2.3.15: ‘chacun doit etre porté a former et entretenir, autant qu’il dépend de lui, une 
Société paisible avec tous les autres’.  
49 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.15, Note 5: ‘le plus ferme ciment de la Société Humaine’.  
50 Cf. Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.15, Notes 1 & 5 and Barbeyrac, DNG [1706] & DNG [1712], 2.3.15, Notes 1 
& 5. Barbeyrac refers to Titius’ Observationes in Samuelis L. B. de Pufendorfi De officio hominis et civis 
juxta legem naturalem libros duo, (Leipzig, 1703). All references to Titius in this thesis relate to this text.  
51 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.15, Note 5.  
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proper and more natural than Pufendorf’s lone principle of sociability, but it is also 
more ancient. Barbeyrac traces the history of this triumvirate of natural law principles 
back to the Roman Stoics, Cicero and Mark Anthony, and to the teachings of St Paul as 
recorded in the Gospel.52  
 
First and foremost, Barbeyrac supposes, man must be considered ‘as a creature of God’, 
by virtue of which every individual ought to acknowledge that a perpetual moral 
relation exists between himself and God. This relation, he states, ‘is the proper source of 
all Duties of Natural Law, which have God as their object, and which are comprised 
under the name Religion’. Second, whether an individual lives in complete isolation 
from his fellow humans or not, as a creature ‘endowed by his Creator with certain 
Faculties’, he thus lies under certain duties with respect to himself; namely to make use 
of these faculties in accordance with the natural ends for which they were intended. 
Derived directly from the principle of enlightened self-love, these duties comprise, first, 
the duty of self-preservation and, second, the duty to cultivate and perfect one’s 
faculties. Finally, as a creature ‘inclined and even required by his natural condition to 
live in Society with others’, every individual is obliged to do whatever is necessary to 
preserve this society with others and render himself agreeable to them, as stated by the 
principle of sociability. This principle, Barbeyrac claims, may be ‘the most extensive 
and the most fecund’, but in itself, it cannot be regarded as the foundation of all the 
duties of natural law.53 These three principles also give rise, respectively, to the three 
principal virtues: piety, moderation or temperance, and justice.54  
 
The conclusion that Barbeyrac is driving towards here, having laid the necessary 
foundation with his three separate principles of natural law, is precisely the one that 
Pufendorf was trying to forestall with his lone sociability principle: namely, that ‘the 
Duties that Man owes to God always take precedence over all other duties’ and thus 
constitute the ‘first and fundamental part of Morality’.55 In the event of a conflict of 
duties, individuals are thus obliged to fulfil their duties to God before all other duties, 
                                                
52 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.24, Note 1. 
53 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.15, Note 5: ‘comme créature de DIEU’ and ‘est la source propre de tous les 
Devoirs de la Loi Naturelle, qui ont DIEU pour objet, & qui sont compris sous le nom de RELIGION’ 
and ‘doué par son Créateur de certaines Facultez’ and ‘porté & nécessité même par sa condition naturelle 
à vivre en Société avec ses semblables’ and ‘le plus étendu & le plus fécond’.  
54 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.2.13, Note 1.  
55 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.15, Note 5: ‘Les Devoirs de l’Homme envers Dieu l’émportent toûjours sur tous 
les autres’; Barbeyrac, TMP, 5.3: ‘la prémiére & fondamentale partie de la Morale’.  
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both to oneself and to others. Thereafter, the duties of enlightened self-love take 
precedence over those of sociability, unless the latter accrue greater utility. Barbeyrac 
thus constructs a moral framework for his theory of natural law within which he is able 
to assert that ‘the greatest of all interests, and the strongest of all Obligations, or rather 
the one that is the foundation and source of all others’, that is to say, the first and 
fundamental duty of natural law, consists in ‘the indispensible necessity that each 
person is under to follow the light of their conscience’.56 Barbeyrac’s naturalised 
concept of conscience, defined as a faculty of moral judgement, thus comprehends 
within its sphere of judgement a comprehensive field of natural law duties, both internal 
and external, with those related to a sincere belief in and worship of God at the 
forefront.  
 
While Barbeyrac surely intended his argument as a response to the Huguenot 
experience of religious persecution, it must be remembered that he also conceived of his 
own project as a pedagogic enterprise.  Barbeyrac thus grappled with the question of 
what it would mean in practical terms to insist on the primacy of an individual’s duties 
to God and when, if ever, these duties may be dispensed with. For Barbeyrac, the duties 
of natural religion principally consist in worship of God, as both an interior and an 
exterior practice, as well as assent to certain speculative truths; that is to say, the 
principles of natural religion, the most significant of which were elucidated earlier in 
this chapter.57 Worship of God includes the duties of honouring and serving God; 
obedience to His commands; rendering Him homage through prayer and in acts of 
grace; admiring and celebrating His greatness; faithfulness in swearing oaths; and so 
forth.  
 
Specifying the nature of the relationship between interior and exterior worship, 
Barbeyrac states that ‘exterior worship in general is nothing other than a demonstration 
                                                
56 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.8.5, Note 5: ‘le plus grand de tous les intérêts, & la plus forte de toutes les 
Obligations, ou plûtot celle qui est le fondement & la source de toutes les autres’ and ‘la nécessite 
indispensible où chacun est de suivre les lumieres de sa Conscience’. Cf. Chapter 5, p. 178, fn. 119 for 
the full passage quoted from here.  
57 Barbeyrac adopts Pufendorf’s classification of the duties of natural religion here, summarising the 
duties listed in DHC within his notes to DNG [1706] and DNG [1712], only removing this summary and 
replacing it with a reference to DHC, along with his notes thereof, in the 1734 edition of DNG in order to 
allow greater space for the development on his response to Christian Thomasius regarding the necessity 
of exterior worship: Barbeyrac, DNG [1706] and DNG [1712], 2.4.3, Note 2. Cf. Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.4.3, 
Note 2.  
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of interior worship, without which the latter is to no avail’.58 Individuals are thus 
obliged to worship God, externally as well as internally, as witness of their submission 
to Him. Moreover, he claims, they cannot easily help doing so, given that ‘once 
something has made a vivid impression on our Heart, it cannot easily be hidden’.59 
Arguing against his fellow Pufendorf commentator Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), 
Barbeyrac says that exterior worship is also absolutely necessary for the good of 
society, where it has an educative role to play.60 Most people are not capable of 
acquiring knowledge of and sincerely practising their duties to God without the 
assistance of moral instruction and the example of others.61 Exterior worship schools 
‘the Ignorant and the common people, that is to say… the greater part of Mankind’ in 
their duties to God, ‘without which the People would readily forget the Divinity’.62 
Barbeyrac thus lays the foundation for a defence of the practice of exterior worship of 
God as a binding obligation intrinsically linked to sincere interior worship.  
 
The difficulty that Barbeyrac faced was that duties such as the exterior worship of God 
were the same duties that could easily put individuals in grave danger of persecution. 
Barbeyrac thus concedes that in cases of extreme necessity, ‘to avoid some great harm 
immediately threatened by an unjust Aggressor’, individuals may dispense with the duty 
of exterior worship of God; but even then, only if they can do so ‘without their omission 
thereby constituting any abnegation of the Religion that they believe to be true, or any 
other mark of contempt for the Divine Majesty’.63 In such cases, Barbeyrac 
acknowledges, duty gives way to necessity. Necessity, however, does not absolve 
individuals from all their duties to God. For Barbeyrac, individuals cannot preserve 
their lives ‘to the prejudice of the Glory of God’. To this end, he instructs his readers 
that it is necessary to suffer all harm, even death, ‘rather than to blaspheme, or to 
                                                
58 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.4.7, Note 1: ‘Le Culte extérieur en général n’est autre chose, qu’une demonstration 
du Culte Intérieur, sans lequel il ne sert de rien’.  
59 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.4.3, Note 2: ‘lorsqu’une chose a fait vives impressions sur nôtre Coeur, on ne peut 
gueres l’y tenir cachée’.  
60 For the wider context behind Thomasius’s claim that exterior worship is not necessary according to the 
principles of natural religion, see Ian Hunter, The Secularisation of the Confessional State: The Political 
Thought of Christian Thomasius, (Cambridge, 2011), p. 124.  
61 On the moral edification of the people as the principal duty of public ministers of religion, cf. Chapter 
4, pp. 137-138 and pp. 145-146.  
62 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.4.3, Note 2: ‘aux Ignorants & aux gens de commun, c’est-à-dire… la plus grande 
partie de Genre Humain’ and ‘sans quoi le Peuple oublieront aisement la Divinité’.  
63 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.6.2, Note 5: ‘pour éviter un grand mal dont on est menacé de près pas un injuste 
Aggresseur’ and ‘sans que d’ailleurs leur omission emporte aucune abnégation de la Religion qu’on croit 
bonne, ou aucune autre marque de mépris pour la Majesté Divine’.  
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commit some act of Idolatry, or to renounce profession of the Religion that one believe 
to be true, in order to embrace a religion that one considers to be false’. These duties 
can never be renounced, or otherwise omitted, no matter what the circumstances. The 
purpose of individual conscience, with its natural moral light, is to ensure that this does 
not happen.  
 
The principles analysed in this chapter form the basic moral framework within which 
Barbeyrac develops his theory of natural law. This theory considers both the divine and 
the human forum with its idea of the faculty of conscience as a moral link between man 
and God. It also constitutes an attempt to resolve moral and political problems arising 
from Barbeyrac’s experience as a Huguenot refugié, and the needs of the Huguenot 
Diaspora more generally. Whether or not the theory is satisfactory in philosophical 
terms, there is a sustained effort to make sense of the role of individual conscience as a 
moral arbiter and the source of authoritative moral judgements. The purpose of this 
chapter has been to show how this concern is deeply rooted within the foundations of 
his natural law. The purpose of the next two chapters, on moral obligation and moral 
permission respectively, is to argue that this same concern determines the nature of his 
response to the perennial issue of moral obligation and inspires him to develop his own 
distinctive theory of moral permission.
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Chapter Two 
Barbeyrac on Moral Obligation 
 
I 
Introduction 
 
‘The proper and direct reason why Men are obliged to follow the Rules of Justice, that 
which imposes upon them the moral necessity to conform to these rules, is the will of 
God, who as their Sovereign Master has a full right to constrain their natural Liberty, as 
he deems appropriate’.1 The statement encompasses the basic line of argument 
developed by Barbeyrac in his theory of moral obligation, namely that the only possible 
legitimate foundation of moral obligation is the will of God. It is also the view that he 
wants to ascribe to all three of his principal authors – Pufendorf, Grotius and 
Cumberland – as part of his project to forge a coalescent and authoritative school of 
natural law. In his natural law commentaries, Barbeyrac engages not only with his 
authors but also with other thinkers whose positions he intended to rebut, above all, 
Bayle and Leibniz. Pufendorf’s critic Leibniz sums up the principal issue at stake: ‘It is 
agreed that whatever God wills is good and just. But there remains the question of 
whether it is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is 
good and just’.2 In modern terms, this is traditionally cast as the debate between 
voluntarism, where law is an act of will by the divine legislator, and rationalism, where 
law exists as eternal truths in the understanding of the divinity, with each argument 
drawing on a different set of moral and theological assumptions; however, as with most 
typologies, the majority of early modern natural law theorists drew their arguments 
from both sides of the divide.3  
                                                
1 Barbeyrac, ‘Jugement d’un anonyme sur l’original de cet abrege: avec des réflexions du traducteur, qui 
serviront à éclaircir quelques principes de l’auteur’, §15: ‘la raison propre & directe pourquoi les 
Hommes sont obligés de suivre les Régles de la Justice, ce qui leur impose la nécessité morale de s’y 
conformer, c’est la volonté de DIEU, qui en qualité de leur Maître Souverain a plein droit de gêner leur 
Liberté naturelle, comme il le juge à propos’.  
2 Leibniz, ‘Meditation on the Common Conception of Justice’, in Leibniz: Political Writings, p. 45. 
3 Several introductions take up the issue of moral obligation from different perspectives, that together 
provide a detailed account of the historical and philosophical parameters of the debate: John Chandler, 
‘Divine Command Theories and the Appeal to Love’, in American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1985); J. 
B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy; Knud Haakonssen, ‘Protestant Natural Law Theory: A 
General Interpretation’ in New Essays on the History of Autonomy, ed. N. Brender and L. Krasnoff, 
(Cambridge, 2004); Stephen Darwall, ‘The Foundations of Morality: Virtue, Law and Obligation’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy. 
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The current chapter elucidates Barbeyrac’s theory of moral obligation through a 
contextualised study of his natural law commentaries. Each section focuses on 
Barbeyrac’s engagement with a different thinker in order to draw out issues that were 
essential to the development of his own theory of moral obligation, from Grotius, 
Pufendorf and Cumberland, to Leibniz. This chapter will also provide an opportunity to 
consider how the different dynamic that existed between Barbeyrac and each of his 
authors was reflected in the commentaries that accompanied his translations of their 
texts. In short, Barbeyrac’s Grotius translation, Le droit de la guerre, throws up the 
question of whether human reason or human consent can ever provide a solid 
foundation for moral obligation, whereas in his Pufendorf translation, Le droit de la 
nature, it is the role of conscience that comes to the fore. Likewise, Barbeyrac’s 
Cumberland translation, Traité philosophique, provides us with an important insight 
into Barbeyrac’s response to the issue of sanctions and, finally, in his engagement with 
Leibniz’s critique of Pufendorf, the ‘Jugement d’un anonyme’, Barbeyrac attempts to 
provide a coherent defence of the proper foundations of divine authority. The central 
thread that runs through these sections is the development of Barbeyrac’s own theory of 
moral obligation and its relationship to his wider theory of natural law, thereby building 
on the foundations laid in the previous chapter.  
 
II  
Barbeyrac on Grotius: Reason and Consent 
 
Grotius was a compelling figure for early modern natural law theorists, the appeal of his 
thought lying in the adaptability of his arguments to an array of different perspectives 
and contexts. Many theorists, therefore, were keen to see themselves as the legitimate 
successors of the Grotian school of thought, including not only Barbeyrac and 
Pufendorf, but also theorists that Barbeyrac often identified as his natural opponents, 
namely Bayle and Leibniz.4 His claim, in the Grotius ‘Préface’, that the works of 
Pufendorf and Grotius were ‘inseparable in themselves and in the manner in which I 
                                                
4 Tim Hochstrasser elucidates Grotius’s appeal amongst the leading political theorists of the Huguenot 
Diaspora and competing claims to be the natural successor to Grotius: ‘The Claims of Conscience’, esp. 
pp. 28-37. Fiammetta Palladini provides a powerful refutation of both Barbeyrac’s and Pufendorf’s own 
claim that the latter was the natural successor to Grotius, emphasising instead the continuity between 
Pufendorf and Hobbes (and the reasons for its obfuscation): ‘Pufendorf disciple of Hobbes’, p. 60. 
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have undertaken to translate and comment upon them’ is thus a polemical ploy designed 
to underscore the thesis originally presented in his Pufendorf ‘Préface’ that Pufendorf 
(and by implication Barbeyrac himself) was the only one to have truly taken on the 
Grotian mantle in the modern period.5 Moulding both in his own image, Barbeyrac thus 
sought to use Pufendorf’s arguments to remedy the defects that he perceived in 
Grotius’s texts and, in turn, Grotian arguments as a corrective to Pufendorfian ones; 
thereby weaving the two authors together as a means of substantiating his particular 
reading of both.  
 
In many ways, there was a far greater natural affinity between Barbeyrac and Grotius 
than there was between Barbeyrac and Pufendorf, above all with respect to the 
fundamental role that the principles of natural religion have to play in a system of moral 
philosophy and his general tolerationist outlook. It is reasonable to suppose that 
Grotius’s well-known Arminian sympathies led Barbeyrac to remain relatively silent on 
the issues of natural religion and conscience in his Grotius commentary, principally 
because these were not issues on which he considered Grotius to stand in need of 
remedy. With respect to the foundation of moral obligation, however, Barbeyrac clearly 
felt that Grotius had opened himself up to misinterpretation. He thus took up the task of 
ironing out these ambiguities and establishing what he took Grotius’s thought to be; 
namely, like Barbeyrac himself and Pufendorf, that the foundation of moral obligation – 
its indispensible necessity as Barbeyrac characterises it – derives from the will of God 
alone. To this end, Barbeyrac sets out both to rebut the arguments found within 
Grotius’s texts that suppose that either human consent or human reason could serve as 
the foundation of moral obligation, and also any reading of Grotius that takes these 
arguments to be central (rather than merely supplementary) to the latter’s theory of 
moral obligation.   
 
In early modern theories of moral obligation, a clear distinction is not always made 
between the moral necessity that gives rise to moral obligation proper and the reasons 
for fulfilling an obligation in general, i.e., certain motivating factors occurring posterior 
to the original moral obligation. For Barbeyrac, Grotius’s claim for a consent-based, 
morally obligatory law of nations distinct from the law of nature leads us into just this 
                                                
5 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DGP, p. ii: inséparables & en eux-mémes, & par la maniére dont je m’y suis pris 
en les traduisant & les commentant’. Cf. Chapter 1, p. 27.  
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kind of philosophical confusion. Grotius’s law of nations, like the law of nature, 
consists of a right common to all nations, but unlike the law of nature, takes perpetual 
practice and the testimony of experts as its source.6 For Grotius, the law of nations, 
presenting us with more comprehensible and ‘highly probable’ proofs of our moral 
duties, supplements the more ‘abstract and subtle’ proofs of the immutable law of 
nature; both forms of law taken together thus form a comprehensive system of 
international law that mutually support and overlay one another.7  
 
Barbeyrac, however, comprehensively rejects consent – or its derivative, custom – as 
the foundation of either the law of nations or of nature each time that Grotius attributes 
some field of natural morality, such as the rights of postliminy or burial, to the law of 
nations.8 While individuals may commonly speak of a law of nations to designate those 
laws that reflect the shared customs or common agreements between nations, Barbeyrac 
insists that this law of nations is ‘a pure chimera’ comprised of moral duties that are ‘at 
heart the same as those of Natural Law, properly so called: all difference consisting 
only in the application’.9 In short, the precepts do not possess the necessary obligatory 
force distinct from the law of nature. Barbeyrac claims, therefore, that Pufendorf is right 
to dismiss Grotius’s argument here as a species of ill-founded mutual obligation that 
would be liable to be disregarded by nations according to their own convenience.10 
Moreover, Barbeyrac adds, a species of moral obligation that rests on the tacit consent 
of the sovereign would no longer bind the new sovereign in the event of a change of 
government precipitated by a revolution.11  
 
For Barbeyrac, the basic problem at hand is that both consent and custom are variable, 
according to changing circumstances and particular utility. Thus any law established on 
these foundations alone cannot properly account for the moral necessity entailed by a 
binding obligation. Consent serves as the foundation of a genuine obligation only in the 
                                                
6 Grotius, DGP, 1.1.14. 
7 Grotius, DGP, 1.1.12.   
8 Barbeyrac records his principal objections to Grotius’s law of nations in an early note (DGP 1.1.14, 
Note 3), referring his readers back to this note on numerous occasions, as well as to a further note from 
his earlier Pufendorf commentary (DNG 2.3.23, Note 3). See, for example, ‘Discours préliminaire’, DGP, 
§1 Note 1, §18 Notes 1-2, §41 Notes 5-6 and §55 Note 1 and in DGP 1.1.12 Note 1; 1.2.4 Note 5; 2.3.10 
Note 8; 2.8.1 Note 1; 2.18.1 Note 1; 2.19.1 Note 1; 2.19.6 Note 1; 3.2.2 Note 1; 3.4.4 Note 1.  
9 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.14, Note 3: ‘une pure chimére’ and ‘au fond les mêmes que celles du Droit 
Naturel, proprement ainsi nomme : toute le différence qu’il y a, consiste dans l’application’.  
10 Pufendorf, DNG, 2.3.23. 
11 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.23, Note 6.  
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more limited sense that one is obliged by the law of nature to be true to one’s word; it is 
in this way only that nations may enter into formal conventions with one another.12 But 
for Barbeyrac this does not change the essential point that while consent and custom 
may present individuals with a compelling reason for undertaking a particular action, it 
is only as evidence of a pre-existing moral obligation, or as a general motive for 
obedience. Not only does Barbeyrac seek to establish this opinion for himself, but also, 
pace Cumberland’s interpretation of Grotius, to argue that Grotius also shared this point 
of view.13 
 
In his interpretation of Grotius, therefore, Barbeyrac argues that Grotius himself 
implicitly recognises that the indispensible character of moral obligation is grounded in 
the will of God alone. However, the problem here, as Barbeyrac knew all too well, was 
that his interpretation of Grotius was not the only plausible one available to him and his 
contemporaries. Much of the ambiguity arose from Grotius’s controversial statement 
that the maxims of reason, i.e., the duties of sociability, would hold true ‘even if one 
were to concede, that which one cannot be conceded without considerable sin, that there 
is no God, or if there is a God, that He does not take any interest in human affairs’.14 
Grotius makes this statement in the context of his own rebuttal of scepticism, where he 
is arguing that the knowledge that individuals possess of the maxims of reason, i.e., the 
law of nature comprising the principle of sociability alone, would hold true, insofar as it 
is derived from natural reason and empirical observation.15 In light of this, Knud 
Haakonssen argues that Grotius is not speaking here of the foundation of moral 
obligation as such, but rather the separation of the foundation of moral obligation within 
the sphere of natural law from that of the Christian religion.16 This argument is 
supported by the fact that, in the passages following Grotius’s ‘even if’ statement, he 
states that from the natural knowledge that individuals posses of God, it is clear that the 
free will of God constitutes an equal source of the law of nature.17 
 
The danger that Barbeyrac perceives in Grotius’s thought here is that it opens the door 
                                                
12 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.23, Note 2.  
13 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours préliminaire’, TPLN, §1, Note 3.  
14 Grotius, ‘Discours préliminaire’, DGP, §11: ‘quand même on accorderoit, ce qui ne se peut sans un 
crime horrible, qu’il n’y a point de DIEU, ou s’il y en a un, qu’il ne s’interesse point aux choses 
humaines’.  
15 Grotius, ‘Discours préliminaire’, DGP, §5-10.  
16 Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, p. 29.  
17 Grotius, ‘Discours préliminaire’, DGP, §11-12.  
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to a theory of moral obligation where God is rendered superfluous; a danger realised in 
Bayle’s alternative reading of Grotius as a thinker for whom the law of nature may be 
derived from purely naturalistic premises.18 Bayle, also positioning himself as the 
natural successor to the Grotian school of thought, cites Grotius in support of his 
argument that the constitution of man and the nature of justice are eternal essences; 
hence, by virtue of reason alone, all individuals may discern the moral good that is 
inherent within what is naturally virtuous and so conform their ideas and actions to a 
moral rule independent of considerations of utility. Consequently, the law of nature is 
morally obligatory for both the God-fearing and atheists alike.19 Once again, Barbeyrac 
is keen to rebut Bayle’s claim that natural morality can exist in all its force for atheists, 
claiming instead that the idea of morality grounded in natural virtue and reason lacks 
both the original obligatory moral necessity founded in the will of God and the 
accompanying motivating force provided by our natural knowledge of the strong 
likelihood of divine sanctions.20  
 
In his commentary to Grotius’s ‘even if’ statement, Barbeyrac therefore chooses to 
bring the issue of the proper foundation of moral obligation to the fore. It is true, he 
argues, that the maxims of natural law are founded ‘in the nature of things, in the 
constitution of Man himself, whereby there arise certain relations between certain 
actions and the state of a Reasonable and Sociable Animal’.21 Hence, Grotius’s 
statement may be admitted only insofar as it expresses the immutable character of the 
laws of nature founded in a necessary conformity to the constitution of man. But to 
speak exactly, Barbeyrac continues,  
 
Duty and Obligation, or the indispensible necessity to conform one’s 
actions to these ideas and these maxims, necessarily supposes a Superior, a 
Sovereign Master of Men, that is to say, the Creator or Supreme Divinity.22 
 
For Barbeyrac, while natural reason may reveal to us the content of the law of nature, it 
                                                
18 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.19, Note 2; see also DNG, 2.3.4, Note 2.  
19 Pierre Bayle, Continuation des pensées diverses, écrites à un Docteur de Sorbonne, à l’occasion de la 
comete qui parut au mois de Decembre 1680, 2 Volumes, (Rotterdam, 1705), Vol. 2, §152.   
20 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.19, Note 2.  
21 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours préliminaire’, DGP, §11, Note 1: ‘dans la nature des choses, dans la constitution 
même des Hommes, d’où il resulte certaines relations entre telles ou telles actions & l’etat d’un Animal 
Raisonnable & Sociable’.  
22 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours préliminaire’, DGP, §11, Note 1: ‘le Devoir & l’Obligation, ou la nécessité 
indispensable de se conformer à ces idées & ces maximes, suppose nécessairement un Supérieur, un 
Maître Souverain des Hommes, qui ne peut être que le Créateur ou la Divinité Suprême’.  
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cannot itself be the source of the indispensible necessity entailed by a moral obligation. 
That requires God, whose will is the original source of the law of nature. If reason were 
to be the foundation of obligation itself, Barbeyrac supposes, individuals would be both 
the source and the object of an obligation with no external authority capable of 
preventing the human passions – an equally strong and natural source of the 
determinations of the will – superseding the demands of reason. Thus, while it is true 
that God cannot command anything contrary to the natural order of things, his act of 
will as lawgiver is essential to the obligatory force that accompanies the natural maxims 
of reason and gives them the proper character of law.23 
 
The problem for Barbeyrac is that it is not at all clear that Grotius shares his perspective 
on the foundation of moral obligation. In his discussion of moral obligation proper, 
Grotius again maintains that the precepts of the law of nature specify certain actions as 
morally honourable or dishonourable according to their necessary conformity to the 
rational and sociable nature of man. These actions, he claims, are ‘obligatory or illicit in 
themselves’. Thus it is only by virtue of their intrinsic natural rectitude that ‘one may 
conceive of them as necessarily commanded or forbidden by God’.24 In short, reason 
comprehends the content of the laws of nature in such a way that the knowledge itself of 
these precepts and their natural rectitude entails a binding moral obligation. God – if not 
superfluous – certainly occupies an ancillary role for Grotius in the foundation of moral 
obligation. The issue at hand here is whether morality is an eternal and essential feature 
of the natural order or whether it is instituted by God within the human world by an act 
of his will. Grotius’s account of moral obligation – and his general definition of law as 
what is good and praiseworthy – suggests a reading of him that places him in the former 
camp. But Grotius’s claim that these obligatory maxims of reason must also be 
understood to be commanded by God as an act of his will creates an ambiguity that 
Barbeyrac is keen to turn to his advantage.  
 
In his commentary to Le droit de la nature, Barbeyrac claims that Grotius did in fact 
perceive, albeit faintly, the true foundation of the law of nature and thus moral 
obligation. Not only did Grotius provide an independent standard to determine the 
                                                
23 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.10, Note 4. 
24 Grotius, DGP, 1.1.10: ‘obligatoires ou illicites par elles-mêmes’ and ‘on les conçoit comme 
nécessairement ordonnées ou défenduës de DIEU’.   
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necessary honesty and turpitude of actions in light of their conformity to a rational and 
social nature, Barbeyrac claims, but he also recognised, like Pufendorf, that ‘this 
necessity is not a necessity absolutely independent of the Divine Will’. All that 
separates Grotius from himself and from Pufendorf, Barbeyrac alleges, is ‘a dispute of 
words’. From this perspective, he dismisses Grotius’s other commentators for having 
poorly understood his thought, claiming instead that it is much closer to Pufendorf’s 
than is readily acknowledged.25  
 
As well as emphasising a voluntarist reading of Grotius here, Barbeyrac is also allying 
Grotius to Pufendorf in order to allow for a reading of Pufendorf that blurs his sharp 
distinction between natural and moral good. This amalgam of Grotius and Pufendorf not 
only serves Barbeyrac in his project to establish these two thinkers as the founders of 
modern natural law, but also reflects a position that is much closer to his own thought 
than either thinker in isolation. In short, for Barbeyrac, Grotius is right to say that 
certain actions possess a natural and intrinsic honesty, but wrong to conclude from this 
that this natural honesty can be the foundation of moral obligation proper.  
 
Barbeyrac’s interpretation of Grotius on the issue of moral obligation is typical of his 
attempts to establish a natural concurrence between both Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s 
theory of natural law. With respect to the issue of moral obligation, his commentary 
also reveals his own concern, namely, that the indispensible necessity that characterises 
moral obligation proper has its sole foundation in the will of God. Barbeyrac thus 
rejects out of hand the possibility that moral obligation can stem from our own selves, 
whether in the form of reason’s awareness of the nature of things or as a product of 
custom and consent. The danger that he perceived here is that purely naturalistic 
premises could ultimately render God superfluous and – without God as the foundation 
of morality – one cannot meaningfully speak of man’s duties to God as the first part of 
natural morality nor liberty of conscience as the first duty thereof.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.4, Note 5: ‘cette nécessité n’est pas une nécessité absolument indépendante de la 
Volonté Divine’ and ‘une dispute des mots’.   
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III 
Barbeyrac on Pufendorf: Will and Conscience 
 
As we have seen, Barbeyrac established his scholarly reputation with his translations of 
Pufendorf, considering the latter’s original treatises of natural law worthy of high 
esteem but in need of extensive restoration.26 In the case of his theory of moral 
obligation, Barbeyrac draws heavily on the Pufendorf’s conceptual framework, above 
all the claim that law is instituted by a superior, whose act of will in this regard creates a 
moral obligation. However, Barbeyrac extends this original framework, arguing that 
individual conscience is indispensible as the origin of the ‘sentiment’ of moral 
obligation within the individual. In so doing, Barbeyrac invests individual conscience 
with considerable moral authority. He is thereby able to claim, pace Pufendorf, that the 
obligatory force of natural law rests on a secure foundation that every individual is 
capable of recognising by means of the sentiments that naturally arise within his own 
person, i.e., the interior movements of a properly calibrated conscience.  
 
Broadly speaking, Barbeyrac endorses the arguments that Pufendorf put forward 
concerning the original source (and thus foundation) of human morality. As we saw in 
his response to Grotius, Barbeyrac, like Pufendorf, insists that the character of natural 
law is not that of prescribing or forbidding things that are naturally honest or illicit in 
themselves, agreeing instead with Pufendorf that ‘the Morality of Human Actions 
depends on Law’.27 For Pufendorf, this consists of a radical separation of natural and 
moral good, that is, his theory of moral entities.28 While Barbeyrac does not insist upon 
quite such a sharp distinction between natural and moral good, he does indicate his 
general assent to Pufendorf’s line of argument here, above all, the idea that prior to law 
                                                
26 Cf. Chapter 1, pp. 24-25. See also, Barbeyrac, ‘Jugement d’un anonyme’, §2.  
27 Pufendorf, DNG, 2.3.4: ‘la Moralité des Actions Humaines dépend de la Loi’.  
28 Pufendorf, DNG, 1.1. Michael Seidler argues that Pufendorf rejected both the teleological and 
consequentialist accounts of the relationship between natural and moral good, i.e., the claim that the law 
of nature is directly linked either to the intrinsic nature of things or to the outcomes of actions: 
‘Pufendorf’s Moral and Political Philosophy’ in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. E.N. 
Zalta, (2010). Accessed via: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/pufendorf-moral. The 
extent to which Pufendorf succeeded in establishing a non-metaphysical foundation for natural law and 
moral obligation has been the subject of debate in recent scholarship. J.B. Schneewind considers 
Leibniz’s objections to reveal the inherent weaknesses of Pufendorf’s non-metaphysical theory of moral 
obligation. See J.B. Schneewind, ‘Pufendorf’s Place in the History of Ethics’, in Synthese 72 (1987) and 
more recently The Invention of Autonomy. In Rival Enlightenments, Ian Hunter claims that Leibniz’s 
objections to Pufendorf must be placed within the context of the wider philosophical struggle at hand 
with Pufendorf’s and later Thomasius’s civil philosophy offering a viable alternative vision of the 
foundation of moral obligation to that of Leibniz and later Kant. 
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all human actions are morally indifferent.29 The claim that Barbeyrac wants to establish, 
following Pufendorf, is that morality is not coeval with God or the natural world. It is 
coeval with man. For Barbeyrac, morality and thus certain moral obligations ‘are 
attached to Man from the moment of Creation itself’.30 From this perspective, natural 
good serves as the foundation for morality only insofar as it provides reasons for the 
laws of nature. Natural law is thus consistent with naturally acquired benefits and harms 
but neither natural rectitude nor natural utility can be the source of moral obligation 
itself.  
 
For Barbeyrac, as for Pufendorf, ideas of will, law and obligation are conceptually 
linked. Preferring to build on Pufendorf’s definition of law as ‘the will of a superior, by 
which he imposes on those dependent upon him the obligation to act in the manner that 
he prescribes’ rather than Grotius’s alternative formulation of law as ‘a Rule of Moral 
Actions that obliges us to that which is good and praiseworthy’, Barbeyrac himself 
defines law as: 
 
the will of a Superior, sufficiently notified in some manner or other, by 
virtue of which he directs either all the actions in general of those who 
depend on him, or at least those of a certain genre; consequently, with 
respect to these actions, that superior either imposes an absolute necessity 
to act or not act in a certain manner, or leaves a liberty to act or not act, as 
one deems appropriate.31  
 
Barbeyrac’s definition of law lays the foundation for his claim that there are two distinct 
categories of natural law, namely obligatory natural law and permissive natural law. 
The liberty left by the latter concept of law creates a moral permission, whereas the 
absolute necessity imposed by the former concept of law creates a moral obligation. 
Both forms of natural law, however, have as their origin the commanding authority of 
the divine will. The remaining discussion will focus purely on obligatory natural law, 
leaving the issues surrounding permissive natural law to the following chapter.  
                                                
29 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.2.6, Note 1.  
30 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.1.4, Note 3: ‘sont attachez à l’Homme des le moment même de la Création’.  
31 Pufendorf, DNG, 1.6.4: ‘une Volonté d’un Supérieur, par laquelle il impose à ceux qui dépendent de lui 
l’obligation d’agir d’une certaine manniere qu’il leur prescrit’; Grotius, DGP, 1.1.9: ‘, une Régle des 
Actions Morales, qui oblige à ce qui est bon & louable’; Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.2.2, Note 1: ‘une volonté 
d’un Supérieur, suffisament notifée d’une maniere ou d’autre, par laquelle volonté il dirige ou toutes les 
actions généralement de ceux qui dépendent de lui, ou du moins toutes celles d’un certain genre; ensorte 
que, par rapport à ces actions, ou il leur impose la nécessité d’agir ou de ne pas agir d’une certain 
maniere, ou il leur laisse la liberté d’agir ou de ne point agir, comme il juge à propos’.  
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For Barbeyrac, as his definition of law indicates, the moral necessity required by moral 
obligation is created by the formal act of willing on the part of a legitimate superior. 
There may be other means by which we come to possess moral knowledge and other 
reasons for acceding to our moral duties, but the obligation itself derives from the will 
of a superior. Thus, while every obligatory law contains both a precept and a sanction, it 
is the precept, as the distillation of a superior’s act of will (rather than the sanctions that 
accompany it) that gives rise to moral obligation proper. Insofar as it relates to 
obligatory natural law, Barbeyrac thus agrees with Pufendorf that obligation itself is ‘a 
Morally Operative Quality, by virtue of which one is constrained to do or to suffer a 
certain thing’.32 Moral obligation is distinguished from mere external constraint because 
moral obligation affects the will inwardly by laying it under a moral bond. A true 
obligation must thus act morally on the heart of an individual and thereby directly 
influence the determinations of his will.  
 
In building his theory of law and obligation on Pufendorfian foundations, Barbeyrac 
was faced with the same objections that Pufendorf had faced. First amongst these, for 
his contemporary critics, was that the will of a superior is arbitrary.33 If there is no 
morality prior to its institution by an act of God’s will, nothing prevents God from 
freely altering the content of the law of nature so that the just becomes unjust and the 
unjust becomes just. The issue at stake for Barbeyrac – and for his interpretation of 
Pufendorf – is whether he can establish that individuals possess sufficient knowledge of 
the divine nature to see that God’s legislative will is not arbitrary and free from all 
constraint by virtue of His omnipotence.34  
 
In arguing against this objection, Barbeyrac makes use of Pufendorf’s analogy of the 
architect who is free to build a palace or a hut but necessarily has to use the appropriate 
materials for the construction that he does in fact build. God was free to create man as 
an animal with whatever nature pleased him, but once he settled on man as a rational 
and sociable creature, it was necessary for him to form the law as he did. Natural law is 
thus not arbitrary, but conforms to the nature of man and the order of the natural world. 
                                                
32 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.5, Note 1; Pufendorf, DNG, 1.6.5: ‘une Qualité Morale Operative, par laquelle on 
est tenu de faire ou de souffrir quelque chose’.  
33 Leibniz, ‘Mediation on the Common Conception of Justice’, p. 46 
34 Cf. Chapter 1, Section III.  
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In this sense there is congruity between natural and moral good. Moreover, Barbeyrac 
alleges, it would be a fundamental mistake to assume the will of God is arbitrary in this 
respect, for it is never possible to separate ‘the Will of God from his Goodness and 
Wisdom’. God exercises his authority through acts of will not merely as omnipotent but 
also as all-good and all-wise. Attributing the same view to Pufendorf, Barbeyrac claims 
that the law of nature is an act of divine will because ‘this Will is the principle of God’s 
actions’ and furthermore ‘his Wisdom and his Goodness are attributes, the exercise of 
which is sovereignly free, by virtue of which they could not be conceived of 
independent of his Will’.35   
 
The traditional difficulty that arises from this argument is that it supposes that God 
himself is subject to some kind of necessity, by virtue of which he is constrained from 
acting in a certain manner. Taking a stronger line than Pufendorf, although still not fully 
resolving this difficulty, Barbeyrac claims that, in God, this is ‘a glorious necessity, and 
a happy impotency, which follows from the perfections of his own infinite essence’. 
This argument rests on the idea that the exercise of divine omnipotence is always 
tempered by the other necessary attributes of the divine nature in such a manner that this 
necessity does not constitute a constraint to the divine will in the same way that man’s 
will is constrained by the indispensible necessity of moral obligation. Rather the 
entirety of God’s perfections are realised in this very necessity. For Barbeyrac, 
therefore, ‘there is nothing repugnant to the independence of an All-Perfect Being, to 
say, that he necessarily proscribes or forbids things that possess a necessary conformity 
or disconformity with the constitution of our Nature, of which he is himself the Author’. 
As well as setting out his own position here, Barbeyrac also intends to defend Pufendorf 
against charges of Hobbesianism. In the latter respect, however, his argument 
presupposes a more comprehensive knowledge of God and the divine nature than 
Pufendorf generally allows for in his natural law treatises.36  
 
                                                
35 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.1.4, Note 4: ‘la Volonté de Dieu d’avec sa Bonté & sa Sagesse’ and ‘cette Volonté 
est le principe des actions de Dieu’ and sa Sagesse & sa Bonté sont des attributs dont l’exercise est 
souverainement libre & par conséquent qui ne sçauroient être conçus sans la Volonté’.  
36 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.4, Note 2: ‘une nécessité glorieuse, & une heureuse impuissance, qui suit des 
perfections de son essence infinie’ and ‘il n’y a rien qui répugne à l’indépendence de l’Etre Tout-Parfait, 
de dire, qu’il veut nécessairement  prescrire ou defender les choses qui ont une convenance ou 
disconvenance nécessaire avec la constitution de nôtre Nature, dont il est lui-même l’Auteur’.  
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For Barbeyrac, having rejected the idea that God’s will is an arbitrary foundation for 
natural law in general and moral obligation in particular, it follows that the law of 
nature does not need to be expressly published from the mouth of God in order to be 
properly obligatory.37 Here, Barbeyrac takes up the Pufendorfian line of argument, pace 
Hobbes, that knowledge of God’s will as a law exists independently of its promulgation 
in Holy Scripture, i.e., by virtue of divine Revelation. It need not be supposed, 
Pufendorf claims, that ‘all Law ought necessarily be published either spoken aloud or in 
writing’, rather all that is necessary to apprehend the laws of nature is that ‘the will of 
the Legislator is known in some manner, even by Natural Light alone’.38 Reasoned 
reflection provides the content of the law of nature and, once known, the moral 
necessity that accompanies its precepts; both of which embody the natural conformity 
that exists between these obligatory precepts and the constitution of divinely created 
human nature. 
 
Pufendorf’s argument here rests on the idea that the training of reason and the learning 
of language are simultaneous, thus knowledge of the law of nature necessarily depends 
on some prior linguistic convention.39 Law and obligation cannot exist independently of 
language. As we shall see in the following chapter, Pufendorf believes that linguistic 
conventions depend on the prior existence of purposive social interaction.40 Hence, 
within Pufendorf’s theory of natural law, language and thus some form of society must 
be presupposed in order for individuals to acquire knowledge of the laws of nature 
independently of divine revelation. This argument is in keeping with Pufendorf’s 
general concern to restrict the scope of natural law to a purely social function.   
 
Taking the argument beyond Pufendorf, Barbeyrac argues, on the contrary, that 
language is only necessary for knowledge of the law of nature in order to communicate 
one’s thoughts to others. With respect to each individual, Barbeyrac claims that ‘the 
sentiments of conscience, which convince us of the obligation that we are under to act 
                                                
37 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.4, Note 2.  
38 Pufendorf, DNG, 1.6.4: ‘toute la Loi doive nécessairement être publiée ou de vive voix, ou par écrit’ 
and ‘l’on connoisse la volonté du Législateur de quelque maniere que ce soit, même par la Lumiere 
Naturelle toute seule’.  
39 Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, pp. 89-91.  
40 Cf. Chapter 3, Sections IV-VI.  
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according to these maxims, are also independent of language’.41 For Barbeyrac, 
individuals may thus come to possess knowledge of natural law independently of the 
existence of either language or society, theoretically speaking, by means of the 
sentiments of obligation arising within each individual’s conscience. With respect to 
obligation, conscience is the locus for two distinct sentiments. First, there is the 
‘sentiment of the conformity or disconformity of acting or not acting in a certain 
manner, such that in acting otherwise, one would be guilty of not having followed the 
light of Reason, and judge oneself worthy of blame’. From this, there necessarily 
follows a further sentiment of ‘fear, whether distinct or uncertain, of some harm that 
one may incur in acting or not acting in a certain manner’.42  
 
Barbeyrac’s description of the sentiments of obligation here bears a strong similarity to 
his original definition of conscience itself; both rest on the idea that conscience is the 
source of authoritative moral judgements concerning the conformity of human actions 
to the precepts of natural law, i.e., the commands of the divine will.43 It is in this sense, 
therefore, that Barbeyrac conceives of conscience as the immediate rule of action. 
Defending himself against the objections raised by his fellow Pufendorf commentator 
Gottlieb Samuel Treuer (1683-1743), Barbeyrac claims however that conscience, as the 
locus for this sentiment of obligation, is not the source of the obligation itself, but rather 
it is ‘the impression that the idea of obligation makes’ on those who already possess 
knowledge of the law of nature. While Barbeyrac wants to ascribe considerable moral 
authority to conscience, he rejects the idea of conscience as a self-legislating authority. 
In essence, conscience apprehends and evaluates particular human acts after the fact of 
the law, whereas an indispensible moral necessity ‘can only be imposed by an exterior 
principle, by a Being who has the right to compel us to follow certain rules, and to 
make us suffer some harm, if we fail to do so’.44  
 
                                                
41 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.4, Note 2: ‘Les sentimens de la Conscience, qui nous convainquent de 
l’obligation ou nous sommes d’agir, selon ces maximes, sont aussi indépendans du langage’. 
42 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.2.3, Note 1: ‘un sentiment de la convenance ou de la disconvenance qu’il y a à agir 
ou ne pas agir de telle ou telle maniere; ensorte que si l’on se conduit autrement, on se reproche de 
n’avoit pas suivi les lumieres de la Raison, & l’on se juge digne de blame’ and ‘une crainte ou distincte, 
ou confuse, de quelque mal que l’on pourra s’attirer en agissant ou n’agissant pas de telle maniere’. 
43 Cf. Chapter 1, pp. 33-34.   
44 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.2.3, Note 1: ‘l’impression que fait l’idée de l’Obligation’ and ‘ne peut être imposée 
que par un principe extérieur, par un Etre qui ait droit de nous assujettir à suivre certaines régles, & de 
nous faire souffrir quelque mal, si nous y manquons’. Barbeyrac refers to Treuer’s Sam. L. B. de 
Pufendorf De officio hominis et civis secundum legem naturalem libri duo, (Leipzig, 1726).  
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In this way, Barbeyrac’s theory of conscience explains how the externally imposed law-
based moral norms are consonant with our inner moral experience. Yet whatever 
conscience adds to the original moral obligation, this still only constitutes a reason for 
acting in conformity with the law, however compelling this inner sentiment may be. For 
Barbeyrac, the laws of nature always impose a moral obligation upon an individual 
regardless of whether that individual himself experiences the inner sentiment of 
obligation. Conscience thus serves to strengthen and assure us of our moral duties and 
rights, but it is not in itself the foundation of these moral duties and rights. It is in the 
role that Barbeyrac ascribes to conscience that he departs most clearly from Pufendorf, 
for in this way Barbeyrac brings in the divine forum, namely, the necessity of inner 
conformity to the law of nature and the motivating force produced by the inner 
sentiment of obligation. For Pufendorf, these considerations must be excluded from 
natural law in the interests of preserving stable social relations. For Barbeyrac, however, 
naturally acquired knowledge of the divine judicature is essential to explaining the true 
force of our moral motivations, that is to say, the second of the two sentiments of 
obligation identified above: the fear of sanctions.  
 
IV 
Barbeyrac on Cumberland: Natural and Divine Sanctions 
 
Barbeyrac’s Cumberland translation, his Traité philosophique, is certainly not a labour 
of love crafted in the same way as his earlier translations of Pufendorf and Grotius. This 
much is evident from his willingness to supplement his own notes, which are more 
scant than in his other major translations, with the notes of the English editor John 
Maxwell (1705-1784?), despite his heavy criticisms of the latter.45 Barbeyrac’s muted 
engagement with Cumberland’s thought raises the question of what kind of intellectual 
project he was pursuing through his translation of the text.  
                                                
45 A simple reading of Barbeyrac here would be that Maxwell’s notes provide an additional commentary 
on Cumberland’s text without requiring too much work of Barbeyrac himself. Yet it may also be 
significant that Barbeyrac chooses his notes from the English translation selectively and, with respect to 
the notes that he does include, he either remains silent or is highly critical of Maxwell’s grasp of 
Cumberland’s natural law theory. In short, Barbeyrac shows little esteem for Maxwell either as a fellow 
commentator or translator. However, this issue has more bearing on Barbeyrac as a translator than as a 
natural law theorist. For Maxwell’s original notes, see Richard Cumberland, A Treatise of the Law of 
Nature [1727], trans. J. Maxwell, (Indianapolis, IN, 2005). For a more detailed summary of this text and 
Barbeyrac’s use thereof, see Linda Kirk, Richard Cumberland and Natural Law: Secularisation of 
Thought in the Seventeenth-Century, (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 105-112.  
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The answer lies in Cumberland’s renown as a critic of Hobbes, a fact that Barbeyrac 
attests to in his Preface when he refers to Cumberland as the first and the best to have 
refuted the false but seductive principles of Hobbes.46 This view of Cumberland’s work 
is reiterated in modern scholarship by Jon Parkin, who describes Cumberland as ‘one of 
the most perceptive and innovative critics of Hobbes’ political theory’. As such, Parkin 
claims, one of the text’s most significant legacies was its use by later authors to defend 
themselves or others against charges of Hobbesianism; notably, James Tyrell (1642-
1718) on behalf of Locke and Pufendorf himself in the second edition of his De Jure 
Naturae.47 Barbeyrac’s Cumberland translation follows in this tradition by restating the 
idea of Pufendorf and Cumberland as natural allies, as well as implicitly extending this 
same defence against the charge of Hobbesianism to his own theory of natural law. 
With respect to moral obligation, Barbeyrac’s engagement with Cumberland is most 
pertinent on the issue of the sanctions that necessarily accompany the obligatory 
precepts of natural law.   
 
Cumberland’s original objective was to answer Hobbes in his own terms by providing a 
theory of natural law that stemmed from the same naturalistic premises as Hobbes but 
that reached different conclusions concerning the obligatory character of natural law. 
He does so by using what he considers the same mechanistic natural philosophy, that is, 
the science of cause and effect, to demonstrate that God is the first cause and author of 
all natural and moral phenomena.48 Crucially, this allows Cumberland to claim that the 
regularities of nature provide the necessary objective evidence to anchor the maxims of 
reason as both natural and moral truths and to prove that these maxims possess the force 
of law by drawing on the evidence of their natural effects. In response to Hobbes’s 
sceptical claim of a radical gulf between man and God, Cumberland asserts that man 
and God together form a moral community by virtue of the fact that God possesses 
reason and must be ranked among rational beings.49 In this moral community, God is 
conceived of as the principal part and humans as the subordinate part of an integrated 
                                                
46 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface du traducteur’, TPLN, p. iv  
47 Parkin, Science, Religion and Politics in Restoration England: Richard Cumberland’s De Legibus 
Naturae, (Bury St Edmonds, 1999), p. 4 and pp. 205-222. Cf. Kirk, Richard Cumberland and Natural 
Law, pp. 78-99.  
48 Cumberland, ‘Discours préliminaire’, TPLN, §4 
49 Cumberland, ‘Discours préliminaire’, TPLN, §10 and TPLN, 1.4.  
  
60 
 
moral system.50 For Cumberland, it follows from this that the ultimate moral end, or the 
common good, applies to both God and man within this moral community.51  
 
The moral world is a system governed by the care for the common good rather than the 
anti-system resulting from the unbridled egoism of Hobbes’s self-preserving 
individuals. Thus the fundamental proposition to which all other laws of nature may be 
reduced is to promote ‘the common Good of the whole System of rational Agents’ in 
pursuit of our ultimate moral end, namely moral happiness.52 The evidence lies in the 
natural effects that accompany both morally good and morally bad actions, namely, 
happiness and misery respectively. Cumberland claims that these natural effects serve 
as evidence that the laws of nature are enjoined upon us by God, for the natural effects 
are the sanctions that accompany the creation of the law of nature.53 But while natural 
sanctions may serve as evidence of the laws of nature and as natural motives to observe 
such laws, they are not the origin of the moral obligation to obey such laws.54  
 
By grounding his argument in the idea of a moral community between man and God, 
however, Cumberland brings to the fore the question of whether human justice is 
modelled on divine justice; a position more commonly associated with rationalists such 
as Leibniz. In a somewhat ambiguous manner, Cumberland argues that we come to 
know the maxims of justice through observation of natural cause and effect but that, in 
attributing this justice to God, we must necessarily ‘take his model as our own’.55 In 
short, human justice provides the epistemic model for divine justice. Individuals can 
only come to know divine justice through the knowledge that they possess of human 
justice, for it is the foundations of human justice alone that may be observed through the 
use of our senses and experiences. However, Cumberland also claims here that divine 
justice provides the moral model that human justice must strive to emulate. This latter 
claim – seemingly at odds with the former claim – implies that there is a natural 
continuity between divine and human justice.   
                                                
50 Cumberland, ‘Discours préliminaire’, TPLN, §15 
51 Cumberland, TPLN, 5.8 and 5.13.  
52 Cumberland, ‘Discours préliminaire’, TPLN, §9: ‘le Bien commun de tout le Systême des Agens 
Raisonnables’.   
53 Cumberland, ‘Discours préliminaire’, TPLN, §14. 
54 For a concise account of Cumberland’s theory of moral obligation, see Knud Haakonssen, ‘The 
Character and Obligation of Natural Law According to Richard Cumberland’, in English Philosophy in 
the Age of Locke.  
55 Cumberland, ‘Discours préliminaire’, TPLN, §6: ‘prendre pour modele de la nôtre’.  
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For Barbeyrac, human and divine justice, insofar as the latter may be known, are 
qualitatively different. He responds to Cumberland by referring to a passage of Le droit 
de la nature where Pufendorf rejects the argument that human justice is modelled on 
divine justice. For Pufendorf, this is because the justice exercised by a God, who is 
himself free of all obligation and all law, cannot be the model for a justice between 
naturally equal beings subject to mutual obligations. Interestingly, Pufendorf cites 
Cumberland here in support of his argument.56 Barbeyrac, likewise, reads Cumberland 
as an advocate of the opinion that because we only know God by his effects, we have 
greater knowledge of human than of divine justice, and so divine justice cannot serve as 
the foundation of human justice: ‘It would be ridiculous to establish Divine Justice as 
the foundation of Human Justice, since the latter is more exactly known than the former; 
as Cumberland recognises’.57 Removing the ambiguities of Cumberland’s original 
position, Barbeyrac takes it as read that the logical conclusion of the former’s epistemic 
model is that divine justice cannot therefore be the moral model for human justice. He 
adds to this the claim that what limited knowledge we do have of divine justice assures 
us of the veracity of this conclusion, citing certain duties from human justice that cannot 
be applied to God on account of the excellence of his nature, for example the duty to 
pay one’s debts. 
 
While Cumberland adopted elements of rationalist arguments concerning the 
relationship between man and God, he does not pursue the rationalist line of argument 
when it comes to the foundation of moral obligation. For Cumberland, although God 
and man make up one moral community, it is not by virtue of human insight into divine 
reason that individuals come to know that they are subject to a moral obligation. This 
would be to make a claim that cannot be substantiated on purely naturalistic premises. 
Rather the will of God, comprehended by individuals through the exercise of human 
reason in making sense of created nature, is the foundation of moral obligations entailed 
by the law of nature.  
 
                                                
56 Pufendorf, DNG, 2.3.5.  
57 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.5, Note 5: ‘Il seroit donc ridicule d’établir la Justice Divine pour fondement de la 
Justice Humaine, puisque celle-ci est plûtôt connue que la premiere; comme le reconnoît Cumberland’.  
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Cumberland’s particular amalgam of rationalist and voluntarist arguments leads 
Barbeyrac to respond forcefully to the curious case of Cumberland’s two definitions of 
the law of nature at the beginning of his fifth chapter. Cumberland amended his 
definition of the law of nature after his text had originally gone to print meaning that 
there were two different published versions of his thought. According to Barbeyrac, the 
revised – and to his mind correct – version of Cumberland’s definition of natural law 
may be easily distinguished from the original version because the printers have had to 
squeeze an extra eight lines onto the page in order to make it fit.58 Broadly speaking, 
both versions define the law of nature as a ‘proposition presented to or impressed upon 
our minds clearly enough by the nature of things from the will of the first cause’.59 The 
difference comes from the fact that only the revised version mentions the idea of 
sanctions, whether rewards for obedience or punishments for disobedience. Here, 
Cumberland goes on to specify that by ‘sufficient’ rewards and punishments he means 
those that are ‘so great and so certain’ that it is clear that the happiness of each 
individual depends upon perpetually promoting the public good rather than doing the 
slightest thing that would detract from it.60 In short, Cumberland’s late addition makes it 
clear that sanctions have an important role to play in promoting the observation of the 
law of nature.  
 
Barbeyrac assures his readers that the reason why Cumberland would go to all the 
trouble of amending this original definition is obvious, namely that the omission of any 
mention of sanctions – ‘which the entire world considers to be an essential part of 
whatever kind of law it may be’ – would prove too much of a hindrance in the 
exposition of the proceeding chapter on natural law and moral obligation.61 Here, 
Barbeyrac expresses absolute certainty that Cumberland always meant to include 
sanctions within his definition of the law of nature on the basis that it is a readily 
acknowledged truth that no law may be called a law, properly speaking, unless it 
                                                
58 Barbeyrac, TPLN, 5.1, Note 1. According to Linda Kirk, Barbeyrac’s own edition of Cumberland’s 
original Latin text was the 1694 third edition published in Luebeck and Frankfort by Samuel Otto and 
Johann Wieder (an edition that followed the original rather than the revised definition of natural law): 
Richard Cumberland and Natural Law, p. 95. Nonetheless, in his own translation, Barbeyrac gives the 
revised definition in the main body of the text and the original definition in a separate note.  
59 Cumberland, TPLN, 5.1: ‘une Proposition assez clairement présentée ou imprimée dans nos Esprits par 
la Nature des Choses, en conséquence de la Volonté de la Cause prémiére’. 
60 Cumberland, TPLN, 5.1: ‘si grandes & si certaines’.  
61 Barbeyrac, TPLN, 5.1, Note 1: ‘tout le monde regarde comme une partie essentielle de quelle Loi que 
ce soit’.  
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includes certain sanctions. The perceived danger of the original definition for 
Barbeyrac, is that in the absence of any specific reference to sanctions, Cumberland’s 
original definition of the law of nature opened the door to the idea that moral necessity 
may be derived from the utility accrued by its observation rather than from the 
command of a superior.62  
 
Barbeyrac develops his thinking on this matter in Le droit de la nature, where he 
responds not only to Cumberland but also to Pufendorf’s claim that ‘the idea of good 
and Evil’ produced by our actions creates within the individual an impression of the 
necessity of doing or not doing that particular action.63 For Barbeyrac, both Pufendorf 
and Cumberland are in danger of straying into the same dubious territory as 
Cumberland’s fellow English author Francis Gastrell (1662-1725) – a figure who 
Barbeyrac implicitly but disingenuously takes as representative of Cumberland’s way of 
thinking – in reducing obligation to its reason or motive, namely, the avoidance of 
misery and the attainment of happiness.64 In short, if the law is not properly understood 
as the command of a superior accompanied by sanctions, the danger is that the common 
good becomes the foundation of obligation rather than simply the outcome of 
observance of the law. This would be to confound, Barbeyrac argues, ‘the motive of 
Obligation, or that which most effectively carries us to submit to it’ with ‘the 
foundation of Obligation, or the reason why each person is indispensably held to do a 
certain thing’.65 While these two things are often inseparably joined together within the 
duties of natural law, for Barbeyrac it is of upmost importance that utility does not enter 
directly into the foundation of moral obligation. The sole legitimate foundation of moral 
                                                
62 Linda Kirk argues that Barbeyrac is right to consider these two versions of the law of nature as 
expressing a different sentiment: Richard Cumberland and Natural Law, pp. 24-45. However, both Jon 
Parkin and Knud Haakonssen have subsequently challenged this reading: Parkin, Science, Religion and 
Politics, p. 108 and Haakonssen, ‘The Character and Obligation of Natural Law According to Richard 
Cumberland’, pp. 37-39. 
63 Pufendorf, DNG, 1.6.5: ‘l’idée du bien ou de Mal’.  
64 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.5, Note 4. Cf. Jacques Bernard’s review of Francis Gastrell’s The Certainty and 
Necessity of Religion in general: Or the first Grounds and Principles of Humane Duty establish’d, where 
Bernard claims that Gastrell admits no other form of obligation than the power of a superior to render 
those subject to him happier or more miserable and the motivation for obedience that this inspires in 
individuals: Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, (Amsterdam, [Avril] 1700), p. 408. 
65 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.5, Note 4: ‘on confond ici le motif de l’Obligation, ou ce qui porte le plus 
efficacement à s’y soûmettre, avec le fondement de l’Obligation, ou la raison pourquoi on est tenu 
indispensiblement de faire telle ou telle chose’.  
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obligation is thus ‘the Will of a Superior, whose power with respect to our Happiness or 
Misery consequently serves to move our Will’ and lead us to our duty.66 
 
Barbeyrac’s interpretation of Cumberland is somewhat problematic here. He means to 
take the opportunity that he sees in both Pufendorf’s and Cumberland’s texts to make it 
clear that while sanctions are essential to the idea of law, with respect to the moral 
obligation, they can only ever constitute a motive for obedience by virtue of the utility 
that is thereby accrued. The difficulty arising from Barbeyrac’s commentary here is that 
Cumberland also rejects the idea that sanctions could be ‘the cause of Obligation, which 
comes wholly from the Law and the Legislator’, conceiving of them instead as 
‘evidence’ of the law of nature or as a ‘motive’ for obeying its precepts.67 In this 
instance, then, Barbeyrac makes something of a straw man out of Cumberland in the 
service of his own wider argument. This is all the more perplexing given that in the later 
Traité philosophique, Barbeyrac takes his interpretation in the opposite direction and 
offers a picture of Cumberland that makes him an ally of his own way of thinking, that 
is to say, with God as ‘the original foundation of Obligation’ and natural sanctions as 
nothing other than ‘powerful motives to carry us to perform’ our duties.68 While this is 
closer to Cumberland’s actual position, in both cases, Barbeyrac reveals more about his 
own thought than he does about that of his author.  
 
Up to this point, the idea of sanctions has been treated as a single unified concept when, 
in truth, the issue of sanctions was much more complex. First, there was the question of 
whether reward or punishment would be most efficacious in motivating individuals to 
obey the precepts of natural law. Second, there was the question of whether natural 
sanctions alone provided sufficient evidence of or motive for obedience independent of 
divine sanctions and, if not, in what sense it was possible to make use of the idea of 
divine sanctions insofar as they could be known independently of divine revelation. The 
arch sceptic in this exchange was Hobbes, whose principal objection to the obligatory 
force of the laws of nature was that no sanctions, natural or divine, were clearly 
demonstrable. In response to Hobbes, Cumberland argued for a theory of natural 
                                                
66 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.5, Note 4: ‘la Volonté d’un Supérieur, dont le pouvoir par rapport à nôtre 
Bonheur ou nôtre Malheur sert ensuite à mouvoir nôtre Volonté’.  
67 Cumberland, TPLN, 5.22: ‘la cause de l’Obligation, qui vient uniquement de la Loi & du Législateur’.  
68 Barbeyrac, TPLN, 2.35, Note 3: ‘le prémier fondement de l’Obligation’ and ‘puissans motifs, pour nous 
porter à faire’.  
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sanctions that accompany the observation or violation of the law of nature. For 
Cumberland, it is natural rewards rather than natural punishments that may be observed 
with the greatest regularity, thereby overcoming the Hobbesian claim that natural 
punishments for the wicked are not sufficiently consistent to be certain evidence of 
natural sanctions.69  
 
For Barbeyrac, however, while natural rewards may provide evidence of the laws of 
nature, they remain an insufficient motive for obedience. In his response to 
Cumberland’s theory of natural rewards, Barbeyrac thus refers readers to a passage in 
Le droit de la nature where Pufendorf rebukes Cumberland for having assumed that the 
will is more readily moved by the possibility of rewards than by penalties, that is to say, 
that reward alone, such as promoting the common good, is a sufficient motive to compel 
individuals to obey the law of nature.70 Pufendorf claims that on the contrary it is the 
penal sanction that makes us sensible of the need to conform our will to the law.71 
Pufendorf’s point is that natural rewards, such as the rewards of a tranquil conscience 
and the benefits of honestly conducted social relations with other individuals, do not 
motivate us to action with the same force as fear of penal sanctions.72  
 
In his Pufendorf notes, Barbeyrac agrees that punishment rather than reward is the 
greater motive for action, but he adopts the Lockean explanation of why this is so. In 
short, this is the claim that the will is more readily moved by uneasiness than by the 
desire for the greatest good or some other pleasure. This is because, for Locke, as long 
as ‘we desire to be rid of any present Evil… we find ourselves not capable of any the 
least degree of Happiness’.73 In making use of Locke’s argument here, Barbeyrac 
intends to rebut not only Pufendorf and Cumberland but also Bayle, with whom he 
associates the argument that immediate and greatest pleasure is the primary motive for 
action. To this end, Barbeyrac claims that overwhelming immediate passions are the 
motive for action only insofar as they create a sense of uneasiness in the will, i.e., 
anticipated pleasure is not the true motive for action in such cases but rather delivery 
                                                
69 Cumberland, ‘Discours préliminaire’, TPLN, §14-23.  
70 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours préliminaire’, TPLN, §4, Note 1 and §14, Note (where Barbeyrac refers his 
readers to DNG, 1.6.14). 
71 Pufendorf, DNG, 1.6.14 
72 Pufendorf, DNG, 2.3.21. Barbeyrac refers readers of his Cumberland translation to this passage twice: 
Barbeyrac, ‘Discours préliminaire’, TPLN, §4, Note 1 and §17 Note 1.  
73 Locke, Essay, 2.21.64. Cf. Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.14, Note 4.  
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‘from the uneasiness or pressing affliction’ that it provokes.74 It follows from this 
account that, for the most part, Barbeyrac considers the uneasiness produced by fear of 
penal sanctions to provide a stronger motive for obedience to the law of nature than the 
hope of anticipated rewards.   
 
Barbeyrac also takes issue with the position, common to both Cumberland and 
Pufendorf, that because natural knowledge of divine sanctions does not rest on a 
sufficiently secure foundation independently of divine revelation, only natural sanctions 
can be admitted within the sphere of natural law. For Pufendorf, this follows from his 
strict separation of the human and divine forum. But having rejected Cumberland’s 
argument that natural rewards, such as the rewards of a tranquil conscience and benefits 
of honestly conducted social relations with other individuals, may motivate us to action, 
only the motivating force of natural punishments, such as the perturbations of 
conscience, remain.75 This leaves Pufendorf faced with the problem that Cumberland 
hoped to avoid, that is, the inconsistencey and hence insufficiency of natural penal 
sanctions as evidence of or motive for obedience. The most that Pufendorf can say in 
light of the insufficiency of the perturbations of conscience is that it is highly probable 
that ‘God will punish the wickedness of such persons in some other manner’. But, he 
supposes, these punishments are the product of the arbitrary determinations of God’s 
positive will, as a result of which, ‘there remains some obscurity in this matter, insofar 
as it may be determined by the light of Reason alone’.76  
 
For Barbeyrac, what needs to be remedied here is not so much the substance of 
Pufendorf’s argument but rather the degree of probability concerning divine sanctions 
that ought to be admitted within the sphere of natural law. Quoting Locke, Barbeyrac 
argues that highly probable natural knowledge of divine sanctions rests on the fact that  
 
                                                
74 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.14, Note 4: ‘d’une inquietude ou d’une douleur pressante’.  
75 Pufendorf, DNG, 2.3.21. Barbeyrac refers readers to this passage twice: Barbeyrac, ‘Discours 
préliminaire’, TPLN, §4, Note 1 and §17 Note 1.  
76 Pufendorf, DNG, 2.3.21: ‘DIEU punira la malice de ces gens-là d’une autre maniere’ and ‘il reste 
quelque obscurité dans cette question, tant qu’on ne la décide que par les lumieres de la Rasion toute 
seule’.  
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It would be in vain for an Intelligent Being to presume to subject another’s 
actions to a certain Rule, if it was not also in his power to reward him for 
conforming to this rule, and punishing him for deviating from it.77  
 
Moreover, this power to punish and reward cannot simply comprise the natural rewards 
and punishments that follow from the action itself because ‘that which is naturally 
agreeable, or disagreeable would arise in itself without the help of any Law’.78 In short, 
Barbeyrac takes it as read that God, as author of the law of nature, necessarily exercises 
his authority to do more than uphold natural utility, thereby ensuring that ultimately the 
good are rewarded and the wicked punished. In making use of Locke here, Barbeyrac 
ties natural religion and natural morality more closely together than either Cumberland 
or Pufendorf allowed.79  
 
Again following the Lockean line, Barbeyrac takes the argument further by claiming 
that given the high probability of the rewards of eternal happiness and the punishments 
of eternal misery, only a foolish individual would risk infinite misery in the life to come 
for the sake of the pleasures of vicious action in this life. Better instead, for the well-
reasoned individual, to live a virtuous life of misery and pain here on earth with the 
prospect of infinite happiness in the life to come. Divine sanctions thus enter into our 
moral reasonings by virtue not only of their high probability but also because of the 
stakes involved.80 The problem for Barbeyrac is that in allying himself so strongly to 
Locke in the development of his argument that natural reason gives us sufficient 
knowledge of the divine nature and divine sanctions, his argument consequently 
depends upon the coherence of Locke’s original argument and yet it is not clear that 
Barbeyrac’s Lockean reply successfully overcomes the same objections that could be 
levied against either himself, Locke or even Pufendorf’s original argument.81 
                                                
77 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.9, Note 3: ‘Ce seroit aussi en vain qu’un Etre Intelligent prétendroit soumettre les 
actions d’un autre à une certain Régle, s’il n’est pas en son pouvoir de le recompenser lorsqu’il se 
conforme à cettre régle, & de le punir lorsqu’il s’en éloigne’. Cf. Locke, Essay, 2.28.6.  
78 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.9, Note 3: ‘ce qui est naturellement commode ou incommode agiroit de lui-même 
sans le secours d’aucune Loi’. Cf. Locke, Essay, 2.28.6.  
79 For an account of Locke’s theory of moral obligation in the final edition of the Essay, also situated 
within its immediate historical context, see Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal 
‘Ought’ 1640-1740, (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 149-175. For a detailed analysis of the various arguments 
related to Locke’s account of moral obligation, including his arguments concerning belief, probability and 
moral judgement, see James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts, (Cambridge, 
1993).  
80 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.21, Note 7. Here Barbeyrac quotes from Locke, Essay, 2.21.70.  
81 On the limitations of Locke’s argument see K. Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, pp. 
51-58 and more critically J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, pp. 142-152.  
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V 
Barbeyrac on Leibniz: Human and Divine Justice 
 
As we have seen, Barbeyrac and his chosen interlocutors draw elements of their 
arguments for the foundation of the law of nature and moral obligation from both sides 
of the alleged rationalist-voluntarist divide. Leibniz shares this characteristic inasmuch 
as his comprehensive Platonic ideal of justice as ‘charity of the wise’ retains the 
voluntarist idea that the precepts of this justice necessitate voluntary acts of charity, i.e., 
justice is not purely relational.82 Like so many other early modern natural law theorists, 
Leibniz also has high praise for ‘the incomparable’ Grotius for what he considers to be 
Grotius’s recognition that God is not the ‘cause’ of goodness and justice.83 However, in 
his ‘Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf’, originally written as a letter to the 
Helmstadt professor J. C. Boehmer, Leibniz expressed nothing but disdain for 
Pufendorf both as a jurist and a philosopher.84  
 
The sources of the relationship between Pufendorf’s and Leibniz’s arguments and of the 
latter’s enmity towards the former are complex, disputed and far beyond the brief of the 
present work. Both were deeply concerned with the relationship between church and 
state and with the condition of the German empire as a political unit. But despite 
overlapping educational paths, they deployed very different philosophical ideas to deal 
with these matters. Pufendorf has generally been seen as drawing on neo-Stoic ideas, 
though his Hobbesian leanings have seen him allied with Epicurean elements.85 First of 
all, he has been interpreted as developing a distinctly ‘civil’ concept of philosophy as 
concerned with the nature and possibility of social living organised by political means 
for the sake of peace.86 In sharp contrast, there is general agreement that Leibniz was the 
great metaphysician of individual and communal life, drawing above all on Platonic 
inspiration. Another way of looking at this divergence is that it represents two different 
                                                
82 Riley, Patrick, ‘Introduction’, in Leibniz: Political Writings, pp. 2-7.  
83 Leibniz, G. W. F., ‘An Unpublished Manuscript of Leibniz on the Allegiance Due to Sovereign Powers 
(1695)’ in Leibniz: Political Writings, p. 210. Likewise, Leibniz commends Grotius for his insight that 
natural obligation would subsist even if there were no God: ‘Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf 
(1706)’, in Leibniz: Political Writings, p. 71.   
84 Leibniz, ‘Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf, p. 65 
85 Hochstrasser explains the Stoic side of Pufendorf’s argument, see Natural Law Theories, pp. 72-83. For 
the Hobbesian features, see Palladini, ‘Pufendorf disciple of Hobbes’, pp. 49-59. Cf. Barbeyrac’s remarks 
on the relationship between Pufendorf and Leibniz: Barbeyrac, ‘Avis posterieur, sur la quatriéme édition’ 
[originally dated Groningen, 15th November 1717], DHC [1718], pp. xxix-xxx.  
86 Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, pp. 148-196.  
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forms of Lutheranism. In any case, Leibniz and Pufendorf reached conflicting 
conclusions about the relationship between God and man within the sphere of natural 
law and thus the foundation of moral obligation.87 
 
Barbeyrac himself received a copy of Leibniz’s letter from Turrettini, to whom Leibniz 
had sent his own copy after becoming engaged in a correspondence with the Genevan 
theologian concerning their shared ideal of a reunited Christendom.88 It was Barbeyrac’s 
translation of Leibniz’s Latin letter into French, together with his own commentary 
thereupon – both appended to the 1718 edition of Les devoirs under the joint title 
‘Jugement d’un anonyme avec des réflexions du traducteur’ – that first brought the text 
to the attention of a Francophone audience.  
 
Barbeyrac’s interjection in the debate is notable for the depth of his disdain both for 
Leibniz’s philosophy and the philosopher himself. In a letter to the Leibnizian natural 
philosopher and fellow Huguenot Louis Bourguet (1678-1742), Barbeyrac claims that 
Leibniz’s ‘attack’ on Pufendorf was personally motivated: 
 
It was the secret jealously that he held against all those who distinguished 
themselves in the Republic of Letters, and the desire to cast down their 
productions. I have been witness to it many times, amongst others with 
respect to Mr. Locke, who was by contrast a judicious philosopher.89  
 
Barbeyrac goes on to castigate Leibniz for not being as useful to the Republic of Letters 
as he should have been, largely because of his preoccupation to ‘exert a kind of 
Despotism, above all in his own country’.90 The charge of impropriety of conduct within 
the Republic of Letters was intended as a damning judgement in an intellectual milieu 
                                                
87 Knud Haakonssen suggests that Pufendorf drew on Lutheran theology in a way that subverted Luther’s 
original intention in arguing for a radical gulf between man and God. In this way, Pufendorf challenged 
the dominant tradition of Lutheran scholasticism adopted by Leibniz: Natural Law and Moral 
Philosophy, pp. 36-49 but especially pp. 36-37.  
88 In a letter to Turrettini, Barbeyrac thanks him for the copy of Leibniz’s letter, which he says, is full of 
false imputations and reveals Leibniz’s desire to disparage Pufendorf. Barbeyrac to Turrettini (Lausanne, 
29.09.1715), Ms. 484 (n. 190), in the archives at the Bibliothèque de Genève. For a detailed summary of 
the contents of the letter see: Pitassi, Inventaire critique, Vol. III, pp. 125-126.  
89 Barbeyrac to Bourguet, Lausanne [undated but chronologically identifiable as December 1716], Ms. 
1226 (n.2), in the archives at the Bibliothèque universitaire et publique de Neuchâtel: ‘C’est la jalousie 
secréte qu’il avoit contre tous ce qui se distinguoient un peu dans la République des Lettres, & l’envie de 
déprimer leurs productions. J’en ai été témoin plusieurs fois, & entr’autres, à l’égard de Mr. Locke, qui 
étoit un philosophe tout autrement judicieux’. For an account of Leibniz’s exchange with Locke see: 
Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography, (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 406-418.  
90 Barbeyrac to Bourguet, Lausanne, [undated but chronologically identifiable as December 1716]. Ms. 
1226 (n.2): ‘execer une espéce de Despotisme, sur tout dans son païs’.  
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where the unspoken rules of discourse constituted a binding social code.91 This 
emphasis on proper conduct is further reflected in Barbeyrac’s own anxiety following 
Leibniz’s death in between Barbeyrac’s ‘Jugement d’un anonyme’ going to print and 
being published; in preventing Leibniz from taking up the right of reply, the publication 
could have been misconstrued as intentionally disrespectful.92 
 
Leibniz did not write a treatise on natural law but, in his various essays on the subject, 
he argued for the idea of universal justice, or the ‘charity of the wise’, comprised not 
only of strict justice but also of all that is good and virtuous.93 In contrast to Pufendorf’s 
strict separation of natural and moral good, Leibniz claims that ‘by moral I mean that 
which is equivalent to ‘natural’ for a good man’ who acts from a principle of love rather 
than duty.94 Love here is understood as a feeling of moral perfection that in itself gives 
rise to moral necessity: ‘One cannot know God as one ought without loving him above 
all things, and one cannot love him thus without willing what he wills’.95 Thus love 
rather than will is the foundation of the law of nature and moral obligation. Moral 
necessity does not derive from the command of a superior but rather from the ‘light of 
eternal reason, kindled in us by the divinity’.96 For Leibniz, knowledge of the nature of 
things and properly constituted right reason are sufficient to impress upon individuals 
not only the content of natural law but also the obligatory character of its precepts.  
 
At the heart of Leibniz’s claim that reason alone is proper foundation of moral 
obligation is the belief that there is a moral community between God and man, such that 
the difference between divine and human justice is one of degree not kind. Justice thus 
construed is one of the ‘eternal truths, objects of the divine intellect, which constitute, 
so to speak, the essence of the divinity itself’.97 God is the example of true moral 
perfection and the task of human justice is to imitate, insofar as possible, divine justice. 
From this perspective, morality is thought to be more than simply obedience to divine 
commands: ‘he who acts well, not out of hope or fear, but by an inclination of the soul, 
                                                
91 In Impolite Learning, Anne Goldgar investigates the complex nature of the relationships that sustained 
the Republic of Letters as an intellectual community of equals within which there were nonetheless 
established hierarchies and unspoken rules of conduct, see Chapter 3, pp. 115-173 in particular.  
92 Barbeyrac, ‘Avis posterieur, sur la quatriéme édition’, pp. xxvi-xxix.  
93 Leibniz, ‘Codex Iuris Gentium (Praefatio) (1693)’, in Leibniz: Political Writings, p. 171.  
94 Leibniz, ‘Codex Iuris Gentium’, p. 171.  
95 Leibniz, ‘Meditation on the Common Conception of Justice’, p. 59.  
96 Leibniz, ‘Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf’, p. 75.  
97 Leibniz, ‘Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf’, p. 71. 
  
71 
 
is so far from behaving justly that, on the contrary, he acts more justly than all 
others’.98In short, law constrains a man to act in accordance with justice but what really 
counts for true justice is acting from the principle of love of God, who is ‘so worthy of 
love that it is happiness [itself] to serve such a master’.99  
 
In his ‘Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf’, Leibniz wants to distinguish his own 
position from that of Hobbes and Pufendorf, who in his eyes both make justice depend 
solely on power, thus ‘confounding right and law’, the latter understood here as the de 
facto exercise of power.100 This claim lies at the heart of his critique of Pufendorf, who 
he argues has improperly identified the end, the object and the efficient cause of natural 
law. By this, Leibniz means to say that Pufendorf should not have limited the end of 
natural law to the human forum alone for both the idea of immortality of the soul and of 
the life hereafter may be established in all probability by right reason. Likewise, the 
object of natural law should not be restricted to external action because what constitutes 
just actions, for Leibniz, is the intention more so than the physical performance.101  
 
As we have already seen in his own response to Pufendorf, Barbeyrac himself does not 
adhere to Pufendorf’s stipulation that natural law must be limited to considerations of 
external actions within the human forum. However, rather than conceding the case 
against Pufendorf, Barbeyrac suggests, somewhat disingenuously, that Pufendorf 
himself did not adhere as strictly to the separation of natural law and moral theology as 
Leibniz had implied. He claims instead that Pufendorf tacitly acknowledged and 
certainly ‘never denied’ the principles on which considerations of the life to come are 
grounded.102 Likewise, Barbeyrac suggests that Pufendorf does not entirely exclude 
concern for internal actions of the soul but rather focuses ‘for the most part’ on how the 
law of nature serves to form men’s external actions.103 Ian Hunter draws attention to the 
subversive nature of Barbeyrac’s translation of Pufendorf in these passages, where he 
wilfully misrepresents Pufendorf’s original and quite explicit rejection of the same ideas 
                                                
98 Leibniz, ‘Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf’, p. 72. 
99 Leibniz, ‘Codex Iuris Gentium’, p. 173.  
100 Leibniz, ‘Meditation on the Common Conception of Justice’, p. 50.  
101 Leibniz, ‘Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf’, p. 69.  
102 Barbeyrac, ‘Jugement d’un anonyme’, §6: ‘n’a jamais nié’  
103 Barbeyrac, ‘Jugement d’un anonyme’, §7: ‘EN GRANDE PARTIE’.  
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that Barbeyrac subsequently wants to ascribe to him.104 To a large extent, therefore, 
Barbeyrac’s defence of Pufendorf is more adequate as a representation of his own 
thought than that of his author. 
 
Nonetheless, while Barbeyrac may agree in general terms with Leibniz that 
considerations of the life to come are essential to the foundation of natural law and 
moral obligation, he alleges that the particular arguments advanced by Leibniz confuse 
‘Duty with the effects or the motives for its observation’.105 For Barbeyrac, as we saw 
above, it is of utmost importance that the motivating force of utility, that is to say, the 
rewards and punishments anticipated in the life to come, must be kept conceptually 
distinct from the proper foundation of the law of nature. In his opinion, the greatest 
weakness of Leibniz’s theory of natural law and moral obligation is that it does not 
successfully do this, frequently claiming instead that Leibniz does not properly 
distinguish between justice and utility. 
 
Leibniz’s third objection poses a much deeper philosophical problem, namely that in 
making the efficient cause  – which is Leibniz’s way of saying the foundation of moral 
obligation proper – derive from the command of a superior, Pufendorf (and Barbeyrac 
in his wake) end up in a philosophical circle, whereby ‘the source of law is the will of a 
superior and, inversely, a justifying cause of law is necessary in order to have a 
superior’.106. For Leibniz, the problem is that even if one acknowledges that man is 
always subject to God and thus always subject to the requirements of justice, God 
cannot be both the source of justice and yet be thought of as just independent of the law 
that he himself prescribes.107 Moreover, even if Pufendorf’s argument were true, it 
would mean that man would not love God for his goodness, but only fear Him for his 
greatness just as one fears the power of a tyrant.  
 
This particular objection has attracted considerable attention among modern scholars; 
on the one hand, those who claim that Leibniz identified the core philosophical problem 
at the heart of ‘voluntarist’ natural law and, on the other hand, those who argue for a 
                                                
104 Ian Hunter, ‘Conflicting Obligations: Pufendorf, Barbeyrac and Leibniz on Civil Authority’, in History 
of Political Thought 25:4 (2004), p. 692.  
105 Barbeyrac, ‘Jugement d’un anonyme’, §6: ‘le Devoir avec les effets ou les motifs de son observation’.  
106 Leibniz, ‘Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf’, p. 73.  
107 Leibniz, Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf’, p. 71. 
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contextual reading of Pufendorf that defends his attempt to establish binding moral 
obligation without recourse to transcendental moral norms.108 Most agree, however, that 
Barbeyrac’s defence of Pufendorf strayed too far from his author’s original – and 
innovative – proposal without successfully overcoming the Leibnizian objection. Rather 
than reiterate the substance of past debates about how ‘successful’ Barbeyrac’s reply to 
Leibniz was, the present discussion will focus on Barbeyrac’s response within the 
context of his own natural law project.  
 
Leibniz’s basic objection is that Pufendorf fails to provide independent moral grounds 
for God as a legitimate superior and thus for what makes the law just and moral 
obligation morally necessary. Pufendorf’s original argument rests on the idea that 
neither force nor excellence of nature alone confer the right to impose an obligation but 
rather both are needed in order to produce ‘in the mind of a Rational Creature, the 
sentiments of fear accompanying those of respect’.109 To this end, Pufendorf claims that 
a legitimate superior must possess both sufficient force and just reasons to compel our 
obedience. While force is essential to assert one’s right, the legitimacy of the superior 
also depends on the just reasons for his authority, of which there are two:  
 
one is because he has rendered me some considerable good, especially if – 
being clearly well-intentioned towards me and more capable of managing 
my interests than myself – he actually means to govern my conduct; the 
other is because I have voluntarily submitted to his direction.110  
 
In short, for Pufendorf, the foundation of the right to impose an indispensible moral 
obligation on individuals derives either from the extraordinary good rendered by the 
superior or from the voluntary consent of those subject to him. 
 
Barbeyrac raises several objections to Pufendorf’s argument here, offering what he 
believes to be a more satisfactory account of the nature of divine authority and the 
                                                
108 See the different interpretations offered by J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, pp. 250-259, 
Hunter, ‘Conflicting Obligations’, esp. pp. 675-681 and Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, pp. 72-110. 
Another important discussion of this debate that takes Barbeyrac as its principal focus is Petter Korkman, 
Barbeyrac and Natural Law, Chapter 4, pp. 183-229.  
109 Pufendorf, DNG, 1.6.9: ‘dans l’ame d’une Créature Raisonnable des sentimens de crainte 
accompagnez de sentimens de respect’.  
110 Pufendorf, DHC, 1.2.5: ‘l’une est, parcequ’il m’a fait quelque bien considerable; surtout si étant 
manifestement bien intentionné en ma faveur, & plus capable de ménager mes intérêts que moi-même, il 
veut actuellement prendre soin de ma conduite; l’autre, c’est parceque je me suis volontairement soumis à 
sa direction’.  
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foundation of moral obligation that he believed could withstand Leibniz’s critique. In 
response to Pufendorf’s statement of the just reasons for legitimate authority, Barbeyrac 
claims first that Pufendorf ought to have distinguished more clearly between God’s 
right to command and that of the civil sovereign. The foundation of God’s authority, as 
the ‘King of Kings’, is qualitatively different from that of the civil sovereign, whose 
authority is founded in reasons ‘the justice of which depends on some Precept of 
Natural Law’.111 In short, the latter presupposes and necessarily depends upon the 
former, that is to say, it rests on the implicit contract created by voluntary submission to 
the civil authority.112 Of the just reasons alleged by Pufendorf, therefore, only the first 
could be thought to pertain to the foundation of God’s authority and consequently to the 
obligation to submit to the precepts of natural law.113  
 
Second, the reason alleged by Pufendorf to establish God’s authority, namely the 
‘considerable good’ that he has rendered us in the act of Creation, may serve to 
strengthen his right to impose an indispensible moral necessity, but in itself it is 
insufficient as the foundation of such a right. This is because, for Barbeyrac, rendering 
us some considerable good, even the divine creative act, constitutes an act of 
‘Generosity’ that ‘requires nothing other than Gratitude’ and most definitely not 
‘submission to the will of one’s Benefactor’.114 Instead, Barbeyrac claims, ‘it is the 
natural dependence that we are under to the empire of God, insofar as we owe our 
existence to him’ that constitutes the sole, legitimate foundation of his right to 
command our obedience.115 God the Creator forms the faculties of man’s body and soul; 
thus he has the right to prescribe the limits of their usage. This is why, Barbeyrac tells 
us, the most frequently and forcefully articulated dogma in Revelation is that of the 
Creation of the universe and of man.116 In short, Barbeyrac basically agrees with 
Pufendorf that it is God’s act of Creation that is the foundation of God’s right to rule 
but, for Barbeyrac, this is because that act of Creation reveals to us our natural 
                                                
111 Barbeyrac, ‘Jugement d’un anonyme’, §19: ‘du Roi des Rois’ and ‘dont la justice dépend de quelque 
Loi de Droit Naturel’.  
112 Cf. Chapter 5, pp. 162-165. For an interpretation of the debate between Pufendorf, Leibniz and 
Barbeyrac that focuses principally on the question of moral obligation with respect to civil authority, see 
Hunter, ‘Conflicting Obligations’.  
113 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.2.5, Note 1.  
114 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.2.5, Note 3: ‘Un Bienfait’ and ‘ne demande autre chose que la Reconnoissance’ 
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115 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.12, Note 2: ‘c’est la dépendance naturelle où l’on est de l’empire de DIEU, 
entant qu’il nous a donné l’être’.  
116 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.2.5, Note 1.  
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dependence on God rather than inculcating in us a sense of gratitude and thus 
obligation.  
 
Finally, in response to both Pufendorf himself and Leibniz’s critique, Barbeyrac wants 
to establish that it is just reasons alone that confer legitimate moral authority on a 
superior. ‘Force’, he says, ‘does not, properly speaking, enter into the foundation of 
obligation; it serves only to put a Superior in the proper state to make use of his right’.117 
He makes his criticisms of Pufendorf here on the assumption that the latter shared the 
same viewpoint but merely left some ambiguity in his manner of expressing himself. 
This much is evident from his claim that ‘the vicious circle imputed to our author’ 
disappears once it is acknowledged that God’s right to command our obedience is 
‘founded in reasons whose justice is immanent, such that they do not need to draw their 
force from elsewhere’.118 Barbeyrac’s argument here rests on his belief, pace Leibniz, 
that divine and human justice are qualitatively different, as a result of which, in the 
postlapsarian state man cannot meaningfully speak of divine justice other than by 
reference to what we know of human justice. God simply is a legitimate superior to 
whom we owe obedience by virtue of our natural dependence upon Him.  
 
For Barbeyrac, this follows from his belief that human justice is posterior to an act of 
God’s will but the justness of God himself does not depend upon human justice. 
Barbeyrac thus replies to the Leibniz’s claim that we obey God as a tyrant by stating 
that ‘whoever has a true idea of God knows that he is Good, as well as Great, and that 
his will necessarily conforms with his Perfections’. Again taking up the Lockean line of 
argument, Barbeyrac claims that it necessarily follows from this that God is wise and 
holy as well as mighty, thus what He wills is ‘not only just, but also for our own 
good’.119 Moreover, as creatures who depend upon Him, the limits of human knowledge 
of God are the limits that He himself places upon man. Here, philosophically speaking, 
Barbeyrac fails to address Leibniz’s objection. However, in terms of his own 
                                                
117 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.9, Notes 1-2. For an extended discussion of this issue, see the section below on 
Barbeyrac’s reply to Leibniz.  
118 The translation here is taken from David Saunders translation of the text due to the clarity of 
expression that it offers: ‘Judgement of an Anonymous Writer’, §19. Cf. Barbeyrac, ‘Jugement d’un 
anonyme’, §19: ‘Le cercle vicieux qu’on reproche à notre Auteur’ and ‘fondé sur des raisons, qui portent 
leur justice avec elles, & qui n’ont pas besoin d’emprunter d’ailleurs leur force’.  
119 Barbeyrac, ‘Jugement d’un anonyme’, §16: ‘Quiconque a une veritable idée de DIEU, sait qu’il est 
Bon aussibien que Grand, & que sa volonté est nécessairement conforme à ses Perfections’ and ‘non 
seulement que de juste, mais encore qui ne soit pour notre bien’. Cf. Chapter 1, pp. 29-30. 
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philosophical and theological position – in keeping with the Lockean dictum that God 
himself determines the limits of human knowledge of the divine – Barbeyrac believes 
himself limited to but nonetheless well-founded in asserting that a ‘true’ idea of God is 
necessarily an idea of God as just and good. It is, says Barbeyrac, the knowledge that 
we have of God as an infinitely perfect Being that assures us of the veracity of this idea 
of God. All that we know of divine justice is that the will of God is ‘always in accord 
with every perfection of the Divine Nature’.120 Barbeyrac was not alone in treating this 
basic assumption as well justified; his fellow Pufendorf commentator Carmichael 
followed a similar line of argument, in this respect at least, in his defence of Pufendorf 
against Leibniz’s objections.121  
 
Moreover, for Barbeyrac, it is Leibniz whose position is unsustainable because it is 
Leibniz who goes beyond the limits of human knowledge of the divine nature and thus 
divine justice in his arguments. Barbeyrac considers his own position to avoid the 
‘extremes’ of making justice depend entirely on the arbitrary will of God as he 
considers Hobbes to have done or of making justice independent of the will of God as 
he considers Leibniz (or Bayle for quite different reasons) to have done.122 The danger 
of the former position is that is opens the possibility that God could make what is unjust 
just and of the latter that morality and the law of nature may exist independently of 
religion and thus moral obligation to possess an indispensible necessity even for 
atheists.123 In short, Barbeyrac’s main concern is not the same as Leibniz’s concern. For 
Barbeyrac, one need not – and cannot – do more than assert that God is just in virtue of 
                                                
120 Barbeyrac, ‘Jugement d’un anonyme’, §15: ‘toujours d’accord avec toutes les perfections de la Nature 
Divine’.  
121 Despite clear differences between these two Pufendorf commentators, like Barbeyrac, Carmichael’s 
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his infinite perfections. God is thus a legitimate superior in the sense that the just 
reasons for his law lie beyond our comprehension in the unknowable forum of divine 
justice. For Barbeyrac, the fact that this is a pertinent question for Leibniz reveals the 
extent of the difference between his understanding of the relationship between God and 
man in the postlapsarian state and ‘voluntarists’ such as himself, Pufendorf and Locke. 
 
In seeking to establish (i) that divine authority is inherently just (and therefore 
legitimate) and (ii) that the will of God is the foundation of indispensible moral 
obligation knowable by natural reason alone, Barbeyrac therefore abandons Pufendorf’s 
commitment to avoid metaphysical considerations. For Barbeyrac, considerations of the 
life to come cannot be excluded from the field of natural law. Natural reason must be 
able to provide us with evidence of and motive for obedience to these indispensible 
moral obligations independent of either revealed divine law or civil law. This is because 
the way in which one conceives of the relationship between God and man must be able 
to account for all the duties of natural law, that is to say, Barbeyrac’s restatement of the 
classical tripartite classification of the duties of natural law as those owed to God, to 
others and to oneself.124 The first duty of natural law is thus to follow the light of one’s 
conscience, that is, to fulfil one’s duties to God; hence also his concern for the role of 
conscience and the inward sentiment of moral obligation in his response to Pufendorf’s 
theory of moral obligation. 
 
Moreover, as this chapter has attempted to make clear, Barbeyrac’s theory of moral 
obligation makes most sense in the context of the various authors to whom he responds 
both as a translator and as an intellectual within the Republic of Letters. To a large 
extent, this is a consequence of his constant efforts to arrange a whole series of natural 
law theorists into their proper place within his map of the science of morality; a project 
that runs concurrently with the development of his own theory of natural law. What we 
see here is Barbeyrac the eclectic, drawing on and responding to his authors whenever 
he deemed their original arguments to be in need of amelioration. The bigger picture 
that emerges, however, is the extent to which his own theory of natural law and 
obligation attempted to combine Pufendorf and Locke.  
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In this way, Barbeyrac believes himself able to answer both his own and his authors’ 
critics, in particular the charges of Hobbesianism levied by Leibniz and the alternative 
vision of natural morality offered by Bayle. While it is not clear that Barbeyrac 
managed successfully to navigate his way through all these issue to develop a coherent 
and sustainable theory of moral obligation, his commentaries nonetheless reveal his 
efforts to construct a series of arguments that would bolster his wider project of 
developing a theory of natural law within which the moral truths of natural religion and 
morality could be reconciled. This argument, in turn, serves as the foundation for his 
claim that individual conscience acts as the source of authoritative moral judgement. 
For Barbeyrac, conscience always has a fundamental role to play in apprehending and 
executing one’s moral rights and duties, whether with respect to obligatory natural law 
or permissive natural law. Thus while this chapter has focused on how Barbeyrac’s own 
thought was often deeply entwined with that of his authors, in the following chapter, we 
shall see how he made a considerable departure from his authors in an attempt to 
establish his innovative but ultimately inchoate concept of permissive natural law. 
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Chapter Three 
Permissive Natural Law 
 
I 
Introduction 
 
‘Permission is as real an effect of the Law, taken in all its extension, as the strongest 
and most indispensable Obligation’.1 With these words, Barbeyrac indicates that natural 
law should not be restricted solely to the obligatory precepts that determine the strict 
rights and duties, that is to say, precepts that lay individuals under an indispensable 
moral necessity. In this, he differs from his principal authors Grotius and Pufendorf for 
whom permission denotes ‘a pure inaction’ of the law.2 Arguing against this 
perspective, Barbeyrac wants to establish that the liberty that ‘the Law leaves to do or 
not do certain things, comprises something more than a negative permission’.3 
Barbeyrac thus rejects Pufendorf’s basic line of argument that all things not explicitly 
commanded or prohibited by natural law come under the province of rights only in the 
sense that one has a negative permission to make use of one’s natural liberty according 
to one’s will.4 Instead Barbeyrac argues that there is a special category of rights 
governed by the natural law of simple permission by virtue of which individuals are 
granted the ‘right or the moral power to assuredly and legitimately possess certain 
things, or to do or to require from others certain actions, as one deems appropriate’.5  
 
In the reciprocal relationship that Barbeyrac insists obtains between rights and 
obligations, what is distinctive about the rights accorded by the natural law of simple 
                                                
1 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.9, Note 5: ‘La Permission est un effet aussi réel de la Loi, prise dans toute son 
etenduë, que l’Obligation la plus forte & la plus indispensible’.  
2 Both Pufendorf and Grotius use the phrase ‘une pure inaction’ to describe the relationship of permission 
to law: Grotius, DGP, 1.1.9 and Pufendorf, DNG, 1.6.15. Despite these explicit disavowals of the concept 
of permissive natural law, Barbeyrac indicates that both authors refer to the concept of permission within 
their treatises (DNG, 1.6.15, Note 2). While this claim is more persuasive in Grotius’s case than in 
Pufendorf’s, neither author accords to permissive natural law anything like the role that Barbeyrac wants 
to ascribe to it. Grotius’s use of the concept of permissive natural law across his natural law writings is 
discussed by Brian Tierney in The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and 
Church Law, 1150-1625, (Michigan, 1997), Chapter 13, especially pp. 328-333.    
3 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.3, Note 1: ‘les Loix laissent de faire ou de ne pas faire certaines choses, renferme 
quelque chose de plus qu’une permission négative’.  
4 Pufendorf, DNG, 1.6.3; Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.3, Note 2.  
5 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.15, Note 2: ‘le droit ou le pouvoir moral d’avoir surement & légitimement 
certaines choses, ou de faire & d’exiger même d’autrui certaines actions, s’ils le jugent à propos’.  
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permission is that the corresponding obligation only arises after individuals take up 
these rights. However, once individuals legitimately make use of the rights accorded by 
permissive natural law, it is incumbent on all others not to hinder them in the enjoyment 
of these rights. To this end, Barbeyrac claims that ‘it is not because one is obliged to do 
a certain thing, that somebody else has a right to require it, but on the contrary, it is 
because somebody has a right to require a certain thing, that one is obliged to do it’.6 
This is in contrast to obligatory natural law, which specifies certain rights, for example, 
the right to have others uphold the duties of sociability towards you just as you have the 
same duty towards them. The rights of permissive natural law, on the other hand, 
possess a different kind of potential for Barbeyrac within his wider moral theory. In 
short, permissive natural law opens up the possibility for a concept of natural rights that 
are claimable by individuals possessed of the moral judgement to make proper use of 
them, and yet that may also be relinquished, as circumstances require.  
 
In making use of the concept of permissive natural law, Barbeyrac is drawing on a 
specific language of natural rights that Brian Tierney argues originates in the Roman 
law tradition and is subsequently employed within both the medieval and the early 
modern natural law tradition.7 Barbeyrac himself mentions both John Selden (1584-
1654) and his fellow Pufendorf commentator Titius as natural law theorists in whose 
footsteps he follows in making use of the concept of permissive natural law.8 For 
Tierney, what makes permissive natural law distinctive is that it defines ‘an area of 
human freedom where a judgement of reason could decide, according to circumstances, 
among actions that were morally valid in themselves’.9 That is to say, Tierney 
emphasises the freedom granted by permissive natural law to undertake and follow 
one’s individual moral judgement. Yet it must also be borne in mind that in the early 
modern period, permissive natural law did not have the character of being a ‘power 
conferring norm’ as Joachim Hruschka describes it in the critical philosophy of 
                                                
6 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.9, Note 5: ‘ce n’est point parce qu’on est obligé de faire telle ou telle chose, que 
quelcun a droit de l’exiger, mais au contraire, c’est parce que quelcun a droit d’exiger telle ou telle chose, 
qu’on est obligé de la faire’.  
7 Scholarship on permissive natural law is fairly limited. Brian Tierney gives an overview of permissive 
natural law from the Roman law jurisconsults to Kant in his article ‘Permissive Natural Law and 
Property: Gratian to Kant’, in Journal of the History of Ideas 62:3 (2001). Permissive natural law is also 
an important theme in Tierney’s earlier book Natural Rights. 
8 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.15, Note 2.  
9 Tierney, ‘Permissive Natural Law and Property’, p. 398.  
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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).10 The shift that had occurred by the time that Kant is 
writing is the shift towards rights as fully claimable within both the natural and civil 
state.    
 
For both Tierney and Hruschka, the primary focus of permissive natural rights in the 
texts that they focus on is as a ground for the institution of property rights. It is with this 
focus in mind that Tierney dismisses Barbeyrac as not having discussed either 
permissive natural law in general or permissive law as the ground of individual property 
rights.11 The purpose of this chapter is to argue that permissive natural law was in fact a 
central feature of Barbeyrac’s wider natural law theory and that it is intrinsically linked 
not only to the foundation of property rights but also to the extensive role that he wants 
to ascribe to the faculty of conscience. The first half of the discussion in this chapter 
will focus on how Barbeyrac defined and developed his concept of permissive natural 
law where it will be argued that his Traité du jeu is his most explicit attempt to make 
sense of how permissive natural law opened up the possibility for a private sphere of 
judgement. The second half of this chapter will demonstrate that Barbeyrac’s concept of 
permissive natural law is fundamental to his claims about how speech, property and 
commerce come to be instituted within the natural, i.e., pre-civil, state.  
 
II 
Barbeyrac’s Natural Law of Simple Permission 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, for Barbeyrac, all law derives from the will of a 
legitimate superior. But in contrast to obligatory natural law, where the will of a 
legitimate superior ‘imposes the necessity to act or not act in a certain manner’, 
Barbeyrac’s law of simple permission, by virtue of the silence of the same legislator, 
‘leaves the liberty to act or not act as one deems appropriate’.12 What makes the special 
category of rights accorded by permissive natural law distinctive is that the liberty 
granted is better understood as a moral liberty rather than a natural liberty. This is 
                                                
10 Joachim Hruschka focuses on the development of permissive law within the German context citing 
Gottfried Achenwall and Christian Thomasius as particularly important precursors to Kant: ‘The 
Permissive Law of Practical Reason in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals’, in Law and Philosophy 23 (2004), 
especially pp. 56-61. 
11 Tierney, ‘Permissive Natural Law and Property’, p. 393, fn. 55. Hruschka also considers Barbeyrac in 
only the briefest terms: ‘The Permissive Law of Practical Reason’, p. 61, fn. 45.  
12 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.2.2, Note 1: ‘leur impose la nécessité d’agir ou de ne pas agir d’une certain 
maniere’ and ‘laisse la liberté d’agir ou de ne point agir, comme il juge à propos’.  
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because the ensuing rights are derived from and thus in Barbeyrac’s own words are 
‘positively regulated by the Law’.13 Yet for this liberty to be meaningful it cannot be 
solely determined by the law that gives rise to it. It must also include some element of 
individual moral judgement. Barbeyrac’s concept of permissive natural law should 
therefore be read as his attempt to grapple with the question of what role the moral 
judgements of conscience have to play in a moral philosophy grounded in law.   
 
This attempt links back to the idea that for conscience to be the source of authoritative 
moral judgements, it cannot simply be the voice of God within an individual as is the 
case with mere enthusiasm.14  Law thus provides the necessary structure to guide its 
determinations. By making use of the concept of permissive natural law, Barbeyrac has 
a framework for defending the judgements of conscience as legislative by analogy not 
only with respect to the obligatory precepts of natural law but rather all moral 
judgements made by individuals. The liberty accorded to individuals by permissive 
natural law is the liberty to make what are essentially private moral judgements about 
whether to do or forbear from certain actions ‘as one deems appropriate’, circumscribed 
by the precepts of both obligatory and permissive natural law. The faculty of 
conscience, as ‘the immediate rule of our Actions’ and thus the source of these 
judgements, can consequently be considered to operate within a legally, that is to say 
morally, defined sphere of action.15 Thus Barbeyrac’s definition of conscience as ‘the 
judgement that each individual forms concerning his own actions, compared with the 
idea that he has of a certain Rule, namely Law’ takes as its guiding ‘rule’ permissive as 
well as obligatory natural law.16 The only difference here, insofar as there is one, is the 
extent to which each form of law accords conscience a genuine power to act as a moral 
arbiter in coming to such judgement, as opposed to merely apprehending and acceding 
to pre-existing moral precepts. 
 
Barbeyrac’s argument that the liberty to act or not act as one deems appropriate is a 
positive rather than negative permission rests on his claim that God’s silence, as divine 
legislator, implies positive approbation. God alone, Barbeyrac tells us, ‘has the power to 
                                                
13 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.9, Note 5: ‘positivement réglées par la Loi’.  
14 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.3.4, Note 3.  
15 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.3.4, Note 3: ‘la régle immediate de nos Actions’.  
16 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.1.5, Note 1: ‘le jugément que chacun porte de ses propres actions, comparées avec 
les idées qu’il a d’une certaine Régle, nommé Loi’. Cf. Chapter 1, pp. 33-34 and Chapter 2, p. 53.  
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direct all Actions in general of those who depend upon him’ but because He does not 
actually impose the necessity to act or not act in all things under His direction, those 
things not directly prescribed or prohibited can be said to be positively – though tacitly 
– permitted.17 Silence can be taken as a certain mark of God’s approbation precisely 
because in the capacity of divine legislator He ‘designed to forbid all that he judged to 
be evil’.18 Barbeyrac’s reasoning is simply that anything not expressly prescribed or 
prohibited by natural law must be positively permissible in the eyes of God because 
God has both the right and the intention of ‘exhorting Men to Virtue’ in whatever 
capacity he acts.19  
 
Lurking in the background to Barbeyrac’s claim that God’s silence implies positive 
approbation is his own response to his Calvinist theological heritage. Traditional 
Calvinist theology was significantly shaped by the doctrine of predestination. However, 
by the time that Barbeyrac was writing, few moral theorists – Barbeyrac included – 
subscribed to the idea of direct and particular acts of providence in daily human life.20 In 
his ‘Discours sur la nature du sort’, Barbeyrac argues that all events, even those that 
depend upon chance, are determined either by the determinations of human will or the 
unchanging laws of movement.21 In short, unless there is overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary, ‘there is no reason to assume a particular and immediate providence, which 
acts alone’.22 This is because ‘His infinite wisdom has so well foreseen all things that he 
does not often need to make exception to the general Laws’.23 Instead, we must praise 
God in his general providence, for we receive all that we have from Him, both as the 
architect of the mechanical laws of nature, and also the legislator of the moral laws of 
nature.24 The fact that God does not intervene in the world and thus determine the 
outcome of all arbitrary mechanical acts, as well as human moral acts, is essential to 
                                                
17 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.2.2, Note 1: ‘le pouvoir de diriger toutes les Actions généralement de ceux qui 
dépendent de lui’.  
18 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.17, Note 1: ‘a prétendu defender tout ce qu’il jugeoit mauvais’.  
19 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.17, Note 3: ‘de porter les Hommes à la Vertu’. Even as temporal monarch of the 
Judaic nation, i.e., as a civil legislator, God cannot positively permit anything that is bad in itself because 
to do so would violate the sanctity of His own nature. Cf. Chapter 4, Section IV for Barbeyrac’s 
distinction between the divine permissions of natural and positive divine law.  
20 Thomas M. Lennon, Reading Bayle, (Toronto, 1999), p. 150.  
21 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours de l’auteur sur la nature du sort’, §12-13. 
22 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours sur la nature du sort’, §13: ‘on n’aucune raison de supposer une Providence 
particuliére & immédiate, qui agisse seule’.  
23 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours sur l’utilité des lettres et des sciences’, p. 114: ‘Son infinie Sagesse a si bien 
prévû toutes choses, qu’il n’a pas souvent besoin de faire des exceptions aux Loix générales’. 
24 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours sur la nature du sort’, §19. 
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Barbeyrac’s idea of moral permission. In short, there must be a sphere of intentional 
human actions within which God lays down certain laws, either as obligatory or 
permissible, and yet leaves the moral responsibility with human beings, who ought to 
determine their own wills in accordance with the injunctions laid down by God.  
 
By virtue of his natural law of simple permission, Barbeyrac effectively distinguished 
two spheres of human moral action: the sphere of obligatory moral action and the 
sphere of permissible moral action. Notably both spheres are governed by law, that is to 
say, under the direction of the will of God. The real difference is that the former is a 
sphere of authority in which individuals are subject to an indispensible necessity to 
conform to the will of God and the latter is a sphere of private judgement in which 
individuals are authorised to make moral judgements consonant with the light of 
conscience. In effect, Barbeyrac is trying to square the circle by making all human 
action moral and thus subject to the will of God without sacrificing the thing that makes 
such action essentially moral, i.e., its imputivity. To do so, Barbeyrac considers it 
necessary to explain how all action may be subject to a moral law without insisting that 
all actions encompassed within a moral law are necessarily prescriptive.   
 
To this end, Barbeyrac argues that human actions may be divided into three categories: 
good, bad and indifferent.25 Morally good and bad actions are those that positively 
conform to or deviate from the prescriptions and prohibitions of obligatory natural law. 
These are, however, relatively few in number. In contrast to Barbeyrac, Pufendorf’s 
theory of natural law principally focuses on morally good and bad actions, in particular 
their application within the civil sphere. For Pufendorf, morally indifferent actions are 
those where individuals possess a natural liberty to act independently of any specific 
norms, that is to say, a negative permission where the legislator and thus the moral law 
do not directly intervene. Barbeyrac chides Pufendorf for failing to grasp the true 
character of morally indifferent actions. It is these actions, Barbeyrac tells us, that 
‘everyone may legitimately do or not do, as he deems appropriate, by virtue of the Law 
of simple Permission’.26 This comprises a much larger field of action, namely all actions 
not already determined by obligatory natural law.  
                                                
25 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.7.1, Note 1.  
26 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.7.5, Note 5: ‘chaqun peut légitimement faire ou ne pas faire, selon qu’il le juge à 
propos, en vertu d’une Loi de simple Permission’.  
  
85 
 
 
With reference to his fellow Pufendorf commentator Titius, Barbeyrac thus defines 
morally indifferent actions as those actions that ‘one may also call Good in a negative 
sense, that is to say, not-bad’.27 Morally indifferent actions are actions that concern the 
doing of certain things that have the potential to be morally licit insofar as their actual 
practice stems from a good intention and in pursuit of a legitimate end. By tying 
together his concept of moral indifference and permissive natural law, however, 
Barbeyrac is presented with the problem of whether the actions encompassed within this 
category of moral indifference can properly be thought of as indifferent when they are 
in fact governed by a moral law, albeit a rather peculiar one. As we shall see, this is a 
tension that Barbeyrac does not fully resolve. This inherent tension may go some way to 
explaining why the section of text quoted above, along with a number of other notes 
that set the groundwork for the relationship between morally indifferent actions and 
permissive natural law, are edited out of Barbeyrac’s final revision for his 1734 edition 
of Le droit de la nature.28   
 
In light of this, the evolution of Barbeyrac’s natural law of simple permission across his 
different works throws up a rather interesting intellectual puzzle. Both in his original 
1706 edition and his subsequent revised 1712 edition of Le droit de la nature and in his 
1724 Grotius edition Le droit de la guerre, the natural law of simple permission retains 
its prominent role. In 1734 edition of Le droit de la nature, Barbeyrac makes extensive 
revisions including a number of notable alterations to his concept of permissive natural 
law. In effect, these revisions are indicative of the difficulty inherent within a concept of 
permissive natural law as extensive as Barbeyrac’s where all action not determined by 
obligatory natural law falls within its scope. That is to say, if all non-obligatory action is 
morally indifferent and thus determined by permissive natural law, in what sense does 
the language of permission retain the meaning that Barbeyrac wants to ascribe to it? 
                                                
27 Barbeyrac, DNG [1706], 1.7.5, Note 5: ‘l’on peut aussi appeller Bonne en un sens négatif, c’est-à-dire, 
non-mauvaise’.  
28 There is a distinct shift in emphasis from the original 1706 note by the time of the 1734 edition. Cf: 
Barbeyrac, DNG [1706], 1.7.5, Note 5 and DNG, 1.7.5, Note 5. Another revision relevant to the current 
issue of indifferent actions and permissive natural law occurs in Note 1 to DNG 1.6.16. While there is an 
extent to which this shift in emphasis is consistent with his gradual reduction of references drawn from 
Titius, for example in the note quoted above, the fact that other revisions are simply amendments to his 
own comments indicates that Barbeyrac’s natural law of simple permission was causing him some 
philosophical difficulties. Cf. fn. 77 below on Barbeyrac’s revisions to his notes on permissive natural 
law and property. 
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Barbeyrac’s innovative turn in his concept of permissive natural law thus sees him 
grappling later in his scholarly career to retain some of the sharpness of its intended 
meaning.  
 
III 
Moral Indifference 
 
At the outset of his scholarly career, however, it is clear that Barbeyrac intended his 
concept of permissive natural law to create the necessary moral framework to govern 
individual moral deliberations within a private sphere of judgement. Barbeyrac’s 
attempt to create this framework finds its fullest exposition in his Traité du jeu, where 
he focuses on the morality of gaming, a common pastime, and the perceived need for a 
proper moral framework to govern its practice, which had already attracted the attention 
of a number of Barbeyrac’s contemporary moral theorists.29  
 
Barbeyrac’s own treatise on gaming is of particular interest to the present discussion 
because he defines gaming, interchangeable with its close correlative gambling, as an 
activity that is morally indifferent in itself but liable to abuse in its actual practice. The 
task, as Barbeyrac sees it, is to show clearly how the liberty to do or forbear from things 
indifferent in themselves, i.e., those things governed by permissive natural law, is 
structured according to specific moral considerations: ‘There is nothing more difficult 
than convincing men of their aberrations, when it concerns things indifferent in 
themselves, and that are only harmful in the abuse of them’.30 Barbeyrac’s treatise on 
gaming, then, is principally about the limits of the liberty granted by permissive natural 
law.  
 
Barbeyrac infers the status of games as indifferent from the silence on the matter of God 
as divine legislator. To this end, Barbeyrac claims that gaming is not explicitly 
condemned by the dictates of obligatory natural law nor within the express commands 
                                                
29 There is relatively little modern scholarship focused on Barbeyrac’s Traité du jeu. Dunkley, Gambling, 
Chapters 3-4, pp. 57-123 provides an overview of the various intellectual cross currents between the 
moral theorists of Barbeyrac’s day on the subject of games and gambling; Lennon, Reading Bayle, 
Chapter 6, pp. 143-182, discusses the relationship between the practice of gambling and ideas of 
providence in both Bayle’s texts and those of his time, including Barbeyrac. 
30 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, TJ, p. xlvi: ‘il n’y a rien de plus difficile que de convaincre les Hommes de leurs 
égaremens, lorsqu’il s’agit de choses indifférentes en elles-mêmes, & qui ne sont mauvais que par l’abus 
qu’on en fait’.  
  
87 
 
of Scripture.31 All further reflections on the morality of gaming must therefore be drawn 
from the general moral teachings of the law of nature (and the Gospel) applied to the 
specific nature of gaming. Here Barbeyrac defines gaming as:  
 
a recreational combat, in which two or more individuals, after having agreed 
upon certain laws, establish who will be the more skilful or the more 
fortunate in relation to certain movements of which the effect either does not 
depend at all on their direction, or which depends upon it only in part.32 
 
This definition presents us with the two core issues that arise in relation to the morality 
of gaming: its contractual foundation and its recreational function. Both of these aspects 
of gaming must be shown by Barbeyrac to be morally licit in order for him to uphold 
his basic contention that gaming is not in itself a moral evil. 
 
First, games usually comprise ‘a self-seeking convention on both sides’ that involves an 
exchange of goods, normally monetary wagers but sometimes simply the rewards of 
honour. This transaction must meet certain conditions in order to be deemed valid.33 As 
all commercial society rests upon such self-seeking behaviour and yet individuals 
within society are obliged to do more than simply seek their own advantage without 
limits, the general laws of contract intervene in order to determine what conditions are 
necessary for any such convention to be deemed valid: namely, ‘liberty in the 
engagement; equality in the conditions; and fidelity in the execution’.34 In essence, this 
means that (i) all those who engage in the gaming contract must possess sufficient 
reason to understand the obligation that they place themselves under, and that (ii) there 
must be a high degree of parity in both skills and means between players, and finally 
that (iii) one must play as honestly as possible to the extent that one must not even take 
advantage of mistakes and distractions that befall other players.35 All stakes must also 
be freely wagered and morally licit in themselves.36 
 
                                                
31 Barbeyrac, TJ, 1.1.9.  
32 Barbeyrac, TJ, 2.1.1: ‘une espéce de combat recréatif, dans lequel deux ou plusieurs personnes, après 
être convenuës de certaines loix, font à qui sera plus adroit ou plus heureux par rapport à certains 
mouvements dont l’effet ou ne dépend point du tout de leur direction, ou en dépend, du moins en partie’.  
33 Barbeyrac, TJ, 2.1.4: ‘une Convention intéresssée de part & d’autre’.  
34 Barbeyrac, TJ, 2.1.4: ‘la liberté dans l’engagement; l’egalité dans les conditions; & la fidélité dans 
l’exécution’.  
35 Barbeyrac, TJ, 2.1.4-6. 
36 Barbeyrac, TJ, 2.1.7. 
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Barbeyrac’s position here on the validity of contracts within the sphere of natural law 
saw him enter into a heated exchange with Jean Frain Du Tremblay (1641-1724). 
Tremblay had argued that contracts require that something is positively beneficial to 
society in order to be deemed valid, but Barbeyrac vehemently opposed this idea, 
arguing instead that to be valid a contract must simply cause no harm to society or the 
individuals within it rather than produce some positive good. Barbeyrac alleges that if 
the position held by Tremblay was put into practice, it would render ‘the majority of our 
everyday business, where the rules of justice and fidelity are observed with great 
exactitude… as null’ given that most transactions are driven more by greed, pride and 
vanity than by charity and other laudable sentiments.37  
 
For Barbeyrac, the key point is that a distinction needs to be held between the valid and 
the licit.38 The external circumstances that may render gaming morally illicit do not 
invalidate the contract provided that the basic conditions of contract have been met; 
otherwise the natural law foundations of all social and commercial interactions between 
individuals would be jeopardised.39 In short, the balance that is struck between the 
requirement of morally obligatory and morally permissible natural law must always 
serve to uphold the duties of sociability. But while Barbeyrac allows considerable scope 
with respect to the validity of gaming contracts in keeping with the good of society in 
general, he does not allow nearly as much scope when it comes to the question of how 
far individuals may licitly pursue the liberty to game.  
 
Secondly, then, Barbeyrac insists that the purpose of all recreational activities is to 
restore the mind and body so that individuals may return to the serious occupations of 
work with renewed vigour. This constitutes the first stricture that Barbeyrac places on 
the permission to game, namely that the sole legitimate end of gaming is to ‘relax 
oneself, in order to be in a state to resume one’s work and to employ oneself with 
greater ardour’.40 To be permissible, gaming must serve some moral purpose, i.e., to 
strengthen the practice of the strict duties of natural law, e.g., industrious labour.41 In 
                                                
37 Barbeyrac, ‘Premiere et derniere replique de l’auteur. À ce que M. Tremblai avoit dit dans les 
Mémoires de trevoux au mois de Juillet 1713. Artic. 102’, TJ, p. 763. 
38 Barbeyrac, ‘Premiere et derniere replique’, TJ, p. 760. 
39 Barbeyrac, ‘Premiere et derniere replique’, TJ, p. 759. 
40 Barbeyrac, TJ, 3.2.4: ‘de se délasser, pour être en état de reprendre son ouvrage & d’y travailler avec 
plus d’ardeur’. See also §5-12.  
41 On Barbeyrac’s theory of work and labour, see pp. 105-109 below, inc. fn. 93.  
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other words, both the intention and the action itself must, at the every least, be morally 
licit and, preferably, be morally praiseworthy too. Hence there arises a tension in 
Barbeyrac’s thought between the idea of moral indifference and moral virtue.   
 
On the face of it, Barbeyrac’s natural law of simple permission appears to accord a 
positive moral liberty to undertake to do those things that lie beyond the bounds of the 
strict duties of natural law. The implication here is that moral indifference defines a 
private sphere of judgement in which individuals make use of the permission to do or 
forbear from such things as they deem appropriate. Thus morally indifferent actions are 
all equally morally neutral. However, in practical terms, Barbeyrac suggests that the 
case may be otherwise with respect to gaming:  
 
Let us suppose nevertheless that one has employed sufficient time in serious 
Occupations, both leisured and necessary; I maintain that even in this case 
one may still find a way to relax and divert oneself in some manner, without 
giving oneself over entirely to Gaming.42 
 
Included among the more edifying activities that Barbeyrac proposes are conversing, 
reading, the arts, walking and other physical activities.43 Taken in this light, while 
gaming may be morally indifferent in the sense that it is morally licit, it is far from 
being morally praiseworthy. Individuals are mistaken, Barbeyrac says, if they think that 
after fulfilling their public duties and private acts of devotion, they are free to determine 
their actions according to their inclinations. Instead, individuals must ‘occupy 
themselves in a manner that may proffer some utility either to the State or to Human 
Society in general’.44 The scope of Barbeyrac’s concept of permission governing 
morally indifferent things is again subordinated to the higher demands of human social 
and commercial interaction.   
 
In fact, Barbeyrac’s Traité du jeu is an extended survey of all the different 
circumstances, both internal and external to gaming, that transform it from something 
                                                
42 Barbeyrac, TJ, 4.6.7: ‘Supposon néanmoins qu’on aît emploié assez de tems à des Occupations 
sérieuses, tant libres que nécessaires; je soûtiens qu’en ce cas-là même on trouvera d’ailleurs dequoi se 
délasser & se divertir en plusieurs maniéres, sans se donner presque tout entier au Jeu’.  
43 Barbeyrac, TJ, 4.6.7-15.  
44 Barbeyrac, TJ, 4.6.6: ‘s’occuper d’une maniére d’où il puisse revenir quelque utilité ou à l’Etat ou à la 
Société Humaine en général’.  
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that it is indifferent in itself into something that transgresses the limits of the moral 
permission. He thus argues that: 
 
while there is nothing more innocent than Gaming considered in itself and 
reduced to its legitimate use, there are few things more dangerous and 
more criminal, when the abuse is carried to the point that we see it.45  
 
But the exhaustive account that Barbeyrac gives of the various circumstances in which 
harm should be considered to be caused either to ourselves or others leaves little scope 
for gaming in an manner that is morally licit. It is difficult to see, therefore, in what 
sense, gaming could be thought of as morally indifferent other than simply by virtue of 
the fact that it is not explicitly prohibited by obligatory natural law.  
 
This all begs the question of how far Barbeyrac’s concept of permissive natural law and 
the concomitant idea of moral indifference actually specifies a sphere of genuine 
individual moral judgement in which individuals possess the liberty to judge whether to 
take up a moral permission as they deem appropriate? In practice, this liberty would 
appear to be so heavily circumscribed that Barbeyrac’s concept of permissive natural 
law would be more accurately read as a sphere in which individual moral judgements 
are authoritative insofar as they successfully identify and uphold the requirements of the 
strict duties of natural law. Individuals are permitted, if you like, to be willing do what 
they ought to do. For Barbeyrac, this much is frequently taken for granted. His bigger 
concern is that poor education and ingrained customs often leave individuals bereft of 
the inner moral compass necessary for determining when they ought to refrain from 
making use of a specific moral permission.46    
 
But while Barbeyrac identifies poor education and harmful customs as the cause of the 
corruption of morals within human society, the morally transformative power of good 
education and proper customs are also the surest means to rectify these moral ills. Of all 
the possible forces of moral edification, education and custom stand alone as the best 
means to reform our moral sensibilities and make us better able to judge the merit or 
harm brought about by a particular course of action, both to ourselves and to others with 
                                                
45 Barbeyrac, TJ, 4.7.9: ‘comme il n’y a rien de plus innocent que le Jeu considéré en lui-même & réduit à 
son légitime usage, il y a aussi peu de choses plus dangereuses & plus criminelles, quand l’abus est monté 
au point où nous le voions’.  
46 Barbeyrac, TJ, 3.5-7.  
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whom we are in society. Although civil laws may also legitimately intervene to the 
same purpose, the most effective means to inspire individuals to fulfil, for example, the 
duty of industrious labour is through keeping ‘a careful watch over the Education of the 
Young’ and encouraging ‘through recompenses those who distinguish themselves in the 
Arts, in the Sciences, in a word in all honest Occupations from which some utility may 
recur’.47 Individual moral judgements concerning morally indifferent things thus depend 
upon a solid social morality expressed through education and custom by virtue of which 
individuals may be instilled with a proper understanding of true morality, itself a 
necessary prerequisite to undertake such moral deliberations.  
 
Insofar as Barbeyrac advances a theory about the relationship between social and 
individual morality, this idea seems to be at its heart. Thus when he depicts gaming kept 
within its proper limits, that is, when it can be deemed to contain nothing morally illicit 
either within itself or in the attendant circumstances, the scene that he envisages is the 
very model of proper social interaction: 
 
Let us imagine first a company of wise people, where, without any other 
purpose than agreeable amusement, one proposes to make a games party. An 
amiable gaiety is painted on their faces… Everything presents itself in good 
order: no disputes, no bizarre and superstitious affections for a certain place 
or a certain game: each submits equally to the Rules of the Game, and to 
those of a Civility without constraint, the majority voice decides cases of 
doubt, and no one complains about a law that applies equally to all… finally, 
they separate still as good friends as they had come.48 
 
Here, the moral probity of the individuals who engage in gaming for pleasant 
amusement fulfil all of the strictures that Barbeyrac would lay upon the legitimate use 
of gaming. Significantly, individuals are assumed to submit not only to the rules of the 
game, that is, to the ‘legal’ requirement of the situation, but also to the more extensive 
idea of civility, that is, the demand of virtue in one’s relations with others. Just as 
important is the apparent absence of any passions so great as to render those engaged in 
                                                
47 Barbeyrac, TJ, 3.9.21: ‘de veiller soigneusement à l’Education de la Jeunesse’ and ‘d’encourager par 
des récompenses ceux qui se distinguent dans les Arts, dans les Sciences, en un mot dans toutes les 
Occupations honnêtes & d’où il peut revenir quelque utilité’.  
48 Barbeyrac, TJ, 4.3.2: ‘Imaginons-nous donc d’abord une compagnie de quelques personnes sages, où, 
sans autre vûe que de s’amuser agréablement, on propose de faire une partie de Jeu. Une aimable gaieté 
est peinte sur leur visage… Tout se fait dans l’ordre: point de dispute, point d’affection bizarre & 
superstitieuse d’une certaine place ou d’un certain jeu: on se soûmet également & aux Règles du Jeu, & à 
celles d’une Civilité sans constrainte, la pluralité des voix décide des cas douteux, & personne ne se plaint 
d’une loi qui est également pour chacun… ils se séparent enfin aussi bons amis qu’ils étoient venus’. 
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gaming to have relinquished their wisdom, i.e., the rational aspect of their natures 
through which they are sensible of the requirements of the rules and of civility. Properly 
conducted gaming becomes, so to speak, a schooling in the requirements of sociability. 
This is in strong contrast to those whose abuse of games thereby renders them 
‘denatured’ by the overwhelming passions that carry them there. 
 
The question that it leaves us with, however, is the precise relationship that Barbeyrac 
envisages between obligatory and permissive natural law. In sum, it is clear that for 
Barbeyrac moral indifference does not always denote moral neutrality. Likewise, the 
permission granted is limited by the demands of individual moral probity, the 
requirements of civility and the duties that one owes to God, to oneself and to others as 
specified by obligatory natural law. In light of this, Barbeyrac concludes that: ‘one must 
completely renounce the most innocent and most legitimate, indeed, the most necessary 
things, when there is no way of making use of them without prejudice to one’s duty’.49 
The idea here is that morally indifferent things may be licit by virtue of the law of 
simple permission but that this permission is heavily circumscribed by the requirements 
of the strict duties of natural law.  
 
Nonetheless, it should also be clear from the present discussion that Barbeyrac’s 
concept of permissive natural law cannot simply be subsumed within his theory of 
obligatory natural law. Instead it reflects a sustained effort to show how moral 
judgements enter into almost all spheres of human activity and thus the importance for 
each individual to cultivate within himself the necessary moral lights to navigate the 
vast array of moral predicaments faced in the course of everyday social practice. Thus, 
in reading Barbeyrac’s Traité du jeu as an extended study of morally indifferent actions, 
it would seem that the framework that Barbeyrac creates to govern the sphere of 
permissible actions, that is to say, morally neutral actions, is far more extensive than his 
original definition of permissive natural law may have suggested.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
49 Barbeyrac, TJ, 4.7.9: ‘il faut renoncer entiérement aux choses les plus innocentes, les plus légitimes, 
que dis-je ? les plus nécessaires, quand il n’y a pas moien d’en user sans préjudice de son devoir’.  
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IV 
Conditional Duties 
 
The discussion of Barbeyrac’s permissive natural law has hitherto focused on how far it 
determines the moral liberty that individuals possess to undertake certain social 
practices, exemplified by gaming but more widely applicable. Yet there is a further 
series of challenges that Barbeyrac encounters in the application of his conception of 
permissive law arising from the sheer extent of actions and of things encompassed 
within the idea of moral indifference and thus requiring his concept of permissive 
natural law to operate at different levels of normativity. In short, the moral norms that 
govern gaming and similar social practices already presuppose the institution of a 
comprehensive social morality, whether natural or civil, on which to draw in order to 
determine the parameters of proper moral conduct. This social morality depends (to 
some extent) on the prior creation of certain basic social institutions, themselves 
morally indifferent. Hence, some explanation of the moral norms that determine their 
institution is needed. This includes the moral norms governing speech, property, 
commerce and political governance. The present discussion will focus on Barbeyrac’s 
discussion of speech, property and commerce whereas political governance will be dealt 
with at greater length in the final chapter of this thesis. Once again, Barbeyrac develops 
his own argument through his response to the Pufendorfian framework that he has 
inherited.  
 
As we saw in the previous two chapters, for both Barbeyrac and Pufendorf before him, 
the strict duties of natural law obtain at all times and in all places prior to any act of 
human will. These duties are derived directly from the fundamental principles of natural 
law, as the unmediated will of God. Pufendorf restricts these duties to the principle of 
sociability alone, where Barbeyrac argues for three separate principles – religion, 
enlightened self-love and sociability – that correspond to the three objects of our duties, 
namely God, oneself and others. By extending the scope of the strict duties of natural 
law in order to emphasise the natural relationship between man and God independent of 
socially formed spheres of authority, Barbeyrac lays the foundation for his concept of 
conscience as the source of authoritative moral judgement. With respect to his theory of 
permissive natural law, the authority of conscience is crucial to explaining how the 
natural rights bequeathed by the silence of the divine legislator can be the foundation of 
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the basic institutions of speech, property and commerce and thus the conditional, or 
socially dependent, rights and duties that are thereby created.50  
 
Barbeyrac agrees with Pufendorf that the conditional duties of natural law may be 
differentiated from the strict duties of natural law insofar as the former ‘suppose a 
certain state, or a certain establishment, formed or received by the will of Men’.51 In 
short, some act of human will must bring them into being. For Pufendorf, with respect 
to the institutions of speech, property and commerce, this act of human will takes the 
form of a mediating contract or convention between individuals. These conditional 
duties therefore become binding on all individuals by virtue of the strict duty to keep 
one’s word, i.e., to honour one’s act of will. Barbeyrac, however, disagrees. ‘All the 
establishments, which our Author will treat of here’, he claims, ‘are not founded in 
some convention’.52 Having already extended the scope and reach of natural law, 
Barbeyrac believes that his theory of permissive law is able to provide an authoritative 
foundation for these conditional duties without recourse to the Pufendorfian idea of an 
intervening contract between social beings and so overcome the objections levied 
against his author in this regard.    
 
For Barbeyrac, there is no moral necessity for a convention to intervene in order to 
create binding duties and claimable rights for such conditional institutions because ‘it is 
upon this Natural Law of Simple Permission, that all Rights are founded, whether 
natural or acquired’.53 The strict duties of obligatory natural law and the rights accorded 
by permissive natural law are sufficient, when acting in concert, to serve as the 
foundation of the rights and duties of speech, property and commerce. In the original 
1706 edition of the text, Barbeyrac suggests that this framework also encompassed 
‘Liberty, the right to not suffer harm at the hands of another, Empire or authority over 
other persons, and other similar things, which are commonly subject to diverse changes 
                                                
50 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.24, Note 1. 
51 Pufendorf, DNG, 2.3.24: ‘supposent un certain état, ou un certain établissement, formé ou reçu par la 
volonté des Hommes.  
52 Barbeyrac, DNG, 3.9.8, Note 1: ‘Tous les établissemens, dont nôtre Auteur va traiter, ne sont pas 
fondez sur quelque Convention’.  
53 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.24, Note 5: ‘C’est sur cette Loi Naturelle de simple Permission que sont fondez 
tous les Droits, soit naturels ou acquis’.  
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by the will of men’.54 This was deleted in the 1734 edition of the text, and we may 
speculate that this excision was made precisely because the blurring of the boundaries 
between obligatory and permissive natural law had resulted in Barbeyrac conflating the 
idea of permissive rights to things that originally were morally indifferent with rights 
that are derived directly from the strict duties of natural law.  
 
Across the different editions of his text, however, Barbeyrac consistently maintains that 
what characterises things determined by permissive natural law is their quality of 
becoming obligatory when the permissive right is taken up but being equally capable of 
subsequently returning to their state of natural indifference. This is because the rights 
accorded by permissive natural law ‘are of such a nature, that one may make use of 
them or not, as one deems appropriate, or even renounce them, whether for a time, or 
for good’.55 These rights are therefore characterised both by the liberty to do or forbear 
from certain things and by the liberty to renounce them where appropriate; that is to say, 
these are rights that may be fully claimable in certain circumstances but not necessarily 
enduring in all circumstances. Here, Barbeyrac takes up the distinction proposed by his 
fellow Huguenot and moral theorist Jean la Placette (1629-1718) between alienable and 
inalienable natural rights.56 Inalienable natural rights cannot be renounced, even 
willingly, because ‘a superior Law prohibits it’. Alienable rights, on the other hand, are 
natural rights ‘of which we are so much the master that we may dispose of as we 
please’. The examples that Barbeyrac gives here are the rights that we have over our 
material possessions, i.e., the rights accorded by permissive natural law. These rights, 
arising from an original act of human will, may consequently be alienated or otherwise 
altered by a subsequent act of human will.57 
 
As always, the strict duties of natural law specify the necessary bounds that these 
natural permissive rights must operate within. In light of the social character of most 
                                                
54 Barbeyrac, DNG [1706], 2.3.4, Note 5: ‘la Liberté, le droit de ne pas souffrit du mal de la part d’autrui, 
l’Empire ou l’autorité sur les personnes, & autres choses semblables, qui ordinaire reçoivent divers 
changemens selon la volonté des hommes’.  
55 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.3.24, Note 5: ‘sont de telle nature, qu’on peur en faire on n’en pas faire usage, 
comme on le juge à propos, ou même y renoncer, soit pour un tems ou pour toûjours [my italics].  
56 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.7.17, Note 2. Cf. Jean la Placette, Traité de la restitution, (Amsterdam, 1696), pp. 
76-78. For a brief overview of La Placette’s works and thought, see Auguste Schaffner, Essai sur la vie et 
l’oeuvre de Jean de la Placette, (Paris, 1885).  
57 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.7.17, Note 2: ‘une Loi superieure nous le défend’ and ‘dont nous sommes tellement 
les maîtres, que nous pouvons en disposer comme il nous plaît’. Cf. Chapter 5, p. 154 and pp. 162-163.  
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permissive natural rights, the strict duties that usually circumscribe their exercise, 
Barbeyrac tells us, are for the most part the duties entailed by the principle of 
sociability: namely, not to harm others, to prevent any harm that they are threatened by 
whenever possible and to do them positive good.58 Nonetheless, by conceiving of the 
foundation of the conditional duties of natural law in this manner, Barbeyrac is in effect 
arguing that the authoritative moral judgements of individuals are sufficient to serve as 
the foundation for the fundamental institutions of speech, property and commerce. As 
we shall see in the following two sections, however, while he expends great energy 
setting out the theoretical framework necessary to make this argument, there remains 
considerable ambiguity with respect to its practical application within the development 
of his actual arguments concerning speech, property and commerce.  
 
V 
Speech and Language 
 
Language may be described as indifferent in two conceptually distinct ways. On the one 
hand, there is the ontological question of the origins of language. In this respect, both 
Pufendorf and Barbeyrac agree that the origins of language itself and the meanings of 
words are arbitrary not naturally or divinely instituted.59 Language is indifferent here in 
the sense that the meanings of words are determined by acts of human will rather than 
the nature of the thing itself. On the other hand, there is the moral question of how 
individuals make use of language, for example, how far individuals have a duty to 
disclose their thoughts to others. In this sense language may be described as indifferent 
insofar as individuals are not bound by any specific duties constraining its use. It is the 
latter form of moral indifference that is pertinent to the present discussion, but the two 
often overlap within Barbeyrac’s engagement with the subject.  
 
Barbeyrac broadly agrees with Pufendorf that it is language, specifically speech as the 
most effective way of signalling one’s thoughts to others, that makes society possible. 
In short, language provides individuals with the means to engage in all forms of 
                                                
58 Barbeyrac, DNG, 3.1.1, Note 3. Cf. Barbeyrac, DNG, 3.9.8, Note 1.  
59 Neither Pufendorf nor Barbeyrac completely rejects the Scriptural account of the origins of language, 
but rather they claim that the Scriptural account may be interpreted in a manner consistent with the idea 
of language as having an arbitrary foundation by historicising its development. See Pufendorf, DNG, 
4.1.3-4 and Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.1.3, Notes 3-4.  
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commerce, establish peace and erect civil discipline.60 To ensure that this necessary end 
of language is upheld, Pufendorf claims that the first duty in making use of language is 
‘to never deceive anyone by the use of speech, nor by the use of any other signs 
established in order to express our thoughts’.61 Barbeyrac enters into a disagreement 
with his author, however, over Pufendorf’s claim that both this principal duty and all 
subsequent duties are established by virtue of a convention between individuals to settle 
both the meanings and proper use of words. This is because, for Pufendorf, once the 
meanings of words are settled by this convention, individuals are obliged to use them in 
conformity with their established meanings and for the purpose that they were intended. 
Hence all forms of dissimulation are condemnable.62 
 
Barbeyrac claims that any such instituted convention entails a strict obligation that 
limits individuals in the proper use of the rights and duties attached to language, 
specifically speech.63 This objection rests on the belief that if the meanings of words 
were established by an obligatory convention, any change in the instituted usage of 
words would not be permissible.64 Thus it is more reasonable to propose ‘that the 
establishment of the meaning of Words arises from simple consent, where nothing 
obligatory enters, when considered in itself’.65 While Barbeyrac’s slight modification to 
the claim that simple consent rather than a convention may settle the ontological 
question of the origin of the meaning of words, it leaves open the moral question of how 
the duties attached to the use of language, specifically speech, are to be determined.  
 
Given that Barbeyrac identifies speech as something indifferent in itself, it should 
follow that the rights and duties attached to the use of speech are determined by 
permissive natural law, previously identified as the moral law that governs all morally 
indifferent things. Throughout his commentary on the rights and duties of language, 
however, there is no explicit mention of the concept of permissive natural law. Instead, 
                                                
60 Pufendorf, DNG, 4.1.1. Cf. Chapter 2, p. 56, and Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories, pp. 89-91. 
61 Pufendorf, DNG, 4.1.1: ‘DE NE TROMPER JAMAIS PERSONNE PAR DES PAROLES, NI PAR 
AUCUN AUTRE SIGNE ÉTABLI POUR EXPRIMER NOS PENSÉES’.  
62 Pufendorf, DNG, 3.4.2.  
63 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.1.10, Note 3. 
64 This is a conclusion that Barbeyrac draws from Pufendorf’s principles. It runs contrary to Pufendorf’s 
own assumption that a convention would not prevent the meanings of words evolving even when a 
further obligation requires us to make known our thoughts. Cf. Pufendorf, DNG, 4.1.5, and Barbeyrac, 
DNG, 4.1.5, Note 1.  
65 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.1.5, Note 1: ‘que l’établissement de la signification des Mots s’est fait par un 
simple consentement, où il n’entre rien d’obligatoire, à le considerer en lui-même’.  
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Barbeyrac frames the discussion somewhat differently: ‘Speech, like all other actions 
indifferent in their nature, is directed by the three great principles of our Duties… I 
mean Religion, Enlightened self-love, and Sociability’.66 On this basis, individuals are 
obliged always to speak the truth to God and, with respect to the requirements of the 
strict duties that they owe to others or to themselves, ‘either to speak the exact truth, or 
to keep quiet, or to feign and dissimulate’.67 In short, the use of speech must not involve 
anything contrary to obligatory natural law but rather must positively uphold it.  
 
By virtue of including among the duties attached to the use of speech not only the duty 
to faithfully reveal one’s thoughts to others when required but also the duty to conceal 
those thoughts when required, Barbeyrac also enters into a discussion of whether it is 
ever permissible to lie and under what circumstance such lies would, in fact, be 
innocent rather than criminal.68 The kind of permissible lies that he has in mind are 
those debated by the early modern Catholic casuists and subsequently taken up and 
reformulated by Protestant natural law theorists, for example, whether it is permissible 
to lie to save one’s own life and thus uphold the duty of self-preservation and, in a 
similar vein, whether it is permissible to conceal the whereabouts of a would-be 
murderer’s intended victim and thus uphold the duty to prevent harm to others.69 In both 
cases, Barbeyrac answers in the affirmative, that is to say, lying is not always, strictly 
speaking, morally bad. 
 
As Barbeyrac sees it, the problem with appropriately defining cases where telling a lie is 
permissible, and thus morally good in the sense of being ‘not-bad’, is that the 
‘imperfections’ of language do not allow us to distinguish between conceptually distinct 
ideas: 
 
The word Lie [Mensonge], and corresponding words in other languages, 
usually occur in an odious sense; because in effect most of those who speak 
or act contrary to their thoughts, do so with a wicked design, or contrary to 
                                                
66 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.1.7, Note 1: ‘la Parole, comme toutes autres actions indifferentes de leur nature, est 
dirigée par les trois grands principes de nos Devoirs… je veux dire la Religion, l’Amour de soi-même & la 
Sociabilité’.  
67 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.1.7, Note 1: ‘ou à dire exactement la verité, ou à nous taire, ou à feindre & à 
dissimuler’.  
68 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.1.7, Note 1.  
69 For a broad context of these issues, see Johann P. Sommerville, ‘The ‘New Art of Lying’: 
Equivocation, Mental Reservation, and Casuistry’, in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, 
ed. Edmund Leites, (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 159-184.  
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what duty requires: there is no other term, that may be applied to cases 
where feigned discourse contains nothing vicious, nor harmful to whomever 
it may be.70  
 
The same is true of words like ‘homicide, murder, kill’ that all suppose, by their very 
definition, that it is never permissible to take the life of another person. In both cases, 
Barbeyrac wants to argue that the general – and strict – duty not to deceive nor to take 
the life of others is subject to certain conditions. Here, Barbeyrac argues that a 
particular permission takes precedence over a general prescriptive duty against 
Pufendorf’s original assertion that a prescriptive duty must always override a 
permission.71 In the case of the exceptions to the prescription against lying, Barbeyrac’s 
argument depends upon the idea of language as arbitrarily instituted, i.e., not expressing 
the nature of the thing itself, in order for him to take up the Lockean idea that the 
physical action and the moral relation must always be distinguished when judging the 
moral rectitude of actions.72 
 
At the beginning of his principal note on the rights and duties determining the legitimate 
use of language, including for the purpose of dissimulation, Barbeyrac frames his 
discussion in terms of the strict duties of natural law. But as he develops his argument 
through the note, the emphasis on individual judgement in determining the proper limits 
of the permission to deceive others constitutes a near direct reference to the language of 
permissive natural law: ‘Besides, it is not necessary to determine when and how often 
one is permitted to lie. It depends on the circumstances, which are infinite, and on the 
discernment of each individual’.73 In this particular part of the note, Barbeyrac 
subsequently argues that whenever the person to whom one speaks does not have a 
particular right to require the truth from us, we cause no harm [tort] by disguising the 
                                                
70 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.10.8, Note 1: ‘Le mot de Mensonge, & ceux qui y répondent en d’autres Langues, 
se prennent d’ordinaire en un sens odieux; parcequ’effectivement la plûpart de ceux qui parlent ou 
agissent contre leur pensée, le font à mauvais dessein, ou contre ce qu’exige quelque Devoir: on n’a point 
d’autre terme, qui seul puisse être appliqué aux cas où les discours feints n’ont rien de vicieux, ne de 
nuisible à qui que ce soit’.  
71 Barbeyrac, DNG, 5.12.23, Note 1.  
72 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.10.8, Note 1. Barbeyrac gives a reference to Locke’s Essay 2.28.16 where Locke 
says that ‘because, very frequently, the positive Idea of the Action and its Moral Relation, are 
comprehended together under one Name, and the same Word made use of, to express both the Mode or 
Action, and its Moral Rectitude or Obliquity: therefore the Relation it self is less taken notice of; and 
there is no distinction made between the positive Idea of the Action, and the reference it has to a Rule’. 
Barbeyrac makes the same point but more briefly, again citing Locke, in DNG, 1.2.6, Note 9.  
73 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.1.7, Note 1: ‘Au reste, il n’est nullement nécessaire de determiner quand & 
combien de fois il est permis de mentir. Cela dépend des circonstances, qui sont infinies, & du 
discernement de chacun’ [my italics].  
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truth. That is to say, our obligation is assumed to depend on the existence of another 
individual’s right to require something of us. Barbeyrac implies here that the scope of 
the permission is determined by what lies outside the strict duties of obligatory natural 
law (the violation of which would constitute a ‘harm’). However, individuals must be 
careful not to stray from legitimate use of such a permission to abuse of that permission 
by taking ‘too great a liberty’ in making use of the rights that it confers.74 
 
This discussion presents us with a good example of the different ways in which 
Barbeyrac uses the idea of permission in his natural law theory. On the one hand, there 
is the idea of a permission that is grounded in the strict duties of obligatory natural law, 
exemplified by Barbeyrac’s claim that all the duties attached to the use of speech may 
be derived from the three principles of natural law. In this vein, Barbeyrac discusses the 
permission to conceal the truth, whether by explicitly lying or merely keeping silent, as 
a permission entailed by the strict duties themselves, rather than as a permission that lies 
beyond their bounds. On the other hand, as the preceding paragraph makes clear, there 
is also the idea of moral permission that concerns morally indifferent actions and things, 
which lie beyond the bounds of obligatory natural law and are codified within the 
concept of permissive natural law.  
 
The conflation of these two different ideas of permission is something that Barbeyrac 
neither acknowledges nor resolves. With respect to the permission to disguise the truth, 
Barbeyrac thus concludes that ‘the wise man does not make recourse to the slightest 
disguise without a certain necessity’.75 Individuals ‘of discernment’ thus will refrain 
from pushing ‘the permission to feign or dissimulate beyond its just limits, so long as 
they solemnly undertake to regulate all their conduct by the light of right Reason’.76 
Right reason here signifying the same thing as the light of conscience. In short, 
Barbeyrac’s general concept of permission appears to suffer from some blurring of the 
boundaries with respect to the question of whether it is a distinct form of natural law or 
rather a derivation from obligatory natural law. It is thus not always clear whether 
Barbeyrac intends for the strict duties of natural law to give rise to certain permissions 
                                                
74 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.1.7, Note 1: ‘une trop grand liberte’.  
75 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.1.7, Note 1: ‘il n’est pas d’un homme sage d’avoir recours sans quelque nécessité 
au moindre déguisement’ [my italics].  
76 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.1.7, Note 1: ‘la permission de feindre ou dissimuler au-delà de ses justes bornes, 
pourvû qu’ils travaillent serieusement à régler toute leur conduite sur les lumieres de la droite Raison’.  
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by virtue of some prevailing obligation, such as legitimate self-defence, or whether 
these strict duties simply determine the limits of the legitimate use of a permission 
derived from the conceptually distinct framework of permissive natural law.  
 
This is not a question that it is possible to resolve on Barbeyrac’s behalf. Rather, it is 
indicative of the difficulties with which Barbeyrac’s concept of permissive natural law 
presented him when it was employed to the full extent entailed by its definition as the 
rule that governs all things indifferent in themselves. From a modern perspective, if all 
moral permissions, however they may be derived, remain heavily circumscribed by the 
strict duties of obligatory natural law in their use, then it begs the question of whether 
Barbeyrac needed a distinct concept of permissive natural law in order to regulate 
morally indifferent actions and things. However, the question of whether the concept of 
permissive natural law was necessary to Barbeyrac’s general theory of natural law is, of 
course, quite different from whether he thought that it was necessary – he evidently did 
– and where he thought that it found its most effective purchase within his theory, 
namely in grounding the rights of individuals to make authoritative moral judgements in 
certain matters. In effect, upholding and extending the rights of individual conscience.   
 
What must also be borne in mind here is that this concept of permissive natural law was 
developed against the backdrop of Pufendorf’s intentionally restrictive theory of natural 
law. Thus in a simple sense, Barbeyrac is also trying to reinstate the full gamut of rights 
and duties excluded by Pufendorf. Above all, this includes creating a new framework 
that serves as the ground for the authoritative moral judgements of individuals capable 
of discerning the rights and duties encompassed within a more extensive theory of 
natural law. Before turning to these issues in more detail in the two remaining chapters, 
it is necessary first to enquire how the difficulties that he faced in developing his 
concept of moral permission played out within his discussion of the foundation of 
individual property rights.  
 
VI 
Property 
 
Just as in his discussion of the foundation of language, so too in his discussion of the 
foundation of individual property rights, Barbeyrac rarely makes any direct reference to 
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his theory of permissive natural law.77 However, even more so than in the case of 
language, in offering an interpretation of Barbeyrac’s argument concerning the 
foundation of individual property rights, it is necessary to consider how he draws upon 
assumptions that are implicit within his wider theory of permissive natural law. This 
also helps answer the question of whether Barbeyrac considers the foundation of 
individual property rights to derive from an individual act of will alone or whether he 
subscribes to the Lockean theory of labour as the foundation of individual property 
rights. Once again, Barbeyrac’s objections to Pufendorf’s argument that an instituted 
convention is the original foundation of property rights provide the best context in 
which to consider Barbeyrac’s own arguments.78 
 
The institution of property goes to the heart of Barbeyrac’s disagreement with 
Pufendorf over the proper relationship between rights and obligations. Pufendorf’s 
rejection of natural rights that are claimable against others forms the central tenet of his 
repudiation of the Hobbesian thesis of a natural right to all things: ‘For it is ridiculous to 
give the name of right to a power that we could not avail ourselves of, without all others 
having an equal right to prevent us from doing so’.79 This is because for Pufendorf the 
right to do certain things – into which category Hobbes’s right to all things falls – is not 
a true right that produces a corresponding obligation.80 When Pufendorf speaks of an 
original negative community of goods arising from the divine permission to make use 
of the things of the natural world insofar as the needs and wants of life require it, we 
must therefore understand this permission as a purely negative permission that bestows 
a liberty to do or forbear but no claimable right.81  
                                                
77 One of the rare notes where Barbeyrac refers explicitly to his concept of permissive natural law in 
relation to individual property rights is modified in the final revised edition of the text so that the 
reference is to permission in general rather than permissive natural law in particular. Cf. Barbeyrac, DNG 
[1706], 4.10.7, Note 1 and DNG, 4.10.7, Note 1.  
78 In both his Grotius and Cumberland translations, Barbeyrac claims that his notes to his Pufendorf 
translations contain the definitive account of his theory of property rights. Cf. Barbeyrac, DGP, 2.2.1, 
Note 1 and Barbeyrac, TPLN, 8.11, Note 3.  
79 Pufendorf, DNG, 3.5.3: ‘Car il est ridicule de donner le nom de droit à un pouvoir dont on ne sauroit 
faire usage, sans que tous les autres ayent du droit égal de nous en empêcher’. For clarifying my 
understanding of the relationship between Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke and Barbeyrac on the issue of 
property rights, I am indebted to James Tully’s reconstruction of the arguments in A Discourse on 
Property: John Locke and his Adversaries, (Cambridge, 1980), especially here pp. 72-77. For further 
valuable discussions on the general context and issues surrounding property rights in the early modern 
period, see also: Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume, (Oxford, 
1991) and Peter Garnsey, Thinking about Property: From Antiquity to the Age of Revolution, (Cambridge, 
2007), esp. pp. 136-146.  
80 Pufendorf, DNG, 3.5.1.  
81 Pufendorf, DNG, 4.4.4.  
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For Pufendorf, the transition from the original negative community of goods to the 
institution of individual property rights thus requires something additional to create a 
particular right to things that others are morally obliged to recognise. Having rejected 
God and nature as the immediate foundation of such rights, Pufendorf claims instead 
that individual property rights depend upon the tacit or express consent of all others, 
whereby all individuals voluntarily renounce their natural liberty in order to acquire 
particular moral rights and duties.82 Premised on the idea of an intervening human 
convention, these rights properly belong to obligatory natural law in the sense that this 
obligatory natural law ‘advises us’ of the need to institute such rights insofar as the duty 
to procure and promote peaceful society with others demands it.83  
 
Like Pufendorf, Barbeyrac is also concerned to repudiate what he takes to be the 
Hobbesian thesis of open-ended natural rights but he considers Pufendorf’s alternative 
line of argument equally problematic. Instead, Barbeyrac’s response to both Hobbes and 
Pufendorf is to insist upon a strict 1:1 correlation between rights and obligations. Right 
and obligation, Barbeyrac tells us, are ‘two relative ideas, which almost always go hand 
in hand’.84 To be sure, Barbeyrac says, in certain circumstances these natural rights lose 
their utility when they come into conflict with an equal right possessed by someone 
else, such as in the case of two men in conflict over a plank of wood in a shipwreck 
where neither has a prior or particular right to it.85 Barbeyrac’s claim here is that the 
rights themselves do not cease to exist but rather that it is no longer possible to exercise 
them effectively. As we have already seen, Barbeyrac’s law of simple permission is his 
attempt to explain what he takes to be the proper foundation and the limits to this idea 
of natural rights. Deriving from positive divine permissions, the actual exercise of one’s 
natural rights produces a corresponding obligation in others. Yet, the exercise of these 
                                                
82 Pufendorf, DNG, 3.5.4.  
83 Pufendorf, DNG, 4.4.4: ‘elle nous conseille’. Peter Birks and Grant McLeod argue that Pufendorf’s 
theory of the foundation of property rights here owes its origin to the Roman concept of quasi-contracts 
and implied consent and that Barbeyrac both identified and rejected Pufendorf’s use of quasi-contractual 
reasoning: ‘The Implied Contract Theory of Quasi-Contracts’, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 6:1 
(1986), pp. 65-68.  
84 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.5, Note 2: ‘deux idées relatives, qui marchent presque toûjours d’un pas égal’. 
The phrase ‘hand in hand’ used here is adopted from the early modern translation: The Law of Nature and 
Nations, 1.6.15, Note 6, p. 70.  
85 Barbeyrac, DNG, 3.5.1, Note 1. Barbeyrac cites Thomasius for the example.  
  
104 
 
rights is circumscribed by the wider framework of one’s general duties to oneself, to 
others and to God.  
 
In Barbeyrac’s own account of the original negative community of goods, he claims 
therefore that the divine permission upon which this community is founded ‘naturally 
accords a full power’ to use things as individuals deem appropriate.86 In the natural 
state, Barbeyrac delimits the exercise of this ‘natural’ right as follows: ‘that as long as a 
man does not abandon something that he has seized with the design of making use of it, 
thus far it belongs to him, such that no one may dispossess him of it’, after which point 
it is once again left to the right of first occupancy.87 For Barbeyrac, this limited right of 
first occupancy is a necessary consequence of God’s intention in having accorded His 
permission in the first place. As we saw above, it is also characteristic of the rights 
accorded by permissive natural law that they may be taken up for a time and then cease 
to pertain or even be renounced.  
 
Moreover, Barbeyrac claims that the principal difference between this original limited 
right of possession and a full individual right of property is that the former only lasts as 
long as an individual is actually in possession of something, whereas the latter does not 
cease with possession, except for when an individual explicitly or tacitly abandons his 
right of property.88 That it to say, for Barbeyrac, the foundation of property rights 
ultimately derives from a natural right accorded by the original divine permission rather 
than from human consent. But how does Barbeyrac envisage the transition from a 
natural right to legitimately possess and use goods held in common to individual 
property rights? 
 
In the 1706 edition of his Pufendorf translation, Barbeyrac refers to Titius’s Pufendorf-
glosses to claim that the essence of an individual property right lies in the thing itself 
fully belonging to an individual for him to enjoy and dispose of as he pleases, rather 
than in the exclusion of the presumptions of all others to it.89 In short, for Barbeyrac, the 
divine permission establishes a relation of right that does not require the consent of 
                                                
86 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.4.1, Note 2: ‘ont naturellement plein-pouvoir’.  
87 Barbeyrac, DNG, 3.5.4, Note 3: ‘que tant qu’un homme n’abandonnoit pas une chose dont il s’étoit 
emparé à dessein de s’en servir, elle étoit à lui jusques-là, ensorte que personne ne pouvoit l’en 
deposseder’.  
88 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.12.2, Note 1.  
89 Barbeyrac, DNG [1706], 4.4.1, Note 2.  
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others for its exercise. Individual property rights are thus not introduced by any general 
convention between individuals but rather ‘by the sole intention whereby each 
individual indicates his design to keep for all time what he has appropriated, especially 
when the things have taken a new form in his hands as the fruit of his industry and 
labour’.90 Pufendorf’s consent-based theory of property rights, even the idea of 
presumed consent, Barbeyrac argues, is a chimerical and ahistorical supposition that is 
not only improbable but also unnecessary to the foundation of property rights so 
conceived.91 
 
Barbeyrac’s account of the foundation of property rights, however, is far from 
straightforward. On the face of it, the definition of property rights just given draws 
directly on the Lockean idea that it is by virtue of mixing one’s labour with the goods of 
the earth – which all individuals have a natural right to use and consume – that 
individuals come to possess a particular right of property.92 This ties in closely with 
Barbeyrac’s wider argument that what distinguishes humans from animals is an 
awareness of the obligation to undertake honest (and often strenuous) labour in order to 
provide the necessary goods for, first, the preservation of human society and, second, its 
advancement.93 For Barbeyrac, this is evident from God’s purpose in constituting man 
and the natural world as he did, that is, to inspire in them a rationally motivated will to 
work: ‘the Creator himself, in giving the Earth to Men in common, has commanded 
them to work, and has placed upon them, by virtue of their natural condition, the 
                                                
90 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.12.2, Note 1: ‘par la seule intention que chacun temoignoit de garder pour toûjours 
ce dont il s’étoit saisi, surtout quand les choses avoient pris entre ses mains une nouvelle forme, qui étoit 
le fruit de son industrie & de son travail’. 
91 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.4.9, Note 3. It is important to note that a consent-based theory of property and a 
theory of permissive natural law are not mutually exclusive. In fact, Fransisco de Vitoria combined both 
in his natural law works: see Brian Tierney, ‘Permissive Natural Law and Property’, pp. 389-390. Tierney 
rejects the idea that Barbeyrac had anything to contribute to the debate on permissive natural law and 
property, viewing him as only concerned with the relationship between permissive civil law and the 
duties of natural law, see p. 393, fn. 55.  
92 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.4.4, Note 4.  
93 For Barbeyrac, both labour and rest are necessary to human society and thus both have an inherent 
dignity insofar as they uphold the purpose for which they were instituted: TJ, 1.1.3-4. In viewing rest and 
labour in this way, he was very much a man of his time and his religion, sitting between the original 
Reformation idea of work as a spiritual vocation and the emerging idea that linked labour to its utility: 
Leland Ryken, Work and Leisure in Christian Perspective, (Colorado Springs, CO, 1987), pp. 69-71 and 
pp. 92-100. However, it should be noted that Ryken places Locke firmly in the ‘Enlightenment’ tradition 
of valuing work in terms of utility procured, whereas a more careful reading of Locke should place him in 
the period of transition alongside Barbeyrac. Christopher Hill also charts the changing attitudes to work 
and labour in the period after the Reformation, arguing that the radical potential of the original English 
Puritans ideas had diminished by the time that Locke came to put labour at the heart of his theory of 
property: Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England, (London, 1964), Chapter 4, esp. p. 144 
on Locke.   
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necessity not to remain idle’.94 In short, by labouring on something we fulfil our 
individual and social duty to provide for the necessary goods in life.  
 
What makes Barbeyrac’s argument decidedly Lockean is that the property rights in the 
goods that we produce through our labour derive directly from the property that each 
individual has in his own person:  
 
each being sole master of his own person and his actions; the work of his 
Body and the labour of his Hands, are entirely and uniquely his, as his own 
and particular good.95  
 
This echoes Locke’s claim that: 
 
every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right 
to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we 
may say, are properly his.96  
 
It is important to note here that while both Barbeyrac and Locke usually are thinking of 
strenuous labour, they also include the kind of actions that might be thought of as 
merely taking possession, for example, gathering fruits that have fallen from trees 
within the shared community of goods. In light of this, it would seem that Barbeyrac 
adopts the Lockean thesis that individuals come to possess property rights in things 
through their labour by virtue of the property that they already possess in their own 
person.   
 
But despite Barbeyrac’s professed – and at times apparent – fidelity to the essence of 
the Lockean argument, it was Carmichael who first questioned whether Barbeyrac was 
as faithful to Locke as he claimed to be. Carmichael argued that Barbeyrac departs 
substantially from the essential Lockean idea that taking possession of something and 
labouring upon it is the original and proper foundation of property rights. Instead, he 
pointed out, Barbeyrac allows that ‘a declaration of the will alone suffices for acquiring 
                                                
94 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.4.4, Note 4: ‘le Créateur lui-même, en donnant le Terre en commun aux Hommes, 
leur a commandé de travailler, & les a mis, par leur condition naturelle, dans la nécessité de ne pas 
demeurer oisifs’.  
95 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.4.4, Note 4: ‘chacun étant seul maître de sa personne & de ses actions; le travail de 
son Corps, & l’ouvrage de ses Mains, sont entirement & uniquement à lui, comme son bien propre & 
particulier’.  
96 Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett, (Cambridge, 
1988), 5.27.  
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ownership of a thing which belongs to no one, without any taking whether direct or 
indirect’.97 What Carmichael has in mind here is the passage where Barbeyrac says that 
‘taking actual possession is not always absolutely necessary to acquire a thing that does 
not belong to anybody’.98 For Carmichael, it necessarily follows that property rights 
cannot derive directly from individual action, i.e., labour, and thus Barbeyrac’s account 
is not wholly Lockean.  
 
In his final revisions to the Pufendorf translation, Barbeyrac replies directly to 
Carmichael. He states here that will alone does not confer the full rights of property, but 
rather the right acquired by the act of will can only be maintained by actually taking 
possession of the thing itself. Labour is thus a necessary condition for acquiring a 
property right, that it is to say, by labouring on something or even simply taking 
possession of it, individuals make good their initial act of will and thus legitimately take 
ownership of a certain thing. In this, Barbeyrac claims that he has established nothing 
contrary to Locke’s original theory of property as he understands it.99 Yet, in light of the 
fact that Barbeyrac was one of the first to take up and popularise Locke’s theory of 
property, his reading of Locke cannot merely be dismissed as a rhetorical ploy to lend 
weight to his own arguments through a little early modern name dropping.100 Instead, 
Barbeyrac considers himself to be drawing out the implications that, pace Carmichael, 
he believes to be implicit with the original Lockean theory of property rights. 
 
To this end, Barbeyrac clearly considers himself faithful to Locke by virtue of his claim 
that taking possession of a thing and mixing one’s labour with it is necessary to make 
good this original act of will. Barbeyrac declares that taking ‘possession counts for 
nothing here, except inasmuch as it is an incontestable mark of the will to retain what 
one has seized’.101 In effect, what Barbeyrac indicates here is that taking possession, 
especially in labouring on something, is absolutely necessary insofar as it is an effective 
                                                
97 Carmichael, Natural Rights, p. 99. For further context to Carmichael’s objection to Barbeyrac on this 
issue see also Mautner, ‘Carmichael and Barbeyrac’, pp. 198-99.  
98 Barbeyrac, DNG [1706], 4.6.2, Note 2: ‘la prise de possession actuelle n’est pas toûjours absolument 
nécessaire pour acquérir une chose qui n’appartenoit à personne’.  
99 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.6.2, Note 2.  
100 Tully identifies Barbeyrac as ‘the first to agree in print with Locke’s claim that his is the best available 
explanation of property’ in his Discourse on Property, p. 5.  
101 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.6.1, Note 1: ‘la possession ne fait rien-là, qu’autant qu’elle est une marquee 
incontestable de la volonté qu’on a de retenir ce dont on s’est emparé’. See also Barbeyrac’s remarks in 
DHC, 1.12.6, Note 1: ‘Ce qui fonde proprement le droit du Premier Occupant, c’est qu’il a donné à 
connoître avant toute autre le dessein qu’il avoit de s’emparer de telle ou telle chose’. 
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sign to others of one’s will, that is to say, as a form of communication. Implicit within 
Barbeyrac’s concept of permissive natural law is the idea that individuals have certain 
dormant rights that others are obliged to respect once individuals take up these rights. 
But to do so, some form of communication, whether in words or actions, is necessary in 
order for these rights to become part of the fabric of individuals’ linguistically 
constructed social reality. Thus, for Barbeyrac, an undeclared or unexpressed act of will 
to retain something without any corresponding effective sign, such as actually taking 
possession, cannot produce a true property right because the original act of will is not 
real insofar as the absence of an effective sign of one’s will means that the ensuing right 
lacks social reality.   
 
For Barbeyrac, Locke’s great insight therefore is that labour is especially fitted to the 
task of being an effective sign. This is, in part, because the strenuous effort involved 
means that others cannot easily dispute that an individual has made good their original 
act of will and that a property right has thereby been created. The individual act of will 
expressed in the form of one’s act of labouring takes what is effectively a dormant 
natural right and makes it vital by indicating to all other individuals that they are now 
under a corresponding obligation. The individual will is thus an essential moment in 
making natural rights genuinely claimable in some meaningful sense of the word. The 
reason that an act of individual will is able to establish these permissive natural rights is 
closely connected to the point made earlier that, by labouring on something, individuals 
bequeath to the object laboured upon some part of the property that they already possess 
in their own person.  
 
This is crucial for Barbeyrac because it connects the kind of rights that individuals 
possess in the goods that they labour upon, i.e., individual property rights in general, to 
Locke’s much wider concept of naturally acquired property rights. For Barbeyrac, the 
Lockean property rights encompass ‘not only the right that one has to one’s goods and 
possession; but also those to one’s action, to one’s Liberty, to one’s Life, to one’s Body, 
&c., in a word to all sorts of right’.102 It is these latter rights to life, liberty and body that 
are the bedrock of one’s property in one’s own person, that is to say, they are 
                                                
102 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §2, Note (c): ‘non seulement le droit qu’on a sur ses biens ou ses 
possessions; mais encore sur ses actions, sur sa Liberté, sur sa Vie, sur son Corps, &c., en un mot toute 
sorte de droits’.  
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inalienable rather than permissive rights. Moreover, as the subsequent two chapters will 
make clear, this idea of property in our own person (insofar as our relations with others 
are concerned) depends on the concomitant idea of God’s enduring mastery of our 
person.103 The implication here is that the authoritative character of an individual act of 
will, by virtue of which certain permissive natural rights are brought into being, depends 
on certain antecedent and inalienable natural rights. It is in this sense that Barbeyrac is 
able to speak of property rights (understood in the narrower sense of goods and 
possessions) being claimable and thus enforceable by individuals within the natural 
state.104 
 
It is important, however, not to read into Barbeyrac’s commentary a fully developed 
theory of natural rights that were claimable or enforceable in all circumstances. This 
much is apparent from the fact that throughout his texts the idea of permissive natural 
law often remains in the shadows, as for example in the discussion of the institution of 
both language and property. Thus what modern commentators might consider the full 
potential for a comprehensive theory of natural rights – both permissive and inalienable 
– is not exploited by Barbeyrac and, more significantly, may not even have been 
apparent to him. In an immediate sense, this may be because the spectre of Hobbesian 
open-ended rights is always looming for Barbeyrac, and for this reason he is always 
cautious about how much power he ascribes to the individual will in determining the 
exercise of these natural rights.  
 
In fact, Barbeyrac builds certain restrictions into his theory of naturally acquired 
individual property rights in keeping with what he deems to be the proper use that one 
ought to make of the original divine permission. Following Titius, Barbeyrac claims 
that the bearers of property rights are obliged to observe the law of nature in the use of 
these rights, first, ‘to procure the glory of God properly understood, and to put his Laws 
in practice’ and, subsequently, ‘to procure an innocent advantage to other Men, as well 
as to his own self’.105 This means making use of one’s property for the purpose intended 
by God, that is to say, labouring upon things in order to provide for the necessities and 
                                                
103 Cf. Chapter 4, p. 140 and Chapter 5, p. 154.  
104 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.3.4, Note 3. Cf. Chapter 5, p. 158.  
105 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.13.1, Note 1: ‘à procurer le gloire de DIEU bien entenduë, & à mettre ses Loix en 
pratique’ and ‘à procurer l’avantage innocent des autres Hommes, aussi-bien que le sien propre’.  
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comforts of life and the advancement of human society.106 In effect, individuals fulfil 
their individual and social duties by making use of their rights of property in a manner 
that conforms to the original purpose for which such rights were instituted. Like all 
rights grounded in Barbeyrac’s concept of permissive natural law, the actual exercise of 
the natural right that individual property rights are derived from is circumscribed by the 
strict duties of obligatory natural law that all individuals are indispensably bound to 
observe.  
 
For Barbeyrac, the institution of individual property rights has a further purpose in that 
it enables individuals to enter into commercial life with others.107 In the example of how 
far the right of prescription extends according to the principles of natural law, 
Barbeyrac states that this issue must be judged according to the proper ends of property, 
namely making good use of things and establishing commerce for the good of society. 
Thus any person that had not made good their original right to property in conformity 
with these principles may consequently be deprived of this property right in favour of 
the putative owner who has possessed the thing in question in good faith and in 
conformity with these principles.108 Naturally acquired individual property rights may be 
claimable in the natural state but this is not to say that they are enduring if the individual 
in question ceases to uphold their wider duties in the maintenance of these rights. To 
claim a legitimate right of property, therefore, means taking up and continuing to use 
that property in a manner conformable to the duties entailed by the original divine 
permission.  
 
Finally, it is notable that Barbeyrac argues that commerce, like property, is both 
innocent in itself and necessary to human life, given the natural constitution of man. 
Yet, just as with the use of the permissions accorded to individuals to game (itself a 
form of commerce), the institution of both property and commerce may also open the 
way to vice and corrupted morals.109 What we find in Barbeyrac’s theory of property 
therefore are two mutually dependent claims: (i) individuals have a natural right to 
acquire property rights in things by virtue of the original positive divine permission, and 
such a right is established in practice by an act of will made express by labouring upon 
                                                
106 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.4.4, Note 4.  
107 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.13.3, Note 1.  
108 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.12.8, Note 3.  
109 Barbeyrac, DNG, 5.1.1, Note 1.  
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something; and (ii) this natural right to acquire and retain property in things is limited 
by the duties of natural law taken in their full extension and the purpose of property 
itself, namely, to make proper use of the natural goods of the earth and to establish 
commerce between men for the benefit of society. These claims must be understood 
within Barbeyrac’s wider theory of permissive natural law, because it is here that he 
develops the language of naturally acquired rights circumscribed by natural law duties. 
 
In conclusion, the purpose of the present chapter has been to consider the internal 
tensions between Barbeyrac’s innovative and, at times, elusive concept of permissive 
natural law as the sphere of individual natural rights and authoritative moral judgement 
and his concomitant concept of obligatory natural law as the sphere of natural divine 
authority and the resulting strict duties to God, to others and to oneself. While 
Barbeyrac often blurs the boundaries between these two spheres of natural law, the 
present chapter has sought to show that it is not possible simply to dismiss Barbeyrac’s 
concept of permissive natural law or to subsume it within his wider theory of obligatory 
natural law. Instead, the concept of permissive natural law plays a fundamental role 
both in terms of the moral deliberation individuals make with respect to common social 
practices and in the establishment of the very social institutions that make such 
interactions possible, i.e., speech, property and commerce.  
 
The question that remains unresolved at the end of this chapter is one that goes to the 
heart of Barbeyrac’s theory of natural law. That is to say, the extent to which 
individuals possess a genuine moral liberty to make use, as they deem appropriate, of 
the natural rights accorded by permissive natural law. Or, in other words, how far 
individuals themselves are the source of authoritative moral judgements informed by the 
light of conscience. Thus far, we have only sought to answer this question with 
reference to the tensions between obligatory and permissive natural law. The purpose of 
the two subsequent chapters is to extend this discussion by focusing on the relationship 
that Barbeyrac envisaged between the authority of natural law – both obligatory and 
permissive – and other spheres of authority, namely ecclesiastical authority (in chapter 
4) and civil authority (in chapter 5). 
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Chapter Four 
Natural Law and the Limits of Ecclesiastical Authority 
 
I 
Introduction 
 
‘Who is not aware that the ordinary Preachers of the Gospel soon forgot the title of 
Servants that the Apostles themselves conferred upon their Disciples so that they would 
consider themselves only as Ambassadors of the Heavens, and instead imperiously 
raised themselves up above other Men, under the pretext of a metaphorical commission, 
from which they handed down their orders to so many?’.1 Barbeyrac’s rhetorical 
question served to emphasise his conviction that ecclesiastics, both Catholic and 
Reformed, arrogated undue power to themselves. In his history of the Christian religion, 
he argued that the perfection of Christ’s moral and religious teachings, embodied in the 
Apostolic church, gave way to the appropriation of improper authority by ecclesiastical 
powers through the ages, establishing the tyranny of ambitious and avaricious 
ecclesiastics as the greatest threat to true morality. The roots of this corruption were laid 
with the early church fathers; theologians and moral teachers who ‘readily confuse their 
own glory with the glory of God’.2  
 
Establishing the proper limits of ecclesiastical authority was central to Barbeyrac’s 
thought, as it developed from his early, avowedly anticlerical, Pufendorf ‘Préface’ in 
1706 to his 1728 Traité de la morale des peres de l’eglise; remaining a constant theme 
throughout his works, both in his natural law commentaries and public discourses. 
However, Barbeyrac’s critique of ecclesiastical authority constitutes more than mere 
anticlerical polemic stemming from his personal experiences of ecclesiastical 
intolerance.3 The sharp polemic edges of his critique are tempered by his broader 
                                                
1 Barbeyrac posed this rhetorical question to his audience during his public address – subsequently 
published as a short discourse – upon taking up the office of Rector of the Académie de Lausanne in 
1714: ‘Discours sur l’utilité des lettres et des sciences’, p. 123: ‘Qui ne sait que les Prédicateurs 
ordinaires de l’Evangile oubliérent bientôt le titre de Serviteurs, que les Apôtres eux-mêmes se donnoient 
à l’égard de leurs Disciples, pour ne se considérer que comme les Ambassadeurs du Ciel, & pour s’élever 
fiérement au dessus des autres Hommes, sous prétexte d’une commission métaphorique, où ils passoient 
de beaucoup leurs ordres?’.  
2 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours sur l’utilité des lettres et des sciences’, p. 124: ‘confond aisément sa propre gloire 
avec la gloire de Dieu’.  
3 For more on this context, see ‘Introduction’, pp. 16-22.  
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pedagogic concerns as an academician and natural law theorist. To this end, he seeks 
not only to determine the limits of ecclesiastical authority, but also to identify what he 
takes to be the purpose of and the duties incumbent on public ministers of religion, 
namely to follow the example of Christ the moral teacher.  
 
This chapter brings together a number of different arguments that Barbeyrac developed 
in support of his basic contention that ecclesiastics have stepped beyond the bounds of 
their authority in seeking to constrain the legitimate exercise of individual conscience. 
The discussion presented here may be divided, broadly speaking, into two parts. First, 
in the following three sections, arguments relating to the relationship between natural 
law and the history of Christian morality are explored: namely, (i) the consonance 
between natural law and Christian moral law; (ii) the obfuscation of this principle by the 
early church fathers; (iii) the importance of both obligatory and permissive law in 
determining the moral limits of ecclesiastical authority. Secondly, the final two sections 
take up the question of toleration, both ecclesiastical and civil.  
 
The picture that emerges is a defence of the duty incumbent on every individual to 
follow the light of conscience, above all with respect to sincere religious belief, free 
from interference by meddlesome and misguided ecclesiastics and from civil 
intolerance. Here, we see how Barbeyrac embraces the idea of a strong civil sovereign 
capable of keeping the exercise of ecclesiastical authority within its proper bounds. 
Some of the themes addressed in the final sections are closely linked to the argument 
that will be developed in the following chapter regarding the nature and limits of civil 
authority.  
 
II 
Christian Morality Corrupted 
 
In his Pufendorf ‘Préface’, Barbeyrac presents his readers with a historical narrative of 
the evolution and corruption of Christian morality. At the heart of his narrative is the 
ministry of Jesus Christ and his immediate disciples, the Apostles. Barbeyrac alleges 
that Jesus’s ministry followed in the wake of the corruption of morality at the hands of 
the early Jewish priests, who were ‘solely occupied with Civil Law, or the study of 
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Ceremonies’ and failed to perceive the true moral principles in the Mosaic revelation.4 
Barbeyrac thus casts Christ’s divine mission as the restoration of the purity of divinely 
revealed moral law: 
 
He [Christ] re-established Morality in its utmost purity, he fully disclosed 
the true sources thereof, and he gave, regarding the whole Duty of Man in 
general and of each individual in particular, Rules general indeed, but 
perfect, entirely conformed to Reason and to the true interests of 
Mankind’.5 
 
Here, Barbeyrac depicts Christ as a moral teacher whose principal intention was to 
dispel the confusion wrought by the lack of penetration into the spirit of the legislator, 
i.e., God, rather than simply taking up the letter of the law as had the Jewish public 
ministers of religion. Taking on Christ’s mantle, the Apostles are credited with 
‘everywhere preaching this most-holy doctrine’ by virtue of which individuals could 
determine the proper moral action ‘in every imaginable case’.6  
 
For Barbeyrac, Christ’s ministry peeled away all false moral doctrine to reveal the true 
principles of Christian morality, characterised as clear and conformable to natural 
reason and thus accessible to all rational beings. He perceives the greatest threat to true 
Christian morality to come from the obfuscation of these general moral principles, a 
development that first occurred in the time of the Apostles when other ‘false doctors’ 
tried to reinstate Mosaic ceremonies as essential religious duties for all Christians.7 In 
effect, Barbeyrac makes the essence of the Christian faith reside in the knowledge and 
practice of the moral law as revealed by Christ and preached by the Apostles.  
 
Barbeyrac reserves his greatest censure for the early church fathers, theologians whom 
he holds almost solely responsible for the corruption of the true message of Christianity, 
both moral and religious. The church fathers, Barbeyrac alleges, were,  
 
                                                
4 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §7: ‘Uniquement occupez au Droit Civil, ou à l’étude des Cérémonies’.  
5 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §8: ‘Il rétablit la Morale dans toute sa pureté, il en découvrit pleinement les 
véritables sources, & il donna, sur tous Les devoirs des Hommes en général & de chacun en particulier, 
des Régles générales, mais parfaits, entierement conformes à la Raison & aux véritables intérets du Genre 
Humain’. Some turns of phrase are borrowed from the 1749 edition The Law of Nature and Nations.  
6 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §8: ‘prêcherent partout cette doctrine très-sainte’ and ‘de tous les cas 
imaginables’.  
7 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §8.  
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more jealous of their rights, and more attached to the discussion of points 
of Discipline, or various abstract Questions, than the careful study of 
Morality, and its dissemination among the people.8  
 
He chastises them for failing to follow the example of Christ and the Apostles, that is to 
say, acting as diligent and attentive public teachers of the moral law. As such, they 
failed to uphold the duty incumbent of all public ministers of religion to make the study 
and teaching of morality their principal concern.9 
 
Barbeyrac makes recourse here to a line of argument particularly popular among his 
Huguenot contemporaries, according to which the purity and simplicity of primitive 
Christianity stands in contrast to the corrupted and intolerant spirit that emerged during 
the patristic period.10 The recovery of the true morality of the primitive church is thus 
necessary to confront the erroneous and dogmatic moral philosophy of the early church 
fathers and the unjustified stranglehold on moral authority held by subsequent 
generations of ecclesiastics. Barbeyrac praises the ‘light of the Reformation’ for the 
considerable progress made towards the reestablishment of ‘the purity of doctrine and 
practice’, though at the same time condemns ‘the abhorrent dogma of Intolerance, or 
Persecution in the name of Religion’ that was nonetheless preserved.11 Barbeyrac 
commends the ministry of a number of his contemporaries for upholding the true spirit 
of Christian faith, above all, those of latitudinarian sympathies: in particular, the 
ministries of Turrettini, Tillotson and the former Bishop of Salisbury, Gilbert Burnet 
(1643-1715).12 For the most part, however, Barbeyrac intends his arguments as a 
critique of overly zealous and dogmatic Reformed ministers and their Catholic 
counterparts.   
 
Barbeyrac’s history of Christian morality in the original Pufendorf ‘Préface’ drew much 
attention from his contemporaries, with his avowedly anticlerical article on the church 
                                                
8 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §9: ‘plus jaloux de leurs droits, & plus attachez à discuter quelque point de 
Discipline, ou quelques Questions abstraites, que soigneux d’étudier la Morale, & d’en instruire le 
Peuple’. 
9 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §6.  
10 John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture: Religious Intolerance and 
Arguments for Religious Toleration in Early Modern and ‘Early Enlightenment’ Europe, (Cambridge, 
2006), pp. 200-212.  
11 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §11: ‘les lumieres de la RÉFORMATION’ and ‘la pureté de la doctrine & 
de la pratique’ and ‘Le dogme affreux de l’Intolérance, ou de la persecution pour cause de Religion’. 
12 Barbeyrac, ‘Epitre Dedicatoire [1722]’, in Sermons sur diverses matieres importantes, par feu Mr. 
Tillotson, 6 Volumes, (Amsterdam: Pierre Humbert, 1744), Vol. 6.  
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fathers even being independently translated and published in English.13 Amongst his 
most notable respondents was the Benedictine monk and ecclesiastical historian, Rémi 
Ceillier. Inspired to take up his pen in reply to Barbeyrac’s ‘unjust accusations’ against 
the early church fathers, Ceillier wrote a vehement defence of the moral teachings of the 
fathers, entitled Apologie de la Morale des Pères (1718).14 Ceillier reasserted the 
orthodox Catholic argument that the church fathers were depositories of a written and 
non-written tradition received directly from the Apostles, arguing that the ‘fact’ of 
apostolic succession conferred upon the church fathers an infallibility commensurate 
with the infallibility of Christ and the Apostles.15 
 
Responding to Ceillier’s argument, Barbeyrac rejects the idea that the person and the 
ministry of Christ was characterised by his infallibility. In light of this, he also disputes 
the claim that both the Apostles and subsequent ecclesiastics in their stead may lay 
claim to a ‘supposed’ infallibility. This is important for Barbeyrac because the moral 
example set by Christ in his person and his ministry represents the perfection of true 
Christian morality. He furthers this argument in response to what he takes to be the 
moral teachings of the second century theologian, Clement of Alexandria. Here, 
Barbeyrac claims that the moral example that Christ offers us in his own person is the 
example of the perfect harmony of his divine and human nature. In contrast, Clement 
draws on ‘either entirely false, or extremely excessive’ Stoic principles, depicting Christ 
as the example of moral perfection, exempt from all human passions and suffering.16 
Here, the idea of Christ’s perfection lies in his insensibility to all human passions, 
including not only the renunciation of all emotions and desires, but also the absence 
even of hunger, thirst or any other form of physical suffering.17 Christ alone is sustained 
solely by the Holy Spirit ‘from the beginning’.18 For Clement, as Barbeyrac interpreted 
him, while Christ naturally possessed such divine perfection, the perfect Christian, 
                                                
13 The translator Thomas Gordon, however, altered the text significantly in his translation to strengthen its 
anticlerical message: The Spirit of the Ecclesiasticks of all Sects and Ages, as to the Doctrines of 
Morality, and more particularly the Spirit of the Ancient Fathers of the Church, examin'd ... Translated 
from the French by a gentleman of Gray's-Inn, (London, 1722). 
14 Remi Ceillier, Apologie de la morale des pères de l'Eglise: contre les injustes accusations du sieur 
Jean Barbeyrac, (Paris, 1718). 
15 For an overview of Ceillier’s position, see the whole of his ‘Dissertation preliminaire sur l’authorité des 
peres de l’Eglise’, pp. i-xl. 
16 Barbeyrac, TMP, 5.39: ‘ou entiérement faux, ou extrémement outrez’. Here, Barbeyrac reproaches 
Clement for his uncritical use of Stoic philosophy. However, in general terms, Barbeyrac is broadly 
sympathetic to Stoic moral philosophy. Cf. Chapter 1, p. 27, fn. 14.   
17 Barbeyrac, TMP, 5.54. 
18 Barbeyrac, quoting Clement, TMP, 5.52: ‘DES LE COMMENCEMENT’. 
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epitomised by the Apostles, purposefully became insensible to all human passions. The 
perfect Christian thus has no intemperate or immoderate passions left to conquer, he has 
no need of the virtues of temperance and moderation: that is to say, he is free from sin.19  
 
In contrast to Clement, Barbeyrac argues that far from being insensible to human 
passions and so free from temptation, Christ’s redemptive power and thus his moral 
example depends upon his humanity. Citing a passage of Scripture that explicitly states 
that Christ suffered from the same temptations and human infirmities as all humanity, 
Barbeyrac argues that Christ was ‘wholly like us, except without sin’.20 The perfection 
of his nature is not the absence of passion or temptation to sin, that is, his insensible 
divine nature, but rather the true moral example that he provides for all other moral 
beings arises from the perfection of his sensible, human nature. Barbeyrac uses 
Scripture to argue that not only was Christ susceptible to human passions and human 
weakness, but also that, even if he so wished, he could not exempt himself from his own 
human nature.21 It is Christ’s divine mission rather than his divine nature that Barbeyrac 
emphasises. In arguing that Christ’s moral example does not derive from transcending 
his human nature but rather through the embodiment of his humanity in his own person, 
Barbeyrac leaves a certain degree of ambiguity, presumably to guard against the charge 
of Socinianism, having already lived through the damage caused by such accusations, 
which effectively ended his early aspirations to join the ministry.22  
 
Barbeyrac extends his argument further by rejecting the claim that the church fathers 
and subsequent generations of ecclesiastics themselves possess an infallible moral 
authority in the image of Christ and the Apostles. For Barbeyrac, the Apostles alone, as 
the immediate disciples of Christ, were possessed ‘of knowledge and of authority’ that 
                                                
19 Barbeyrac, TMP, 5.50. 
20 Barbeyrac, TMP, 5.56. The quote is from Hebrews 4.15, which Barbeyrac renders as ‘semble à nous en 
tout, hormis le Péché’.  
21 Barbeyrac, TMP, 5.56.  
22 J.G.A. Pocock argues that in the Morale des peres Barbeyrac is suggesting that ‘Jesus taught nothing 
but morality and that all accounts of his divinity, incarnation, miracles and resurrection were subsequently 
invented’ with the Fathers as the source of this confusion in Christian belief. The difficulty with this 
thesis is that Barbeyrac is reticent about explicitly developing this line of argument because of the 
difficulties that he had already experienced on account of his perceived theological unorthodoxy. What it 
is fair to say, however, is that Barbeyrac considers Christ first and foremost as a moral teacher, 
deliberately refusing to address what he refers to as ‘theological controversies’. See J.G.A Pocock, 
Barbarism and Religion, Volume Two: Narratives of Civil Government, (Cambridge, 1999), p. 69. Cf. 
Introduction, p. 18. 
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‘none after them had’.23 Barbeyrac’s evidence rests on his claim that the Apostles were 
‘invested with the gift of Miracles by the Holy Spirit’ whereas the ministers of the 
Gospel who succeeded them were ‘without any extraordinary power, and [hence had] 
infinitely less authority’.24 Together with Christ, the Apostles alone are thus understood 
as faithful propagators of Christ’s divine mission, uniquely subject to divine insight. In 
effect, it is not from any claim to infallibility that the moral authority of the Apostles 
derives as founders of the primitive church but rather from their fidelity to his divine 
mission as moral teachers.   
 
Both in his original Pufendorf ‘Préface’ and in the subsequent Morale des peres, 
Barbeyrac argues that the moral authority possessed by ecclesiastics cannot rest on a 
claim to an infallibility shared with Christ and his Apostles, but rather through fidelity 
to Christ’s original message, both in one’s person and in one’s ministry. The restoration 
of true Christian morality rests on the recovery of the true spirit of Christ’s revelation. 
By divesting the fathers of their claim to moral authority as depositories of both written 
and non-written truths, Barbeyrac clears the way to reassert the fundamental 
Reformation principles that Scripture ought to be the sole rule of faith. Christ’s moral 
teaching, that is to say, all principles of ‘this Holy Religion’, Barbeyrac claims, ‘are 
founded in that which Jesus-Christ either said himself, or taught to his Apostles, with 
the order to announce it in his name’.25 The purpose of the following section is to set out 
his argument in this respect.    
 
III 
Interpreting Scripture 
 
Barbeyrac opens his Morale des peres with the declaration that he intends to combat the 
pernicious ‘Prejudice of Authority, [and] Prejudice of Religion’.26 To this end, he states 
his fidelity to the Reformation principle of Scripture as the sole rule of faith (sola 
scriptura), arguing that he himself ‘does not take account of any Human Authority, 
                                                
23 Barbeyrac, TMP, 7.2: ‘d’une Connoissance & d’une Autorité’ and ‘aucun n’a euë après eux’. 
24 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DNG, §10: ‘le St. Esprit avoit revêtus du don des Miracles’ and ‘sans aucun 
pouvoir extraordinaire & avec une autorité infiniment moindre’.  
25 Barbeyrac, TMP, 8.12: ‘cette Sainte Religion’ and ‘fondez sur ce que JESUS-CHRIST ou a dit lui-
même, ou a enseigné à ses Apôtres, avec ordre de l’annoncer en son nom’.  
26 Barbeyrac, TMP, 1.2: ‘Préjugez d’Autorité, Préjugez de Religion’.  
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except inasmuch as it conforms to Holy Scripture and to Reason’.27 This includes not 
only Catholic authorities but also Reformed theologians, books and synods. For 
Barbeyrac, Scripture is capable of standing alone as the rule of faith because of its 
natural consonance with reason. This argument rests on the claim that both religion, 
specifically here the Christian faith, and morality, i.e., natural law, have their foundation 
in the truths of natural religion.28 Hence, the truths of natural religion are first and 
foremost moral truths, epitomised in Christ’s moral law as recorded in the Gospel. For 
Barbeyrac, natural morality and the Christian faith become, in effect, two different 
forms of the same moral law.  
 
Barbeyrac is cautious, however, to ensure that his claim for the consonance of natural 
and Christian moral law does not collapse certain necessary distinctions between the 
two. Each has an independent foundation: namely, natural reason and divine revelation. 
Nonetheless, he argues that despite these separate foundations, the moral truths that they 
arrive at are coterminous:  
 
The Principles and Precepts of the Morality of Jesus-Christ, if one excepts 
a small number that suppose the quality of a Christian considered as such, 
are at their core the same as those of Natural Morality, or the Duties that 
Reason alone may teach all Men.29 
 
Authoritative interpretation of Scripture thus rests on its conformity to natural reason 
and, likewise, no interpretation of Scripture may be admitted that is contrary to reason. 
Scripture and reason, Barbeyrac asserts, are the ‘two infallible Guides of our conduct’.30 
He takes it as read here that recourse to the principle of natural reason is sufficient to 
guard against charges of religious enthusiasm and individual caprice.31 His argument 
                                                
27 Barbeyrac, TMP, 1.9: ‘ne compte pour rien aucun Autorité Humaine, qu’autant qu’elle est conforme à 
l’Ecriture Sainte & à la Raison’. On the development of different approaches to Biblical interpretation 
that follow from the principle of Sola Scriptura, see the brief overview in Jonathan Sheehan, The 
Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship and Culture, (Princeton, 2005), pp. 1-4.  
28 Cf. Chapter 1, p. 28.  
29 Barbeyrac, TJ, 1.3: ‘les Principes & les Préceptes de la Morale de JESUS-CHRIST, si l’on en excepte 
un petit nombre qui supposent la qualité de Chrétien considéré précisement comme tel, sont au fond les 
meme que ceux de la Morale Naturelle, ou des Devoirs que la Raison seule peut apprendre à tous les 
Hommes’.  
30 Barbeyrac, TJ, 1.3: ‘deux Guides infaillibles de tout notre conduite’.  
31 For example, Ceillier objects that making Scripture the rule of faith is to invite schism and heresy 
because each individual may flatter himself that he has ‘received a particular gift from God to interpret 
the Scriptures’ and to ascribe meaning to it ‘as he deems appropriate’. It is notable here that Ceillier’s 
language mimics the language that Barbeyrac uses to describe the individual’s liberty to determine his 
proper moral conduct ‘as he deems appropriate’ within the sphere of permissive natural law according to 
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rests on the idea that it is possible for individuals to be possessed of rightly constituted 
reason, that is to say, for individual judgements of reason and by implication the 
deliberations of conscience to be ‘right’ in the sense that they are properly attuned to the 
moral truths of both natural law and Christian moral law.  
 
Barbeyrac’s insistence upon a natural consonance between the truths of natural law and 
natural religion epitomised in Christ’s moral law was integral to his rejection of 
Pufendorf’s claim that natural law concerns only the temporal duties that we owe to 
others in our external conduct. As we saw in Chapter 1, he significantly extended the 
purview of natural law duties, insisting on the primacy of individual conscience and 
duties owed to God. In the context of the present discussion, this same argument is 
developed in a different direction. In light of his claim that there is a fundamental 
consonance between the duties of Christian moral law and natural law – except for a 
small number of duties ‘that suppose the quality of a Christian considered as such’ – it 
follows that the scope and application of Christian moral law must accord with that of 
natural law. In effect, ‘the Gospel does not destroy Nature’. This means that just as the 
principles of natural law must demonstrate a fidelity to those of Scripture, likewise, for 
Barbeyrac, the moral principles adduced from Scripture must be in accord with the 
natural law framework depicted in the previous three chapters.  
 
For Barbeyrac, it follows from this that the moral authority possessed by ecclesiastics 
depends upon their fidelity to teachings of a Christian moral law. Such a law is 
characterised by its purity and simplicity, that is to say, its conformity to natural reason. 
It is on this footing that Barbeyrac censures the church fathers for being excessively 
attached to allegorical interpretation of Scripture. Barbeyrac claims that the use of 
allegory in the teachings of Christ is rare and inasmuch as it exists, it only serves as an 
accommodation to truths that have already been established on proper natural, or 
rational, foundations.32 In matters of morality, the most direct source of these properly 
founded truths is the law that ‘God has engraved on the hearts of all Men’, by which 
Barbeyrac means the law of nature.33 The excessive use of allegory by the church 
                                                                                                                                          
the light of conscience. Ceillier, Apologie de la morale des pères, p. viii: ‘reçû de Dieu le don particulier 
d’interpreter les Ecritures’ and ‘comme il le juge à propos’.  
32 Barbeyrac, TMP, 7.10. 
33 Barbeyrac, TMP, 7.13: ‘DIEU a gravée dans le cœur de tous les Hommes’. There is an implicit 
reference to Romans 2:15 here. 
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fathers thus exemplifies their corruption of the Christian message.34 Barbeyrac cites the 
injunction recounted by St Paul, in which Christ warns against an allegorical spirit that 
carries one away from the truth and promotes only disputes.35 All those who are sensible 
of the true and proper foundation of the teachings of Christ can have nothing but 
‘distaste and contempt for Allegory’ and the confusions that enter morality on account 
of its use.36  
 
In short, Barbeyrac argues that the preoccupation with an imagined Christian moral 
perfection leads the church fathers to make a false distinction between natural and 
Christian duties that is subsequently bolstered by their erroneous principles of Scriptural 
interpretation based on a search for allegorical meanings. This alone makes them ‘bad 
Masters and poor Guides in matters of Morality’.37 Having presented the position of the 
church fathers, Barbeyrac opposes it. As we shall see in the following discussion, the 
consonance between natural and Christian moral law means that these principles of 
Scriptural interpretation effectively uphold the framework of natural law rights and 
duties discussed in the previous three chapters.  
 
IV 
Moral Permission and Christ’s Moral Law 
 
At the heart of Barbeyrac’s critique of the moral teachings of the church fathers is his 
belief that the church fathers drove a wedge between natural and Christian duties, 
falsely insisting that Scripture was too obscure to act as a rule of faith without an 
intervening, and supposedly infallible, human authority, capable of discerning the true 
Christian duties contained therein.  Barbeyrac thus accused the church fathers of 
improperly setting themselves up as the bearers of an exclusive moral authority. For 
Barbeyrac, the most pernicious consequence of this arrogation of undue moral authority 
was its exercise in those spheres of moral action that properly belong to the judgements 
of individual conscience, not only within the sphere of obligatory moral duties but also 
the sphere of moral permission. In effect, conformity to the moral teachings of both 
Scripture and reason sets the limits to ecclesiastical authority and preserves an extensive 
                                                
34 Barbeyrac, TMP, 7.9. 
35 Barbeyrac, TMP, 7.8. 
36 Barbeyrac, TMP, 7.13: ’du dégoût & du mépris pour l’Allégorie’ 
37 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, TMP, p. xx: ‘de mauvais Maîtres & de pauvres Guides en matiére de Morale’.  
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sphere of individual moral judgement free from the overweening and unnecessary 
interference of any human authority acting beyond its proper limits.  
 
Barbeyrac’s argument for the consonance of natural and Christian moral law leads on to 
the claim that just as natural law comprises of a number of general maxims from which 
all particular moral judgements derive, so too does Christian moral law recorded in 
Scripture: 
 
It is for each individual to enquire with care into the true foundations of 
general Precepts; to develop them, as much as it is possible for him; to draw 
from them, by virtue of just consequences, particular Rules, applicable to the 
diverse states of Life, and the infinite number of cases that present 
themselves to us every day.38 
 
In short, the obligatory precepts of Christian moral law, like those of natural law, are 
maxims that still require individuals to make use of their reason in applying them to 
their own particular circumstances.39 These kinds of moral judgements are the principal 
activity of individual conscience. What distinguishes Christian moral law recorded in 
Scripture from natural law, Barbeyrac claims, is neither the content nor the scope of its 
moral precepts. Rather Christian moral teaching ‘compensates for the lack of 
attentiveness of Men, and furnishes them with much more powerful motives to practise 
their Duties’ by virtue of its medium as direct divine revelation containing all the truths 
necessary for salvation.40  
 
Barbeyrac also carves out a comparable sphere for permissible moral action within 
Christian moral law as in his account of natural law. Rejecting the claim of the fourth 
century theologian, St Ambrose, that only those things expressly commended or 
permitted by Scripture may be thought of as morally permissible in general, Barbeyrac 
cites instead St Paul’s injunction that all that is not expressly forbidden by Holy 
Scripture is therefore tacitly permitted. In effect, this is the argument from divine 
silence we encountered in the previous chapter.  
 
                                                
38 Barbeyrac, TMP, 1.5: ‘C’est à chacun à chercher avec soin le vrai fondement des Préceptes généraux; à 
les developer, autant qu’il lui est possible; à en tirer, par de justes consequences, des Régles particuliéres, 
applicables aux divers états de la Vie, & à une infinité de cas qui se présentent tous les jours’.  
39 Barbeyrac, TJ, 1.3.2.  
40 Barbeyrac, TMP, 1.5: ‘suppléer au peu d’attention des Hommes, & fournir des motifs beaucoup plus 
puissans à la pratique de ces Devoirs’.  
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With St Paul’s words as a foundation, Barbeyrac establishes the fundamental principle 
that anything not strictly prohibited by Scripture, understood as the sole authoritative 
record of Christian moral law, is tacitly permitted:  
 
It suffices that a thing is not prohibited in Scripture, and that moreover one 
does not perceive within it anything harmful, considered in itself, nor 
anything contrary to some other clear and indispensible Duty.41  
 
Christian moral law is thus comprised of the same spheres of obligatory moral precepts 
and moral permissions as natural law. The permissions of Christian moral law are 
subject to the same restrictions as those of permissive natural law, namely that the 
permission does not refer to something harmful in itself and that taking up the 
permission does not contravene a presiding moral duty.  
 
While this basic framework may hold true for the interpretation of Christ’s moral 
teachings in the Gospel, as the expression of Christian moral law in all its purity and 
simplicity, there remains the question of how to interpret divine permissions within 
Mosaic law recorded in the Old Testament. Here, the importance of clearly upholding 
the distinction between the letter and the spirit of the law becomes apparent for 
Barbeyrac’s argument. For Barbeyrac, God’s design as legislator of both natural and 
Christian moral law is to forbid all that is evil; hence the silence of the laws implies a 
positive permission. Mosaic law, however, is shaped by God’s design as temporal 
legislator of the Jewish nation. It is comprised of ceremonial, civil and moral law for the 
purpose of governing the conduct of a particular people at a particular point in history. 
Yet, Barbeyrac claims in Le droit de la guerre, that even as temporal legislator, God 
always proposes to bring men to greater virtue.42  
 
Barbeyrac thus argues that with respect to Mosaic law the silence of the laws and even 
certain express permissions do not necessarily imply positive approbation. All that may 
be inferred is that: 
 
                                                
41 Barbeyrac, TMP, 13.22: ‘qu’il suffit qu’une chose ne soit pas défénduë dans l’Ecriture, & qu’on n’y 
voie d’ailleurs ni rien de mauvais, à la considerer en elle-même, ni rien de contraire à quelque autre 
Devoir clair & indispensable’.  
42 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.17, Note 3. 
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When God permits a thing in certain cases, or to certain persons, or with 
respect to certain nations; it ought be inferred from that, that the thing 
permitted is not evil in its own nature.43 
 
Nothing permitted in the Old Testament, whether explicitly or tacitly, can therefore be 
considered as evil in its own nature, that is to say, subject to divine condemnation. 
Although not positively permitted, such things must therefore be, at the very least, 
indifferent in their own nature. The examples that Barbeyrac gives here are the 
permission to kill a thief in the night time, that is to say, a permissible exception to a 
general rule, and the permissions governing divorce and polygamy, that is to say, 
general permissions about morally indifferent things. In both cases, Barbeyrac’s 
reasoning rests on his belief that, no matter the capacity in which He acts, God cannot 
permit anything that is contrary to natural law ‘without destroying the essence of this 
law, and without doing injury to [His] Holiness, as well as [His] Wisdom’.44 He claims 
that the only exception to this rule concerns the direct commands of God to certain 
individuals recorded within the Old Testament, that is to say, where the divine 
permission refers to the specific instance of an act rather than its continual practice.45  
 
The church fathers, in contrast, come in for censure for fundamentally misunderstanding 
the nature of moral permission. Barbeyrac maintains that moral permission is not a mere 
tolerance borne by God because of the depravity of human nature: 
 
Here is the nub of the matter. They [the Fathers] conceive of the most 
natural Pleasures, as possessing something harmful in themselves; and the 
permission, that God gives to enjoy them, as a kind of tolerance, and an 
indulgence, that He has been forced into to by human infirmity, in order to 
avoid a greater harm.46 
 
                                                
43 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.17, Note 3: ‘Quand DIEU permet une chose en certains cas, ou à certaines 
personnes, ou par rapport à certaines gens; on doit inférer de là, que cette chose permise n’est point 
mauvaise de sa nature’.  
44 Barbeyrac, DNG, 6.1.24, Note 3: ‘sans détruire l’essence de ce Droit, & sans faire injure à la Saintété, 
aussi-bien qu’à la Sagesse [de Dieu]’.  
45 The example that Barbeyrac gives of the former exception to the rule is the civil immunity granted 
under Mosaic law to close relatives who seek blood revenge against a murderer. Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.17, 
Note 3. 
46 Barbeyrac, TMP, 4.34: ‘Voilà le noeud de l’affaire. On se figuroit les Plaisirs les plus naturels, comme 
aiant quelque chose de mauvais en eux-memês; & la permission, que Dieu donnoit de les goûter; comme 
une espéce de tolerance, & d’indulgence, à laquelle l’infirmité humaine l’avoit forcé en quelque maniére, 
pour éviter un plus grand mal’.  
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Far from being a species of divine concession to human weakness, for Barbeyrac moral 
permission denotes an extensive area of positive moral liberty to be exercised in 
accordance with the dictates of conscience insofar as the exercise of this liberty does not 
constitute an abuse of the thing itself. As Barbeyrac’s statement makes clear, he 
considers the church fathers’ faulty reasoning to rest on the assumption that Christian 
virtue requires the renunciation of one’s natural humanity and thus all permissions 
related to its fulfilment must necessarily be a kind of tolerance. Once again, at the heart 
of Barbeyrac’s critique of the church fathers is their alleged adherence to the principle 
that ‘the more that they depart from common practice and maxims, the more they 
conform to the Morality of Jesus-Christ’.47  
 
The contrast that Barbeyrac creates between his own position and the position that he 
ascribes to the church fathers is not merely an exercise in abstract moral reasoning but 
rather serves to establish what he takes to be the proper limits of ecclesiastical authority. 
Ecclesiastics of all ages have sought to exercise moral authority beyond these proper 
limits precisely because of their failure to understand the true nature of moral 
permission, that is to say, as a sphere of moral actions determined by the judgements of 
individual conscience. The church fathers and those who follow in their wake extend 
the scope of their authority beyond its proper limits in seeking to heavily circumscribe 
individuals’ liberty to determine the proper course of moral action free from 
interference. Barbeyrac argues that this corruption of true Christian moral teachings 
concerning things indifferent in themselves – and thus governed by the law of moral 
permission – arose in the time of the Apostles when the distinction was first made 
between divine precepts and divine counsels.  
 
Divine precepts are the obligatory prescriptions of the moral law taught by Christ and 
recorded by the Apostles in his name in the Gospel. Differing in scope but not form 
from obligatory natural law, these precepts are obligatory for all Christians at all times 
and in all places. Divine counsels, however, refer to the interpretation of Christ’s moral 
teaching offered by the Apostles with respect to the specific circumstances that they 
were asked to pass judgement upon. Barbeyrac claims that these divine counsels, 
insofar as they truly exist, concern those things ‘either indifferent in themselves, or 
                                                
47 Barbeyrac, TMP, 6.9: ‘plus ils s’éloignoient de la pratique & maximes communes, & plus ils se 
conformoient à la Morale de Jésus-Christ’ 
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about which there is no particular order of Jesus-Christ, nor any general Law of the 
Gospel’ that imposes a particular obligation upon individuals.48 Divine counsels specify 
things that may be praiseworthy in the eyes of God, but it follows from their character 
as morally indifferent that they refer to those things that are morally permissible. Hence, 
the Apostles left it ‘to the judgement and the conscience’ of each individual to 
determine how these counsels applied to their particular circumstances.49  
 
Having misunderstood the foundation of divine counsels, however, the church fathers 
subsequently used the distinction between precepts and counsels to condemn as 
immoral certain practices that are indifferent in themselves and confer upon others a 
special holiness. Hence, Barbeyrac claims, the church fathers falsely condemned a great 
many practices relating to marriage, criminal trial, trading and seeking profit, swearing 
of oaths, taking up public offices and other public honours, profiting from one’s labours 
in general, lending at interest and so forth. Likewise, they confer a special holiness on 
celibacy and other forms of abstinence from human passions, including in some cases, 
Barbeyrac points out derisively, the practice of becoming a eunuch.50 In effect, 
Barbeyrac’s objection to the church fathers’ teachings on these matters is that they make 
a vast wealth of moral practices subject to duties that they improperly claim are specific 
to Christians and, in doing so, extend the scope of their moral authority beyond its 
proper bounds into a sphere of moral actions that ought to be left to the moral 
deliberations of individual conscience.  
 
The moral precepts and permissions governing the state of marriage and the converse 
state of celibacy form one of the core examples through which Barbeyrac develops his 
critique of the church fathers’ moral teachings. He identifies the source of their 
teachings on marriage and celibacy as St Paul’s counsels to the Corinthians. St Paul’s 
counsels, particularly those against entering the marriage state, ought not to be 
interpreted as universal obligations for all Christians, but rather ‘for Christians at that 
time, and with respect to the present situation of things’.51 These counsels thus represent 
the interpretation of St Paul ‘as a faith Minister’ advising on what may be permissible 
                                                
48 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.2.9, Note 19: ‘ou indifférentes en elles-mêmes, ou sur lesquelles il n’y avoit aucun 
ordre particulier de JESUS-CHRIST, ni aucune Loi générale de l’Evangile’.  
49 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.2.9, Note 19: ‘au jugement & à la conscience de chacun’.  
50 Barbeyrac, TMP, 5.12.  
51 Barbeyrac, TMP, 8.11: ‘pour les Chrétiens de ce tems-là, & eû égard à la situation présente des choses’.  
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for the Corinthians, according to the general precepts of the Gospel ‘without prejudice 
to their Duty’.52 To interpret these counsels properly, it is necessary to be attentive to the 
particular circumstances in which the Corinthians found themselves and to which St 
Paul was directly responding. That is, the danger of frequent persecution that threatened 
both their individual and collective security and that prevented married persons from 
living together in peace and tranquillity. Such circumstances are rare and so these 
counsels cannot serve as the foundation for general Christian moral teachings on 
marriage and celibacy.  
 
Instead, Barbeyrac argues that marriage and the natural sexual desires that lead 
individuals to enter the state of marriage conform entirely to both Christian and natural 
moral law. God’s purpose in constituting the human passions as He did was to ensure 
the propagation of the species. Marriage and conjugal intimacy must, therefore, be 
permissible in the eyes of God. For Barbeyrac, marriage is essentially a contractual 
arrangement that best serves the purpose of creating a peaceful and enduring union in 
which to produce and educate offspring. This broadly concurs with his argument in Le 
droit de la nature that the marriage contract is binding on both parties as long as the 
duty to raise and educate any children endures, or as long as the specific terms of the 
contract specify, or as the two persons wish.53 Moreover, Barbeyrac argues that even 
those no longer able to propagate do not violate any natural or Christian divine 
permissions in continuing to enjoy conjugal intimacy within the marriage state. In short, 
while the nature of the contract may differ, both natural and Christian moral law uphold 
the principle that marriage is permissible for the purposes of propagation of the species 
and enjoyment of conjugal intimacy.  
 
Likewise, Barbeyrac maintains that the state of celibacy does not confer any greater 
holiness on individuals than the state of marriage. Rather it is for each individual to 
determine whether it is the state of marriage or the state of celibacy that puts them in the 
position to fulfil their general moral duties, i.e., to God, to others and to themselves. 
                                                
52 Barbeyrac, TMP, 8.12: ‘comme fidéle Ministre’ and ‘sans préjudice de leur Devoir’.  
53 Barbeyrac, DNG, 6.1.20, Note 3. For a far more comprehensive account of how Barbeyrac’s position 
on marriage must be understood within the wider context of his natural law theory, see Dufour, Le 
mariage dans l’école romande du droit naturel au XVIIIe siècle, pp. 39-64. Dufour traces the 
development of Barbeyrac’s views on marriage across his texts, arguing that by the end of his career, he 
had adopted a contractualist position on marriage influenced by his contemporaries Christian Thomasius 
and John Locke but developed in his own innovative fashion. For the purpose of the present discussion, it 
is not necessary to look in any detail at the development of his views, only his basic principles.  
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Celibacy, therefore, may be preferable when a particular vocation requires it, or more 
simply when an individual lacks the temperament or inclination for marriage, but the 
church fathers are wrong to raise it above the state of marriage as a general rule.54 Here, 
we also see a further strand of Barbeyrac’s critique of the church fathers emerge. 
Having depicted the church fathers as improperly wresting apart natural and Christian 
duties and subsequently seeking to exercise the exclusive moral authority that they have 
appropriated to themselves beyond its proper bounds, Barbeyrac argues that their aim in 
doing so was the arrogation of undue temporal powers. Hence, for Barbeyrac, it was the 
desire of the Pope and his church to dominate individual conscience and their avidity to 
acquire worldly riches that lead the Catholic church to insist upon the practice of 
celibacy by all members of the ecclesiastical orders.55 The latter practice enabled the 
church to prevent accumulated wealth being dispersed amongst any legitimate progeny.  
 
The state of marriage and the issues of remarriage, divorce and polygamy bring to the 
fore not only the proper interpretation of the Gospel, but also of Mosaic law as recorded 
in the Old Testament. In keeping with his principles of Scriptural interpretation, 
Barbeyrac claims that both divorce and polygamy are morally permissible according to 
Mosaic law and thus cannot contain anything evil in themselves.56 Likewise, Christ, 
who came to perfect rather than replace the moral law of the Old Testament, does not 
condemn either divorce or polygamy as illicit but rather condemns the abuse of these 
moral permissions.57 Here, we may see a direct analogy with Barbeyrac’s argument 
about gaming in the Traité du jeu, where he argued that gaming was permissible in 
theory but frequently subject to abuse in practice.58 It is because of the likely abuse of 
such permissions and the many inconveniences that may arise for the wider society, 
especially in the use of the permission to practise polygamy, rather than any inherent 
harmfulness, that has lead a great number of civil legislators to prohibit or restrict these 
permissions.59  
 
Here, Barbeyrac is again engaged in defending the sphere of indifferent moral action 
governed by the law of permission and the determinations of individual conscience in 
                                                
54 Barbeyrac speaks at length about celibacy, see for example, TMP, 5.14-26.  
55 Barbeyrac, TMP, 5.27-29.  
56 Barbeyrac, DNG, 6.1.18, Note 2.  
57 Barbeyrac, DNG, 6.1.21, Note 1 and 6.1.24, Notes 1 and 3.  
58 See Chapter 3, Section III.  
59 Barbeyrac, DNG, 6.1.16, Notes 1 and 6.  
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accordance with the general precepts of Christian and natural morality. The moral 
teachings of the church fathers on all aspects of marriage, divorce, celibacy and so forth 
thus demonstrate not only the extent to which, for Barbeyrac, their principles rest on a 
false foundation but also the arrogation and exercise of undue moral authority within 
this sphere of indifferent actions by virtue of the unsupportable distinction between 
precepts and counsels.  
 
Whilst the present discussion has focused on the moral precepts and permissions that 
govern the marriage contract and associated social practices, such as remarriage, 
divorce and polygamy, throughout his Morale des peres and in many of his other texts, 
Barbeyrac identifies numerous further examples of social practices that are sufficiently 
determined by the moral precepts and permissions of natural and Christian moral law 
without requiring the imposition of erroneous and excessively restrictive moral 
precepts. In effect, the natural law framework that Barbeyrac establishes, taken together 
with his insistence on the consonance between natural and Christian moral law, 
determines the limits to the legitimate exercise of ecclesiastical authority. The 
remainder of the chapter takes up the question of toleration and liberty of conscience 
with respect to sincerely held religious belief.  
 
V 
Ecclesiastical Toleration 
 
At the time that Barbeyrac was writing, the arguments justifying intolerance were as 
varied and as sophisticated as those for toleration. Moreover, as much as Barbeyrac 
insisted that Protestantism was fundamentally a tolerant religion, he duly recognised 
that the Reformation itself had not originated in a call for greater toleration but rather in 
the imposition of an alternative orthodoxy. Barbeyrac was consciously disputing at least 
two arguments justifying intolerance, deployed by Catholics and Protestants alike. First, 
the argument that the Gospel had placed its ministers under an obligation to coercively 
correct all erroneous beliefs injurious to individuals’ hopes of salvation, based on 
Augustine’s interpretation of Jesus’s injunction to ‘compel them to enter’ and, second, 
the necessity for a single, unified religion to protect the peace and security of the civil 
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state from the effects of tolerating heretics, who were, by their very nature, seditious 
subjects.60  
 
Like many of his contemporaries, Barbeyrac met this challenge by developing a series 
of interlocking arguments for the recognition of the duty of religious toleration by both 
church and state. Taken together, these arguments form the body of his defence of 
individual liberty of conscience free from domination by external spheres of human 
authority. Barbeyrac’s call for religious toleration follows in the footsteps of thinkers 
such as Locke and Bayle. There is very little novelty in the specific details of his 
arguments, which, however, provide a greater insight into how he conceives of the right 
to liberty of conscience as a moral and religious duty within his theory of natural law.61  
 
Barbeyrac’s most comprehensive discussion concerning toleration is found in Chapter 
12 of his Morale des peres. Here, he insists upon a strict separation between church and 
state. Civil society is instituted for the preservation and security of all its members. 
Obedience to its laws may be coercively enforced by penal sanctions for the general 
good of that society. Ecclesiastical societies, on the other hand, are instituted ‘to 
diligently seek the Truth, and to convince the ignorant of it’.62 In this, they are like other 
voluntary private societies, for example, those dedicated to the study of the human 
sciences. The authority possessed by ecclesiastical societies comes ‘either from the 
manifest consent of the Members of each Ecclesiastical Society, or the good will and 
the permission of the Sovereign Power’.63 In contrast to the laws of civil society, 
whatever laws that an ecclesiastical society may establish, they cannot use violence or 
force to uphold them. Any attempt to do so would conflict both with the origin of their 
authority and the sole legitimate end for which this authority was instituted.  
 
                                                
60 For an overview of arguments for intolerance within the British context, above all, the Augustinian 
inspired argument that coercion is justified and Locke’s rejection thereof, see Mark Goldie, ‘The Theory 
of Religious Intolerance in Restoration England’, in From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious 
Revolution and Religion in England, ed. O. Grell et. al., (Oxford, 1991).  
61 For an overview of the common arguments deployed in favour of toleration that Barbeyrac draws upon 
and moulds to his own purposes, see Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture, 
Chapter 21, pp. 647-679.  
62 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.10: ‘de chercher soigneusement la Vérite, & d’en convaincre ceux qui l’ignorent’.  
63 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours sur la question, s’il est permis d’echaffauder en chaire le magistrat, qui a commis 
quelque faute?’, in Recueil de discours, Vol. 2,  p. 292: ‘ou d’un consentement manifeste des Membres de 
chaque Société Ecclésiastique, ou bien de la volonté & de la permission des Puissances Souverains’.  
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Barbeyrac distinguishes between two different forms of religious tolerance in order to 
uphold the separation of church and state: namely, ecclesiastical and civil toleration. He 
argues that the former ‘consists in suffering in the same Ecclesiastical Society those 
who possess some particular sentiment’, in contrast to the latter, which concerns 
‘granting, in the State, liberty of conscience, to those who do not subscribe to the 
Dominant Religion, or who have separated from it, or have been excluded from it, 
because of certain particular opinions’.64 The purview of ecclesiastics to interfere in 
matters of toleration is restricted to ecclesiastical toleration alone. And even here, 
Barbeyrac advocates that ecclesiastics should accept some degree of variance of belief 
within their own church. For those whose unorthodox beliefs cannot be borne, 
Barbeyrac says that ecclesiastical societies have the right to exclude them, but not the 
right to persecute them: ‘it is one thing not to receive within a Society, or to exclude 
from it those who are not of a certain authorised Opinion; it is another thing, to 
persecute them’.65  
 
Barbeyrac also addresses the question of how far different Protestant sects have a duty 
to be tolerant of one another. Here, Barbeyrac claims that divisions between Christians 
concern the specific details of divine mysteries that, because of the lack of human 
penetration into such mysteries, ‘wholly surpass the feeble reach of our Minds here-
below’.66 Setting aside such theological mysteries, Barbeyrac argues that there are 
certain fundamental articles of faith ‘so clearly contained in Scripture, and so often 
repeated’ upon which all reasonable Christians may be in agreement.67 By extending 
ecclesiastical toleration to all those who also recognise these fundamental articles of 
faith by means of a simple common communion, ecclesiastical societies thereby uphold 
the principal Christian duties of charity and modesty, as well as the general duty to seek 
peace.68 This simple communion does not imply approbation but rather the recognition 
that an ecclesiastical society does not consider the principles of the other injurious to 
salvation. While Barbeyrac remains silent on what he takes the fundamental articles of 
                                                
64 Barbeyrac, TMP, 5.9: ‘consiste à souffrir dans une même Société Ecclésiastique ceux qui ont quelque 
sentiment particulier’ and ‘à laisser, dans un Etat, la liberté de Conscience, à ceux qui ne sont pas de la 
Religion Dominante, ou qui s’en sont separez, ou en ont été exclus, à cause de certaines opinions 
particuliers’.  
65 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.21: ‘Autre chose est, de ne pas recevoir dans une Société, ou d’en exclure ceux qui 
ne sont pas de telle ou telle Opinion autorisée; autre chose, de les persécuter’ 
66 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.18: ‘surpassent entiérement la foible portée de nos Esprits ici-bas’.  
67 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.22: ‘si clairement continues dans l’Ecriture, & si souvent repetées’. 
68 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.24.  
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faith to be, this duty of ecclesiastical toleration does not extend to the Catholic church, 
with whom all attempts at communion or reconciliation have already failed and will 
necessarily fail.69 
 
At the time that Barbeyrac was writing, the argument that there are certain fundamental 
articles of faith was closely associated with the call for Christian reunification. This 
ecumenical movement, championed by his close acquaintances, Turrettini and Le Clerc, 
sought union rather than mere tolerance between different religious denominations; 
usually but not always limited to Protestant reunion. While Barbeyrac was not actively 
engaged in this movement, in a letter to Turrettini, he expressed his sympathy for the 
latter’s position.70 Turrettini, like Barbeyrac, placed sincere religious belief and proper 
moral conduct at the core of all true religion and emphasised the idea of fundamental 
articles that accorded with reason as well as Scripture.71 Barbeyrac does no more here 
than allude, implicitly at least, to these debates in taking up the idea of fundamental 
articles of faith. He does, however, make use of the idea of certain fundamental articles 
of faith in support of his own project to carve out a substantial sphere of indifferent 
things within the Christian faith, over which ecclesiastical societies therefore have no 
right to exercise an exclusive authority. For Barbeyrac, however, the core issue here is 
tolerance not union. Ecclesiastical toleration thus constitutes suffering both within and 
between ecclesiastical societies all things not injurious to salvation, that is to say, moral 
and religious adiaphora.  
 
As we saw in Barbeyrac’s argument concerning gaming in his Traité du jeu and in his 
wider argument concerning permission, however, there is a inherent tension between his 
insistence, on the one hand, that things indifferent in themselves ought to left to the 
liberty of individual conscience to determine, and on the other hand, that there is the 
moral framework that necessarily governs the judgements of conscience. In short, while 
he insists upon the necessity of sincere search for the truth, whether moral or religious, 
according to the light of conscience, the underlying assumption is that, in the end, there 
is one, sole moral and religious truth to be discerned. It follows from this that 
                                                
69 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.23.  
70 Barbeyrac to Turrettini (Lausanne, 03.01.1722), Ms. 484. Cf. Pitassi, Inventaire critique, Vol. III, pp. 
491-492.  
71 For an account of Turrettini’s arguments on this issue, see Klauber, Between Reformed Scholasticism 
and Pan-Protestantism, pp. 165-187. 
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Barbeyrac’s argument for ecclesiastical toleration is not a call for a broad based 
religious liberalism, that is to say, a general acceptance of discordant religious beliefs. 
Instead it is a specific argument targeted against rigorous doctrinalism, both in his own 
Reformed church, as evidenced by his resistance to the imposition of the Formula 
Consensus without the subscription ‘insofar as Holy Scripture allows’, and more 
generally within all Christian churches.72 In short, it is an argument for non-interference 
by religious ministers in matters properly belonging to the judgements of individual 
conscience.  
 
Barbeyrac’s silence with respect to what he takes to be the fundamental articles of faith 
necessary to salvation and for ecclesiastical tolerance may well stem from his stated 
intention, overtly at least, to leave aside ‘theological controversies’ and focus 
exclusively on moral philosophy.73 What Barbeyrac does make clear is that these 
fundamental truths are contained in the Gospel. Further to this, it is possible to surmise 
from Barbeyrac’s wider arguments that these fundamental articles require, at the very 
least, fulfilling the moral duties specified by Christian moral law, both those that accord 
with natural law and those duties that are described as specifically Christian.74 
Considered purely from its moral dimension, Barbeyrac makes sincere and voluntary 
religious belief, that is to say, sincere and voluntary faith in God, necessary to salvation: 
‘the most essential principle of all Religion’ is the duty ‘to serve God according to the 
light of Conscience’.75 It is therefore in the interest of each individual’s salvation that he 
is accorded a genuine liberty of conscience so that he may fully and properly fulfil his 
‘first and fundamental’ duty to God.76 This is of course, for Barbeyrac, the same as the 
first and principal duty of natural law.77  
 
                                                
72 Philippe Meylan attributes the intolerance that Barbeyrac met with over the proper signing of the 
Formula Consensus as the principal reason for his resignation as Rector of the Academy of Lausanne in 
1715, see Jean Barbeyrac, pp. 104-108: the Latin phrase that Barbeyrac originally permitted alongside all 
subscriptions was ‘quatenus Sanctae Scripturae consentit’. Cf. Introduction, p. 20. For an analysis of how 
the subscription debates shaped arguments for toleration in this period, see Knud Haakonssen, ‘Toleration 
and Subscription: An Early Enlightenment Debate’, [Unpublished].  
73 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, TMP, p. viii: ‘Controverses Théologiques’ 
74 See fn. 29 above.  
75 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.30: le principe le plus essentiel de toute Religion’ and ‘de servir DIEU selon les 
lumiéres de sa Conscience’.  
76 Barbeyrac, TMP, 5.3: ‘prémiére & fondamentale’.  
77 Cf. Chapter 1, p. 41.  
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To this end, Barbeyrac argues that ‘rigorous methods are neither proper for procuring 
the Salvation of Men, nor conformable to the genius of the Gospel, still less to the 
character of its Ministers’.78 This tallies with the claim that Barbeyrac makes in his 
original definition of conscience that every individual has a right to follow the light of 
his conscience ‘except in those cases where it would mean doing some violence to the 
Conscience of others’.79 This holds true even if an individual professes beliefs that one 
deems to be erroneous. Barbeyrac thus establishes the principle that: 
 
An individual sins far more in committing, against the light of his 
Conscience, an action that is good in itself, than in doing something that is 
genuinely bad, in order to follow the movements of an erroneous 
Conscience. The reason for this is that in the first case the individual is 
required to directly and deliberately disobey God.80  
 
Barbeyrac reiterates the same basic principle in his Morale des peres, where he adds 
that with respect to the question of individual salvation: ‘God will always pardon 
negligence or faults that one is thrown into by Error more easily, than open contempt 
for his Will and his Authority, which necessarily accompanies all actions committed 
against the light of Conscience’.81 In short, Barbeyrac alleges that the sin of hypocrisy is 
greater than the sin of ignorance or error and thus that enforced religious belief or 
persecution in the name of religion is injurious rather than instrumental to individual 
salvation. 
 
But what are the consequences of following what one erroneously believes to be the 
light of conscience for one’s salvation? In Le droit de la guerre, Barbeyrac discusses the 
salvation of ancient pagans: namely, persons ignorant of the particular law that God had 
given to the Jewish nation or persons whom God had not commanded to take heed of 
the Mosaic law and so share in its advantages. He claims that God would not condemn 
these ancient pagans for not submitting to a law that they could not have possessed 
                                                
78 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.8: ‘Les voies de Rigueur ne sont donce ni propres à procurer le Salut des Hommes, 
ni un moien conforme au genie de l’Evangile, moins encore au caractére de ses Ministres’.  
79 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.3.11, Note 1: ‘hors les cas où il s’agiroit de faire violence à la Conscience d’autrui’.  
80 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.3.13, Note 1: ‘On péche même davantage en faisant contre les lumieres de sa 
Conscience une action bonner en elle-même, qu’en faisant une chose véritablement mauvaise, pour suivre 
les mouvemens d’une Conscience erronée. La raison en est, que dans le premier cas on veut directement 
& de propos déliberé désobéïr à Dieu’.  
81 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.55: ‘DIEU pardonnera toûjours plus aisément la negligence ou les fautes qui ont 
jetté dans l’Erreur, que le mêpris ouvert de sa Volonté & de son Autorité, qui accompagne 
essentiellement les actions faites contre les lumiéres de la Conscience’.  
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knowledge of or that they were not obliged to follow: ‘the absence of such a means to 
Salvation, which God was not obliged to furnish them with, will be for them a 
misfortune, and not a crime’.82 While salvation depends on knowledge of Christ and the 
efficacy of his sacrifice, without the assistance of God’s supernatural revelation, there is 
no fault and thus no sin. Individuals are only obliged to follow a law that is known, or 
rather revealed, to them. To recall, Barbeyrac insists that natural law alone constitutes a 
universally applicable moral law.83  
 
Divine revelation ‘diminished the force of the causes and the occasions of Error, but it 
did not remove them altogether, because it did not change the nature of Men’.84 As a 
consequence, no ecclesiastical society, and no individual, may flatter themselves that 
they are completely free of ignorance, prejudice and passions resulting from poor 
education, poor customs or deference to an undeserving authority. Not all such errors, 
Barbeyrac claims, are excusable before the divine tribunal, especially for those with the 
assistance of supernatural revelation. Nonetheless what matters most in the human 
forum is sincere endeavour in seeking the truth. In this respect, Barbeyrac’s argument 
for individual liberty of conscience does not rest upon the idea of conscience necessarily 
being right, but rather on the necessity of exercising one’s liberty of conscience 
sincerely and diligently as one’s principal duty to God. Hence, the right to liberty of 
conscience that Barbeyrac wants to defend in the human forum depends on ‘leaving 
each individual to believe and to profess that which appears true to him in matters of 
Religion’.85 ‘No one’, Barbeyrac alleges, ‘may infringe upon this liberty, without visibly 
encroaching upon the rights of God, who is the sole master of our Consciences’.86 In the 
end, individuals are responsible both for their own salvation and for God’s judgements 
of their errors in this regard.   
 
Barbeyrac develops two further arguments to bolster his claims here. First, he maintains 
that diversity of religious belief is both inevitable and legitimate in the eyes of God. 
                                                
82 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.1.16, Note 1: ‘La privation d’un tel moien de Salut, que Dieu n’étoit pas oblige de 
leur fournir, sera pour eux un malheur, & non pas un crime’.  
83 Cf. Chapter 1, p. 38.   
84 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.16: ‘diminué la force des causes & des occasions d’Erreur, mais elle ne leur a pas 
ôté toute prise, parce qu’elle n’a point change le naturel des Hommes’.  
85 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.20: ‘laisser à chacun la liberté de croire & de professer ce qui lui parôit vrai en 
matiére de Religion’ [my italics].  
86 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.20: ‘Personne ne peut donner atteinte à cette liberté, sans empieter visiblement sur 
les droits de DIEU, qui est seul maître de nos Consciences’. 
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Diversity of religious belief must be permitted by God because He ‘has not given here-
below a visible Judge’ to settle religious disputes, the resulting diversity of beliefs and 
sects being recognised by St Paul in his letter to the Corinthians.87 In the absence of a 
visible judge and thus certainty in religious knowledge, God’s purpose, Barbeyrac 
supposes, is to encourage men to practice the two most important Christian virtues, 
namely moderation and charity.88 With this in mind, Barbeyrac claims that an ‘all-wise 
and all-good Being’ would not permit violence in order to maintain or advance religious 
truth as this would lead to the destruction of all human society: 
 
Since everyone believes himself to be Orthodox, to give to Orthodoxy the 
right to persecute, is to give it also to Heretics and Schismatics; it is to put 
it into the hands of all the different Parties, and to make Christianity into a 
perpetual Theatre of Wars, where Truth will succumb more often than it 
will be victorious.89 
 
This is not merely a theoretical proposition for Barbeyrac but rather reflects the 
empirical reality of the recent history of Europe for both himself and his 
contemporaries. The theoretical point that underpins this observation, however, is that 
to permit the constraint or persecution of others in the name of religion would be to 
equate religious truth with physical superiority, whether of number or strength.  
 
Second, Barbeyrac argues for the inefficacy of force in changing individual’s sincerely 
held religious beliefs. On the contrary, force makes individuals cling more obstinately 
than before to their original prejudices. Force is also more likely to make ‘Proselytes for 
Error, than for Truth’ because of the sympathy that individuals feel for those who suffer 
persecution.90 Barbeyrac thus claims that erroneous beliefs can only be legitimately and 
efficaciously combated by the means of persuasion alone: ‘by covert ways, by indirect, 
imperceptible, and engaging means’.91 To be sure, there is always an inherent tension 
between the idea of voluntary belief being necessary to salvation and the legitimacy of 
persuasion as a means to compel, internally speaking, a change in an individual’s 
                                                
87 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.14: ‘DIEU n’a point donné ici-bas de Juge visible’. See also TMP 12.37.  
88 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.41.  
89 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.41: ‘Car, chacun se croiant lui-même Orthodoxe, donner à l’Orthodoxie le droit de 
persécuter, c’est le donner aussi aux Hérétiques & aux Schismatiques; c’est mettre aux mains tous 
différens Partis, & faire du Christianisme un Théatre de Guerres perpétuelles, où la Vérité succombera 
plus souvent, qu’elle ne sera victorieuse’.  
90 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.22: ‘Prosélytes pour l’Erreur, comme pour la Verité’. 
91 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.12: ‘par des chemins couverts, par des maniéres indirectes, imperceptibles, & 
engageants’.  
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religious belief.92 Mindful of this, to some degree at least, Barbeyrac insists that where 
persuasion proves impotent, ‘it is necessary to abandon them [the errant] to the 
Judgement of God’.93 As we saw above, in the end it is better to leave an erroneous 
conscience to its own prejudices than to force it to submit to the sin of hypocrisy.  
 
In effect, Barbeyrac’s argument for liberty of conscience heavily circumscribes the 
authority possessed by ecclesiastics to scrutinise, judge or coerce individual conscience 
both within and beyond a particular ecclesiastical society. In this respect, ecclesiastics 
ought always to remain faithful to the title of ‘servants’ conferred upon them in the 
times of the apostolic church. This means that the duties incumbent on ecclesiastics are 
limited by the origin and purpose of the ecclesiastical societies that they administer, 
namely the study and preaching of religious and moral truth, taking the humility of 
Christ and the Apostles as their example.94 For Barbeyrac, this occupation ‘consists 
solely in being the Dispensers of the Mysteries of God, and in seeking to inspire in their 
Listeners all kinds of Virtue, the most considerable of which is to take care over 
fostering peace with all other Men’.95  
 
The duty to inspire virtue in others is fulfilled by, and restricted to, setting a good moral 
example in their own conduct rather than in specifying ecclesiastical laws that seek to 
constrain individual liberty of conscience, both in those things necessary to salvation 
and in things indifferent in themselves. In his Traité du jeu, for example, Barbeyrac is 
critical of ecclesiastics who allege that gaming is contrary to Christian moral law. 
However, he also argues that ecclesiastics are under a more strenuous duty than most to 
set a good example and refrain from gaming in their own conduct: ‘it is certain that 
whoever embraces such a profession ought to resolve to deprive themselves of things 
that are most innocent in themselves’.96 The purpose of their ministry is to inspire virtue 
                                                
92 William Walker dissects the fine line between force and persuasion in his article ‘Force, Metaphor and 
Persuasion in Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration’, in Difference and Dissent, ed. C.J. Nederman and 
J.C. Laursen, (Maryland, 1996), pp. 205-229. 
93 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.46: ‘il faut les abandoner au Jugement de DIEU’.  
94 Barbeyrac, TMP, 1.5.  
95 Barbeyrac, ‘S’il est permis d’echaffauder en chaire le magistrat’, p. 259: ‘consiste uniquement à être les 
Dispensateurs des mystéres de DIEU, & à tâcher d’inspirer à leurs Auditeurs toute sorte de Vertus, dont 
une des plus considérables est le soin d’entretenir la paix avec tous les Hommes’.  
96 Barbeyrac, TJ, 3.6.19: ‘il est certain que quiconque embrasse une telle profession doit se résoudre ou à 
se priver absolument de bien des choses très-innocentes en elles-mêmes’.  
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in others and ‘nothing is more contagious than a bad Example’.97 The duty of 
ecclesiastics as moral educators and moral examples coincides with the only effective 
and legitimate means of correcting the erroneous determinations of conscience.  
 
In sum, ecclesiastical authority is limited by both the origin and purpose of religious 
organisations, namely the sincere and diligent search for truth and the education of 
others in this truth. This authority entails neither a right nor a duty to dominate 
individual conscience, not even to correct an erroneous conscience. Not only would 
such conduct extend beyond the legitimate sphere of ecclesiastical authority, but it is 
also injurious to individual salvation. This is because God alone exercises a mastery 
over individual conscience and He requires the same thing of individuals as he does of 
the ecclesiastical societies that guide them, namely the sincere and diligent search for 
the truth. Barbeyrac thus constructs an argument for liberty of conscience that bestows 
moral authority on the determinations of conscience not for being right but for genuine, 
sincere and careful effort in seeking after truth, both moral and religious. This does not 
licence all error but rather restricts judgements on such error to the divine tribunal, for 
only God has the necessary insight to be the ‘Scrutiniser of Hearts’.98  
 
VI 
Civil Toleration 
 
Turning to civil toleration, I will seek to show that Barbeyrac’s claims for such 
toleration ought to be understood in two mutually supportive way. First, as his response 
to his experiences of religious persecution and intolerance as a refugié and, second, as a 
pedagogic enterprise aimed at instructing the young men in his charge. In both cases, 
Barbeyrac’s argument rests on a belief that the defence of liberty of conscience requires 
a strong sovereign capable of keeping the authority wielded by ecclesiastics within its 
proper bounds.  
 
Like many of his contemporaries, Barbeyrac’s argument for civil toleration is justified 
by the demands of peace and the good of the state. It is Locke who decisively 
                                                
97 Barbeyrac, ‘S’il est permis d’echaffauder en chaire le magistrat’, p. 246: ‘Rien n’est plus contagieux 
qu’un mauvais Exemple’.  
98 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.20: ‘Scrutateur des Coeurs’.  
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demonstrated the truth of this argument in his A Letter Concerning Toleration, arguing 
that civil authorities may only concern themselves with religious affairs insofar as direct 
harm is caused or threatened to the authority and good order of the civil state.99 
Barbeyrac extends the argument further in his Morale des peres, where he claims that 
the greatest threat to civil peace comes from ecclesiastical authorities. It is ecclesiastics 
who are most apt to arrogate to themselves powers legitimately possessed by the civil 
authorities and to use them for the illegitimate cause of enforcing religious belief. In this 
way, Barbeyrac’s argument for civil toleration constitutes a late contribution to the 
fierce debate that raged within the Huguenot Diaspora, not least between Bayle and 
Jurieu.100   
 
Barbeyrac identifies St Augustine as the ‘great Patriarch of Christian Persecutors’.101 
For Barbeyrac, it was Augustine who first developed the argument necessary to 
establish and defend not only the doctrine of ecclesiastical intolerance but also that of 
civil intolerance. But, he argues, whatever ecclesiastics may say to try and beguile civil 
authorities into using the coercive force at their disposal in the interests of the church, 
‘this [Civil] Power, reduced to its just limits, has no more right here, than the Governors 
of an Ecclesiastical Society’.102 Barbeyrac’s argument on the limits of civil power with 
respect to individual conscience in religious matters is thus intrinsically linked to his 
argument on the limits of ecclesiastical authority. Just as in the case of ecclesiastical 
societies, the origin and purpose of civil society specifies the just limits of the exercise 
of its power. These limits are determined by the natural law duties that give rise to its 
institution, namely the preservation of peace, security and, if at all possible, the 
prosperity of its members. Religion, Barbeyrac claims, does not and cannot enter into 
                                                
99 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.4.11, Note 2. Cf. John Locke, Epistola de Tolerantia: A Letter on Toleration, ed. R. 
Klibansky and J.W. Gough, (Oxford, 1968), p. 131.  
100 There is insufficient space to explore Barbeyrac’s relationship to previous Huguenot thinkers in 
greater depth here. It is important to note, however, that Huguenot thought is characterised by a set of 
shared concerns in response to the experience of religious persecution rather than a unified series of 
conclusions: Elisabeth Labrousse, ‘The Political Ideas of the Huguenot Diaspora (Bayle and Jurieu)’, in 
Church, State and Society under the Bourbon Kings, ed. R. Golden, (Kansas, 1982); Luisa Simonutti, 
‘Between Political Loyalty and Religious Liberty: Political Theory and Toleration in Huguenot Thought 
in the Epoch of Bayle’, in History of Political Thought 17:4 (2006) and ‘‘Absolute not Arbitrary Power’: 
Monarchism and Politics in the Thought of the Huguenots and Pierre Bayle’, in Monarchisms and the 
Age of Enlightenment, ed. H. Blom et. al., (Toronto, 2007). For further references specifically related to 
Huguenot resistance theory, see Chapter 5, p. 150, fn. 3. 
101 Barbeyrac, TMP, 16.29: ‘grand Patriarche des Persécuteurs Chrétiens’.  
102 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.26: ‘cette Puissance, réduite à ses justes bornes, n’a pas plus de droit ici, que les 
Conducteurs de la Société Ecclésiastique’. 
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the terms of the original civil contract. Hence, religion necessarily lies beyond the 
sovereign’s jurisdiction.103  
 
Barbeyrac’s principal argument against religion entering into the civil contract comes 
from his belief that individual conscience is an inalienable part of one’s person. Here, 
Barbeyrac clarifies his argument on the foundation of the natural right that individuals 
possess to liberty of conscience. Significantly expanding the original Lockean argument 
for an inalienable property right in oneself, Barbeyrac argues that the natural right to 
liberty of conscience is derived from the corresponding duty to serve God according to 
the light of one’s conscience; further, that this is the direct and necessary consequence 
of the mastery that God retains over individual conscience, which is an aspect of His 
mastery over one’s person in general: 
 
A Man can never give to another Man an arbitrary power over his life, of 
which he is not himself the master. But he is even less the master of his 
Conscience, of which the empire belongs to God to such an extent, that other 
Men, whatever they may require, whatever they may do, could not truly exert 
any [empire] over it.104 
 
In short, Barbeyrac argues that individuals possess an inalienable right to liberty of 
conscience not by virtue of a mastery over their own individual conscience but rather 
because of the exclusive mastery exercised by God. Individuals cannot dispose of this 
liberty in instituting civil society, even if they may want to, because it is not in their gift 
to dispose of.  
 
But, as Barbeyrac duly recognises, if an individual is not truly master of his own 
conscience, then in what sense is religious belief voluntary? Once again disputing the 
efficacy of enforced religious belief, Barbeyrac says that whatever desire one may have 
to acquiesce in a certain belief, individuals are not free to persuade themselves of 
anything that is contrary to whatever seems true to them.105 Belief, in this sense, is not 
voluntary. God, however, does not exercise His mastery to its full extent in matters of 
                                                
103 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.27-31. Cf. Chapter 5, pp. 177-178.  
104 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.29: ‘Un Homme ne peut jamais donner à un autre Homme un pouvoir arbitraire 
sur sa vie, dont il n’est pas maître lui-même. Mais il est encore moins maître de sa Conscience, dont 
l’empire appartient tellement à DIEU, que les Autres Hommes, quoi qu’ils veuillent, quoi qu’ils fassent, 
ne sauroient véritablement y en exercer aucun’. On Barbeyrac’s debt to Locke in this regard, cf. Chapter 
3, p. 106 and Chapter 5, p. 157.  
105 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.29. 
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religion because while belief may not be wholly voluntary when considered in terms of 
the relationship between man and God, it is of the utmost importance that each 
individual voluntarily submits to what he perceives to be true within the human forum. 
It is precisely because belief is not voluntary in the former sense that enforced religious 
belief only opens individuals up to the sin of hypocrisy rather than the possibility of 
salvation. Barbeyrac reiterates his original argument that salvation is a private affair 
between man and God and ‘not the affair of the sovereign’.106 Besides, he observes, to 
submit to the religion of one’s sovereign is to reduce salvation to being ‘the plaything of 
Sovereign ignorance or caprice’.107 Every sovereign upholds whatever religion he 
believes to be true, but in this he possesses no greater insight than any other fallible 
human individual. 
 
While authority over religious belief does not enter into the institution of civil society, it 
would be wrong to infer from this that Barbeyrac considers religion to have no 
relevance for the foundation and continued good order of civil society. Rather he is 
concerned with distinguishing different spheres of authority and, in this vein, insists that 
religious authority neither originates with nor ought to be wedded to civil authority. As 
we have previously seen, Barbeyrac maintains that religion is necessary to bring men to 
recognise and uphold their principal Christian and natural law duties. As such, he 
argues, pace Bayle, that a society of infidels, i.e., those who possess some form of 
religion but do not recognise the Christian God, would be more just and peaceful than a 
society of atheists.108 In his discussion of civil toleration, he adds a further layer to this 
debate. Here he maintains that for religion to produce effects fully and properly 
advantageous to society, it is necessary that individuals possess ‘rightful ideas of the 
Divinity’. By this he means the beliefs possessed by those of the Reformed religion.109 
Otherwise, he adds, moral indulgences may become widespread, as was the case in 
pagan societies where true ideas of the divinity were always mixed with error.  
 
Barbeyrac’s argument, however, takes an interesting turn when it comes to the question 
of toleration for atheists. Citing Bayle with approval this time, Barbeyrac alleges, pace 
Pufendorf, that atheists must be tolerated by the civil authorities insofar as they do not 
                                                
106 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.28: ‘non pas l’affaire du Souverain’.  
107 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.30: ‘le jouet de l’ignorance ou du caprice des Souverains’.  
108 Cf. Chapter 1, p. 31. 
109 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.6.12, Note 8: ‘idées droites de la Divinité’.  
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commit any exterior acts harmful to civil society, such as preaching their erroneous 
beliefs to the public and seeking to convert others to their irreligion.110 However 
abhorrent Barbeyrac may find atheism, he nonetheless maintains that inner sentiment 
always lies beyond the legitimate jurisdiction of the sovereign. The coercive force of the 
state, therefore, cannot be brought to bear against those who lack religious belief any 
more so than it can against those who hold beliefs deemed to be erroneous because of 
their positive content. By extending toleration to atheists, Barbeyrac preserves the 
overall coherence of his own argument. In doing so, he makes a notable departure not 
only from Pufendorf, with whom he is often at odds with respect to religious liberty, but 
also from Locke, to whom he is more frequently concerned to profess fidelity.  
 
For Barbeyrac, despite what certain ecclesiastics may allege to the contrary, no threat is 
posed to the peace and security of the civil state through upholding, in practice, the 
principle of civil toleration required by the inalienable natural right to liberty of 
conscience. Moreover, Barbeyrac claims, this holds true even if diversity of religious 
belief follows in its wake:  
 
Nothing is more false than the wholly disagreeable maxim of Politics, with 
which Ecclesiastics dazzle Sovereigns, for the purpose of dominating 
Consciences, and advancing their temporal interests. They declare most 
forcefully, That the good of the State requires that there is only one Religion, 
because, they say, a diversity of Religions produces only divisions and 
troubles.111 
 
Barbeyrac thus directly equates the false principles of civil intolerance with the desire of 
certain ecclesiastics to illegitimately extend the exercise of their authority beyond its 
proper limits under the guise of protecting the interests of the civil state. It is in this 
way, Barbeyrac claims that ecclesiastics arrogate to themselves unwarranted and 
unnecessary powers over individual conscience and other temporal affairs. He 
consistently asserts, across all his texts, that the moral culpability for instituting the 
principles of civil intolerance and instigating specific acts of persecution lies with 
rapacious ecclesiastics rather than, in his view at least, gullible sovereigns. This takes 
the form of both a historical commentary, especially with respect to the persecution 
                                                
110 Barbeyrac, DNG, 3.4.4, Note 2.  
111 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.32: ‘Rien n’est plus faux, qu’une maxime de Politique toute contraire, dont les 
Ecclésiastiques éblouïssent les Souverains, pour domineer eux-mêmes sur les Consciences, & pour 
avancer d’ailleurs leur intérêts temporels. Ils font sonner fort haut, Que le bien d’un Etat veut qu’il n’y aît 
qu’une Religion, parce, disent-ils, que la diversité de Religions produit des divisions & des troubles’.  
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experienced by the Huguenots, and a pedagogic exercise, where he warns civil 
sovereigns of the dangers posed by ‘giving an ear to Ecclesiastics’ who possess ‘such 
confused, such limited and such false ideas, of the most evident principles of Justice and 
Equity’.112 
 
Barbeyrac claims instead that it is not diversity of religion that causes civil disorder but 
rather the practice of civil intolerance. He insists upon the argument common among his 
Huguenot contemporaries that religious dissension and peaceful obedience to the 
sovereign are not incompatible.113 In his pedagogic ‘Discours sur l’utilité des lettres et 
des sciences’, Barbeyrac argues that truth and liberty are natural bedfellows. Hence, the 
sovereign advances the interest of the civil state by permitting free enquiry not only in 
matters of religious belief but in all the arts and sciences: ‘the Liberal Arts and refined 
Knowledge are one of the best defences of Liberty… [whereas] Ignorance abases the 
Spirit’ and opens the door to religious tyranny.114 Moreover, Barbeyrac claims, civil 
tolerance serves the cause of religious truth. The evidence for this lies in the ‘fact’ that 
the number of different sects in the state diminishes rather than increases as freedom in 
religious belief leads to genuine religious and philosophical enquiry, resulting in the 
reunification of those previously divided.115 Again, the idea that underpins Barbeyrac’s 
argument is that there is a single truth that individual conscience must endeavour to 
seek out. In matters of religious truth, therefore, the sovereign’s sole duty is to maintain 
‘an even balance, so that he does not leave any one Party the means to oppress another 
Party’.116 The only exception to this general rule is toleration of the intolerant, i.e., 
Catholics. In keeping with his pedagogic enterprise, Barbeyrac also advises sovereigns 
that for them, as for ecclesiastics, the sole means to inspire true virtue in their subjects is 
through their own example.117  
 
                                                
112 Barbeyrac, TMP, 17.10: ‘prêtent l’oreille aux Ecclésiastiques’ and ‘des idées si confuses, si bornées, si 
fausses, des principes les plus évidens de la Justice & de l’Equité’.  
113 On the development of common arguments deployed by Huguenot thinkers and the internal debates of 
the Diaspora, see T.J. Hochstrasser, ‘The Claims of Conscience’, pp. 15-51.  
114 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours sur ‘utilité des lettres et des sciences’, p. 122: ‘les Arts Libéraux & les belles 
Connoissances sont un des meilleurs remparts de la Liberté’ and ‘L’Ignorance abbaisse l’Esprit’.  
115 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.35. 
116 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.32: ‘la balance égale, en sorte qu’il ne laisse à aucun Parti les moiens d’opprimer 
l’autre’.  
117 Barbeyrac, TMP, 12.53.  
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Barbeyrac’s pedagogic enterprise is deeply caught up in his own reimagining of the 
history of the Huguenot persecution, where an unassuming Louis XIV was lead astray 
by ecclesiastical forces within the French state. Rejecting Ceillier’s defence of the 
persecution of the Huguenots, based upon the Augustinian principle that future 
generations may be held accountable for the sins of past generations, Barbeyrac claims 
that not only is this a false principle directly in contradiction with the teachings of 
Scripture, but also that the French Reformed population were innocent of any crimes. 
Instead, Barbeyrac casts the conflict that gripped France in the sixteenth century as an 
internecine war between the Houses of Bourbon and Guise, in which the Huguenots 
showed unwavering fidelity to the crown. Religion, he claims, only entered into the 
civil disorder ‘by accident’.118 This much was evident from the fact that the Huguenots 
only ever used peaceful means in their fight for religious liberty and never seditious 
ones. Barbeyrac states that the declarations given by Louis XIV, both to the French 
public in his edicts and in his correspondence with Oliver Cromwell and Fredrick I, 
Elector of Brandenburg, provide further evidence for Huguenot fidelity to the French 
monarchy.119 
 
The point that Barbeyrac is driving at is that the Huguenot community had lived in 
peaceful obedience and shown loyal service to the Catholic Louis XIV and that this 
peaceful and tolerant state of affairs may have continued were it not for the subversive 
actions of French Catholic ecclesiastics. In effect, this highly subjective reading of 
French religious affairs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries allows Barbeyrac to 
reiterate his thesis that religious dissension and peaceful obedience to the civil authority 
are not incompatible and that civil disorder only arises when the spirit of intolerance is 
induced by rapacious ecclesiastics: 
 
It is under such protection of the Royal Command and the Right of 
Nations, that they [the Huguenots] lived in peace; and would still live there 
in peace, if the spirit of Intolerance and the genius of Papism had not trod 
                                                
118 Barbeyrac, TMP, 16.41: ‘par accident’. For Barbeyrac’s history of the persecution of the Huguenots, 
see TMP, 16.39-41. 
119 On the context for Barbeyrac’s claims here, see Simonutti, ‘Between Political Loyalty and Religious 
Liberty’, p. 527. For a general overview of the historical period that Barbeyrac is reimagining here, see 
Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629, (Cambridge, 2005). 
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underfoot all the maxims of the Gospel, of Good Faith, and of Natural 
Humanity.120 
 
For Barbeyrac, both ecclesiastical and civil intolerance lie at the very heart of the 
principles of the Catholic faith, such that while he may pursue a pedagogic enterprise in 
speaking to civil sovereigns and ministers of the Reformed faith, Catholic ecclesiastics 
in general are worthy only of invective. However, even this forms part of the pedagogic 
enterprise insofar as it warns Protestant ministers that also among their churches, the 
‘leaven’ of Catholic intolerance that remains ‘could easily grow if they were not on 
their guard’.121 In short, Barbeyrac’s message is ultimately that ‘no Religion, Sect or 
Party’ ought ever to flatter itself that ‘it is able to be and always has been entirely free 
from temerarious Decisions, from Cabals, from a spirit inclined to Domination’.122 
 
The pedagogic nature of Barbeyrac’s project finds its clearest expression in his 
academic oration, later published as a discourse, first in Latin and subsequently in 
French under the title ‘Discours sur la question, s’il est permis d’echaffauder en chaire 
le magistrat, qui a commis quelque faute?’.123 While his argument for the subservience 
of the church and its ministers to the civil authorities was unremarkable within the 
wider European Republic of Letters, in the narrow Dutch context of Groningen it was 
notable for departing from the restrained prudence of his orthodox academic 
colleagues.124 In this discourse, Barbeyrac argues that in a well-regulated state, ‘all 
Ecclesiastics without exception are to be regarded as Subjects’ of the state even those 
that belong to the public, i.e., dominant, church.125 Both the sovereign himself and his 
representatives, the civil magistrates, are owed ‘the obedience and the honour’ that the 
nature of their public office necessarily requires.126  
                                                
120 Barbeyrac, TMP, 16.40: ‘C’est sous une telle protection de la Parole Roiale & du Droit des Gens, qu’il 
vivoient en paix; & ils y vivroient encore, si l’esprit d’Intolérance & le génie du Papisme ne fouloient aux 
pieds toutes les maximes de l’Evangile, de la Bonne Foi, & de l’Humanité Naturelle’. 
121 Barbeyrac, ‘Discours sur ‘utilité des lettres et des sciences’, p. 124: ‘levain’ and ‘pourroit bien 
s’accroître, si l’on n’était sur ses gardes’. 
122 Barbeyrac adds this part of the text to his original anticlerical note in the final revisions to his 
translations of Noodt’s ‘Discours sur la liberté de conscience’. See Recueil de discours, Vol. 2, p. 172, 
Note 1: ‘point… de Religion, de Secte, de Parti’ and ‘de pouvoir être & d’avoir jamais été entiérement à 
l’abri des Décisions téméraires, des Cabales, de l’esprit d’interêt de Domination’.  
123 Barbeyrac, ‘S’il est permis d’echaffauder en chaire le magistrat’, pp. 235-298 
124 Eijnatten, ‘Swiss Anticlericalism in the United Provinces’, pp. 861-886 but esp. pp. 877-886 on this 
point. Eijnatten also gives detials of the differences between the French and Latin editions of the 
discourse.  
125 Barbeyrac, ‘S’il est permis d’echaffauder en chaire le magistrat’, p. 245: ‘tous les Ecclésiastiques sans 
exception sont regardez comme Sujets’.  
126 Barbeyrac, ‘S’il est permis d’echaffauder en chaire le magistrat’, p. 246: ‘l’obéïssance & l’honneur’.  
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Both as private individuals and as public ministers of religion preaching from the pulpit, 
ecclesiastics thus ought to show proper deference to the sovereign power in the interests 
of the peace and security of the state so as not to inspire sedition amongst the people. 
Appealing to the example set by Christ and his Apostles and to the evidence of 
Scripture, Barbeyrac claims that this duty is not merely a civic duty but also a natural 
and Christian one too. The respect due to the civil authorities, both by public ministers 
of religion and by private individuals, however, is limited to the exterior marks of 
honour. Inner thoughts and sentiments are a private affair: ‘Every individual preserves 
the liberty to judge for himself wisely and modestly the morals and the actions of even 
the most powerful Magistrates and Princes’.127  
 
Barbeyrac seeks to establish here the proper bounds of the different spheres of authority 
belonging to the individual, to ecclesiastics and to the civil sovereign. He warns his 
listeners, including notable public officials, that leaving the exercise of ecclesiastical 
authority unchecked in the civil state poses a direct threat not only to the exercise of 
individual conscience but also to the authority of the civil sovereign himself. The 
historical record speaks for itself, Barbeyrac alleges, in showing how ‘the negligence or 
the impotence of Sovereigns’ have enabled ecclesiastics to establish a ‘usurped 
Jurisdiction’ in a great many civil matters under the pretext of fulfilling those duties 
proper to their religious office.128 For Barbeyrac, one such instance of ecclesiastics using 
this usurped jurisdiction to meddle in civil affairs is the exclusive rights over the 
swearing of oaths.129 Barbeyrac’s discourse cautions the young men to whom it was 
originally delivered, many of whom would have gone on to take up public office, either 
civil or ecclesiastical, that dutiful ecclesiastics, faithful to Christ’s example, ought 
always to respect the legitimate bounds of their authority. Further, if they fail do so, it is 
incumbent upon the sovereign and his civil representative to constrain them to the 
legitimate exercise of their authority alone.  
 
                                                
127 Barbeyrac, ‘S’il est permis d’echaffauder en chaire le magistrat’, p. 256: ‘Chacun conserve la liberté 
de juger en lui-même sagement & modestement des moeurs & des actions des Magistrats & des Princes 
les plus puissans’.  
128 Barbeyrac, ‘S’il est permis d’echaffauder en chaire le magistrat’, p. 274: ‘la negligence ou 
l’impuissance des Souverains’ and ‘[cette] Jurisdiction usurpée’.  
129 Barbeyrac, DNG, 4.2.24, Note 3.  
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The arguments that Barbeyrac develops to establish the necessity of both ecclesiastical 
and civil toleration follow from the principles that he lays down in his theory of natural 
law and the relationship between it and Christian moral law. These arguments were 
developed in response to the religious persecution suffered by the Huguenots and the 
religious intolerance that he himself suffered at the hands of his own Reformed church. 
They also reflect his commitment to his role as a professional academician with the task 
of educating young men in the duties that were necessarily attached to the ecclesiastical 
and civil offices that they would go on to occupy. In this latter respect, he is closer to 
his fellow academician Noodt than to his often cited intellectual predecessor Locke.130 
The arguments presented here may also go some way to answering the objection raised 
by Tim Hochstrasser but first stated by C. R. Emery that ‘Barbeyrac the political 
theorist fails to meet the challenges laid down by Barbeyrac the moralist’.131  
 
In essence, Barbeyrac’s call to arms for the sake of religious liberty and conscience is 
effectively aimed at the future generations of public servants in his academic charge 
much more so than to religious dissidents in the state. Reflecting on what he took to be 
the origin of civil intolerance and persecution, namely, the activity of rapacious 
ecclesiastics, his solution was to call upon the civil authorities to exercise their power in 
the name of civil and ecclesiastical toleration rather than in the illegitimate pursuit of 
religious truth by the force of arms. Barbeyrac’s pedagogic enterprise is thus also aimed 
at civil sovereigns, who, once rehabilitated from the false principles with which 
ecclesiastics so easily beguile them, have the means and the motive to protect the 
natural and inalienable right to liberty of conscience in the civil state. ‘Thanks be to 
God’, Barbeyrac says in his opening preface to the Noodt discourses, ‘that Princes may 
also be easily cured of the Ambition, and other vices which make them abuse their 
Power’ and so be prevented from lending an ear to self-serving ecclesiastics.132  
 
The difficulty that Barbeyrac faces, however, is the same one that gives rise to Emery 
and Hochstrasser’s objection, that is to say, how far do individuals possess the right 
                                                
130 Eijnatten, ‘Gerard Noodt’s Standing in the Eighteenth-Century Dutch Debate on Religious Freedom’, 
pp. 85-86.  
131 Hochstrasser, ‘The Claims of Conscience’, p. 46. Hochstrasser cites C. R. Emery, ‘The Study of 
Politica in The Netherlands in the Early Eighteenth-Century’, PhD dissertation [unpublished], (London, 
1967), p. 198.  
132 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface du traducteur, sur les deux discours de Mr. Noodt’, in Recueil de discours, Vol. 1, 
p. 5: ‘Plût-à-Dieu néanmoins qu’on pût aussi aisément guérir les Princes de l’Ambition, & des autres 
Vices qui font qu’ils abusent de leur Pouvoir’.  
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within the civil state to resist the sovereign in defence of their inalienable and natural 
right to liberty of conscience if the sovereign power cannot or will not be rehabilitated? 
Or to ask the same question in another way, how far does an individual’s duty to serve 
God according to the light of conscience – over which he himself has no mastery – 
license him to go in openly resisting a civil sovereign who exercises his authority 
beyond its legitimate bounds? Barbeyrac’s attempt to respond to the tension that arises 
here within his theory of natural law forms the subject of the final chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
Natural Law and the Limits of Civil Authority 
 
I 
Introduction 
 
‘The submission of Men to Civil Government does not extend, and could not extend, 
even if they so wished, to the point where a Human Legislator is placed above God, the 
Author of Nature, the Creator and Sovereign Legislator of Men’.1 With these words, 
Barbeyrac once again reminds his readers that all legitimate human authority is 
necessarily limited by its dependence on God’s will.  Authority is always conferred for 
a specific purpose and this purpose defines the limits of its use; whether that is the 
public good in the case of the civil sovereign, or moral edification in the case of 
ecclesiastics, or inner morality in the case of individuals. Barbeyrac’s exposition of the 
juridical framework that determines the legitimate exercise of different forms of moral 
authority in both the natural and civil state is intended to inform his readers of their own 
moral duties as well as demonstrating that no genuine conflict between individual 
conscience, the civil sovereign and ecclesiastical powers ought to occur. The difficulty 
that Barbeyrac faced was that experience showed only too well that neither the 
sovereign, nor ecclesiastics, nor even individuals, would always respect the proper 
limits of their respective spheres of authority. It is the de facto absence of any such 
natural harmony that makes the juridical framework of natural law necessary in the first 
place.  
 
In the previous chapter, we saw how Barbeyrac sought the remedy to conflict between 
individual conscience and ecclesiastical authority in the power of the civil sovereign. 
However, the difficulty that he faces is that there is no further terrestrial adjudicator to 
fall back on when the demands of individual conscience appear to be in conflict with the 
commands of the civil sovereign himself. The duty owed to God to follow the light of 
one’s conscience and the duty owed to the civil sovereign to obey his commands for the 
good of society cannot both be upheld in such situations. This chapter will focus on 
                                                
1 Barbeyrac, ‘La permission des loix’, p. 139: ‘La soûmission des Hommes au Gouvernement Civil ne 
s’étend point, & n’a pû s’étendre, quand même ils auroient voulu, jusqu’à mettre un Législateur Humain 
au dessus de DIEU, l’Auteur de la Nature, Le Créateur & le Législateur Souverain des Hommes’.  
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Barbeyrac’s response to a problem that troubled many of his contemporaries, namely 
the limits of civil authority and the extent to which individuals may legitimately 
disobey, and even actively resist, the sovereign power. Barbeyrac’s resistance theory 
draws on a rich history rooted both in the natural law theories of Grotius, Pufendorf and 
Locke, all of whom he modifies eclectically in the service of his own argument, and in 
the long perspective of Protestant, especially Huguenot, resistance theory.2 The latter 
context in particular has a dramatic prehistory of its own that is only touched upon in 
this chapter but remains a vital source of ideas that Barbeyrac draws upon in 
establishing his own resistance theory.3 
 
Much of the discussion here presupposes a distinction that is commonly employed in 
the early modern period between having a legitimate right to resist and being justified in 
exercising that right. The former question asks whether individuals may be bearers of 
natural rights in their own person and the latter question asks who may resist the civil 
sovereign and under what circumstances. To answer these questions, it will be 
necessary to examine: (i) the rights and duties that Barbeyrac ascribes to individuals in 
the state of nature; (ii) the foundation of the civil state; (iii) the relationship between 
civil and natural law; (iv) the character and natural limits of sovereignty; and finally, (v) 
Barbeyrac’s theory of justified resistance. The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the 
intimate relationship between Barbeyrac’s theory of natural law, grounded in individual 
conscience as the faculty of moral judgement, and his defence of individual liberty of 
conscience within the civil sphere as an indispensable moral duty with respect to God 
and thus an inalienable natural right with respect to all other individuals, the civil 
sovereign included.  
 
                                                
2 On Grotius’s and Pufendorf’s respective arguments for justified resistance and their reluctance to 
conceive of resistance in terms of a ‘right’, see Frank Grunert, ‘Sovereignty and Resistance: The 
Development of the Right of Resistance in German Natural Law’, in Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty, 
pp. 124-128. On Locke’s theory of resistance, see fn. 126 below. On the overlap between theories of 
resistance within the natural law tradition and the Huguenot Diaspora, see Hochstrasser, ‘The Claims of 
Conscience’. 
3 In addition to the references already provided in Chapter 4, p. 139, fn. 100 on Huguenot political theory, 
there are also a number of important contributions focusing specifically on the development of Huguenot 
resistance theory in response to the changing fortunes of the Huguenot community before and after the 
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes: Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. 
Volume Two: The Age of Reformations, (Cambridge, 1978), esp. 198-347; Myriam Yardeni, ‘French 
Calvinist Political Thought, 1534-1715’, in International Calvinism, 1541-1715, ed. M. Prestwich, 
(Oxford, 1985); Robert M. Kingdon, ‘Calvinism and Resistance Theory 1550-1580’, in The Cambridge 
History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed. J.H. Burns, (Cambridge, 1991).  
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II 
The State of Nature 
 
The state of nature is an ahistorical construct that conceives of individuals in their 
‘original’ condition logically prior to the establishment of civil society. It is natural man 
‘considered purely and simply as Man’, that is to say, created by God with the necessary 
constitution and faculties to be ‘a Reasonable and Sociable Animal’.4 For Barbeyrac, the 
state of nature serves a double purpose. First, it consolidates his comprehensive account 
of natural law – grounded in the idea of conscience as a quasi-judicial conduit between 
man and God – by arguing for a strong account of individual moral authority premised 
on man’s natural knowledge of God’s purpose for him. Although the nature of the 
juridical relationship between man and God is largely presupposed in Barbeyrac’s 
account of the state of nature, it remains fundamental to understanding how he 
conceptualises the juridical relations between moral equals in the state of nature and 
moral personhood itself. Second, the moral relations that exist within the state of nature 
provide a counterpoint for the respective rights and duties of sovereign and subjects in 
the civil state. For Barbeyrac, the political authority possessed by the civil sovereign 
mirrors the moral authority possessed by individuals in the state of nature. Here, he is 
consciously arguing against Hobbes and Pufendorf, for both of whom the deficiency of 
moral authority in the state of nature justifies the absolute power possessed by the 
sovereign in the civil state. 
 
Barbeyrac defines the state of nature in opposition ‘to all states where someone has the 
right to command in some manner, and respectively others are obliged to obey’.5 In 
theory, this includes all relations of authority not only those between sovereign and 
subject but also those between father and child and between master and servant. 
Nonetheless, like Pufendorf before him, he almost always describes the state of nature 
as a state whose most notable feature is not the absence of any relations of authority but 
rather the absence of a common political authority, namely the civil sovereign.6 
                                                
4 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.1.5, Note 1 and DNG, 2.3.4, Note 2 respectively: ‘consideré purement & simplement 
entant qu’Homme’ and ‘un Animal Raisonable & Sociable’.  
5 Barbeyrac, DHC, 2.1.5 Note 1: ‘à tout Etat où respectivement les uns ont droit de commander en 
quelque manniere, & les autres sont tenus d’obéïr’.  
6 Fiammetta Palladini argues that despite Pufendorf’s three different definitions of the state of nature and 
his accounts thereof, the main theoretical use that he makes of the concept is in contrast to civil society 
alone: ‘Pufendorf disciple of Hobbes’, pp. 31-49. She also argues here that there is a clear affinity 
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Individuals’ common subjection to the authority of God ensures, however, that effective 
juridical relations in the state of nature are possible. This is because individuals are 
possessed of a conscience capable of apprehending the fundamental precepts of natural 
law and enforcing them in God’s stead.7 In making this argument, Barbeyrac opposes 
what he takes to be the subjective individualism that characterises all assertions of right 
in Hobbes’s state of nature, while also overcoming the juridical impotency that besets 
Pufendorf’s state of nature. Here, he takes Locke to be his natural ally, citing him 
frequently to bolster his own argument.8  
 
While Barbeyrac draws very different conclusion concerning the nature of juridical 
relations in the state of nature from those of Hobbes and Pufendorf, his view of the 
twofold nature of man is strikingly similar to that of Pufendorf. Possessed of dignity ‘in 
leaving the hands of his Creator’, Barbeyrac argues that man nonetheless becomes 
corrupted by the vicious and disruptive characteristics attributed to him by Pufendorf – 
his malice, his natural diversity of inclinations and his inherent weakness – once left at 
liberty to make use of his own faculties.9 Moreover, Barbeyrac does not deny that that it 
is man’s malice just as much as his dignity that characterises his dealings with his 
fellows. Barbeyrac deliberately upsets the Pufendorfian apple cart, however, in using 
these same premises to conclude that individuals have just as much to fear from the 
misery of persecution at the hands of a malevolent sovereign in sway to his natural 
fallibility as they do from one another in the state of nature. Where Pufendorf, quoting 
directly from Hobbes’s De Cive, lists various ills brought about in the state of nature by 
man’s vicious temperament and the various social goods produced in the civil state 
through holding this vicious temperament in check, Barbeyrac rebuts both authors point 
by point.10 
 
What Barbeyrac wants to demonstrate in this rebuttal is that both Hobbes and Pufendorf 
mistakenly exaggerate both the miseries that beset individuals in the state of nature and 
                                                                                                                                          
between Pufendorf’s and Hobbes’s account of natural man and the state of nature that Pufendorf 
subsequently felt the need to obscure for prudential reasons, pp. 49-51.  
7 For the foundation of Barbeyrac’s concept of conscince, see Chapter 1, Section IV.  
8 For an account of Locke’s own concept of the state of nature, see John Dunn, The Political Thought of 
John Locke, (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 96-119. On the political importance of Locke’s Second Treatise in its 
French translation, Du gouvernment civil, among the Huguenot Diaspora as ‘an anti-absolutist critique of 
the French regime’, see Savonius, ‘Locke in French’, p. 51.  
9 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.1.5, Note 1: ‘en sortant des mains de son Créateur’. 
10 Pufendorf, DNG, 2.2.2; Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.2.2, Notes 7-17. Cf. Hobbes, On the Citizen, 10.1.  
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the advantages necessarily accrued to them in the civil state. Casting the argument in a 
negative light, Barbeyrac suggests that ‘against the natural intention of the Creator, and 
from an effect of human corruption, both of these states are often unsociable, and 
unhappy’.11 But while both states may be equally miserable, the same remedy may be 
sought to both through obedience to the dictates of natural law. This is achieved through 
attentiveness to the juridical demands placed upon all individuals by the light of 
conscience, whether simple individuals in the state of nature or the sovereign himself in 
the civil state. For Barbeyrac, a well-governed civil state would undoubtedly offer 
individuals greater peace and security than the precariousness of moral relations that 
always prevails in the state of nature, but much depends on whether the civil sovereign 
governs within the legitimate bounds of his authority according to the dictates of natural 
law.12 In short, the best state is a state governed by dictates of natural law.  
 
Barbeyrac’s reply to Pufendorf’s broadly Hobbesian state of nature relies on more than 
simply arguing that the civil state may prove to be as miserable as the state of nature. 
He also wants to establish that individuals in the state of nature possess the necessary 
moral authority to recognise and enforce relations of justice and because of this that the 
moral framework exists for them to be confident enough for ‘a great number to engage 
together for their mutual defence’.13 To understand why Barbeyrac thinks that this is 
possible, despite adhering to the belief that the attributes of the divine nature are beyond 
human comprehension, it is necessary to recall the arguments that have gone before in 
this thesis.  
 
Conscience has a crucial role to play here in bridging the gulf between God and man. It 
assures individuals of the veridical nature all judgements made in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of natural law and confers on these judgements an authority that 
derives directly from the authority of the divine author of that same moral law, namely 
God. The authority of conscience is thus predicated upon man’s subjection to the will of 
God, from whom he receives ‘being, life and movement’.14 This dependency is 
exemplified in the mastery that God retains over man’s life, liberty and conscience. It is 
                                                
11 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.2.2, Note 17: ‘contre la destination naturele du Créateur, & par un effet de la 
corruption humaine, l’un & l’autre de ces états est souvent insociable, & malhereux’.  
12 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.2.2, Note 17. On the natural limits of sovereign power, see Sections V-VI below.  
13 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.2.2, Note 7: ‘on ne s’engage plusieurs ensemble à se défendre mutuellement’.  
14 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.2.5, Note 3: ‘l’être, la vie & le mouvement’. See Chapter 2, pp. 75-77.  
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because of this mastery that individuals may be said to be endowed with a property in 
their own life, liberty and conscience with respect to their fellow man. This is what 
Barbeyrac means when he speaks of inalienable natural rights.15 In contrast to 
permissive natural rights that we may dispose of as we deem appropriate, inalienable 
natural rights refer to those aspects of moral personhood that cannot be alienated 
because ‘a superior Law prohibits it’.16 That law is natural law. Individuals are held to 
protect these attributes of their moral personhood to the upmost degree because in doing 
so they demonstrate the necessary respect for God’s authority. All of this may be known 
be the light of conscience alone.  
 
It is from this perspective that Barbeyrac characterises the state of nature as a juridical 
state where morality is grounded in man’s relationship to God. Moreover, it allows 
Barbeyrac to insist upon the morally authoritative character of individuals’ judgements 
of conscience and thus reject Hobbes’s claim that such judgements are nothing more 
than subjective, human reasoning. From the knowledge that each individual is capable 
of possessing of himself as a moral being dependent on the will of God, Barbeyrac also 
rebuts Hobbes’s claim that there are no relations of justice between individuals. For 
Barbeyrac, morality in Hobbes’s state of nature may be reduced to the sin of ‘claiming 
that something is conducive to our preservation, yet knowing in full conscience that it is 
not’.17 Thus, in the absence of any particular contract, Hobbesian individuals cannot 
cause one another harm (tort) in the juridical sense.  
 
In response, Barbeyrac makes use of Pufendorf’s idea that some sort of basic natural 
equality obtains between all individuals considered as moral beings, i.e., subject to 
natural law, in order to establish his own argument that individuals may cause one 
                                                
15 Cf. Chapter 3, p. 95. Petter Korkman assesses how far Barbeyrac’s concept of inalienable natural rights 
ought to be read as a modern theory of subjective natural rights. He concludes that while Barbeyrac does 
not advance a subjective theory of natural rights, he is a ‘liberal’ thinker whose ultimate aim is to protect 
‘a private sphere in which every person is his own master’ within his religious and moral life: ‘Life, 
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness: Human Rights in Barbeyrac and Burlamaqui’, in Transformations 
in Medieval and Early-Modern Rights Discourse, ed. V. Mäkinen and P. Korkman, (Dordrecht, 2006), p. 
282. On the more general debate over the advent of modern subjective rights, see Richard Tuck, Natural 
Rights Theories. Arguing against the idea of the rise of subjective rights theories in the early modern 
period, see Knud Haakonssen, ‘The moral conservatism of natural rights’. 
16 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.7.17, Note 2: ‘une Loi superieure nous le défend’.  
17 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.2.3, Note 1: ‘on pretend qu’une chose est propre à nôtre conservation, quoiqu’on 
sçache bien en conscience qu’elle ne l’est pas’. Cf. Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.10: ‘A person may sin 
against the Natural Laws… if he claims something contributes to his self-preservation, but does not 
believe it does so’.  
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another harm (tort) in the juridical sense: ‘everyone having the perfect right to be 
regarded and to be treated as a Man, whoever acts otherwise towards another person, 
causes him a true Harm’.18 This moral equality, he argues, is ‘the general foundation of 
Sociability, and consequently of all the Duties of Men towards one another’.19 This 
argument is important because it demonstrates that a genuine moral-juridical framework 
exists between individuals in the state of nature in addition to the juridical relation that 
pertains between man and God in all moral states. In short, individuals have duties to 
their fellow man as well as to God.  
 
For Barbeyrac, this makes some kind of stable society between individuals in the state 
of nature possible because the perfect right to moral recognition pertains no matter what 
natural or social inequalities actually exist between individuals. It follows from this that 
there is a corresponding duty, which Barbeyrac refers to as a perpetual obligation, to 
treat others as moral equals. This is true not only in the state of nature but also in states 
where relations of authority exist between superiors and inferiors, that is to say, in the 
civil state between the sovereign and his subjects. Any individual, whether in the natural 
or civil state, who ‘demonstrates a disposition to violate towards others the maxims of 
Natural Right common to all Men’, and so violate the perpetual obligation to uphold 
this natural equality of right, dispenses his fellows from their perpetual obligation to 
practice these same duties towards him.20 This applies not only in the state of nature but 
also in the civil state. It is not so much that the original obligation to treat others as 
moral equals ceases, for after all it is supposed to be perpetual, but rather that an 
overriding obligation takes precedence. In short, there is a distinction to be made here 
between having an obligation and being justified in exercising or not exercising that 
obligation.  
 
                                                
18 Barbeyrac, DNG, 3.2.1, Note 1: ‘chacun ayant un droit parfait de pretender qu’on le regarde & qu’on le 
traite comme un Homme, quiconque agit autrement avec un autre, lui cause un veritable Dommage’. For 
two contrasting accounts of the idea of moral personhood and basic rights in Pufendorf’s theory of natural 
law, see: Kari Saastamoinen, ‘Pufendorf on Natural Equality, Human Dignity, and Self-Esteem’, in 
Journal of the History of Ideas 71:1 (2010) and Knud Haakonssen, ‘Natural Law and Personhood: 
Samuel Pufendorf on Social Explanation’, (Florence, 2010). Accessed via: 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/14934.  
19 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.7.1, Note 1: ‘le fondement général de la Sociabilité, & par consequent de tous les 
Devoirs des Hommes les uns envers les autres’. 
20 Barbeyrac, DHC, 1.7.2, Note 2: ‘se montre disposé à violer envers les autres les maximes du Droit 
Naturel commun à tous les Hommes’.  
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The duty that takes precedence when other individuals violate the common duties of 
sociability is the fundamental duty of self-preservation. This is the duty to preserve and 
defend both oneself and, as a correlative to this, human society in general. Arguing 
against Pufendorf, Barbeyrac insists that the duty of self-preservation does not merely 
give individuals a right – or permission – to defend their life by taking the life of an 
unjust aggressor but rather positively commands them to do so in the form of a veritable 
obligation.21 For Barbeyrac, the duty to use force to defend one’s life is grounded in the 
idea of life as an inalienable natural right, that is to say, a moral attribute that 
individuals cannot willingly renounce. Rejecting the traditional Christian argument that 
individuals are held to imitate Christ and patiently endure all sufferings, even death, 
Barbeyrac claims that this duty of self-preservation is required not only by natural law 
but also by Christian moral law.22  
 
To this end, it is also permissible for individuals to use force to protect the lives of their 
fellows, thereby upholding the fundamental duties of natural law against those who 
directly violate its maxims.23 Nonetheless, whenever it possible to do so without 
endangering one’s own life or the lives of others, individuals ought to spare the life of 
an unjust aggressor. Even though our aggressor has no right to require it of us, the 
injured party should always seek to ‘salvage both the rights of self-love, and the Duties 
of Sociability’.24  
 
For Barbeyrac, the strict duty of self-preservation includes not only the right to defend 
one’s life, limbs and possessions but also the right that to defend one’s liberty. He is 
highly critical here of both Pufendorf and Grotius for ignoring liberty within their 
accounts of just self-defence. Liberty, Barbeyrac reminds his readers, is ‘the rampart of 
my preservation, and the foundation of all other things that belong to me’.25 
Paraphrasing Locke’s argument in the Second Treatise, Barbeyrac claims that all 
individuals have a right of self-defence by force of arms against anyone who seeks to 
                                                
21 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.5.2, Note 5.  
22 Barbeyrac, TMP, 8.40-45.  
23 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.5.6, Note 3.  
24 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.5.1, Note 3: ‘sauve en même tems les droits de l’amour-propre, & Les devoirs de la 
Sociabilité’.  
25 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.5.19, Note 2: ‘le rempart de ma conservation, & le fondement de toutes les autres 
choses qui m’appartiennent’.  
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establish absolute power over them and thereby deprive them of their liberty.26 There is 
a necessary moral equivalence between life and liberty, both of which constitute 
inalienable natural rights. 
 
The idea of individual liberty is also closely related in Barbeyrac’s thought to the idea 
of conscience as something that one ought to be at liberty to follow. People need to have 
some degree of liberty from domination by other people, including political liberty, in 
order for them to be in a position to make use of their natural moral liberty to fulfil the 
first and fundamental duty of law of nature, namely the duty each individual has to 
follow the light of their conscience. For Quentin Skinner, this particular concept of 
political liberty – the neo-Roman concept of liberty – rests on the idea that ‘to live in a 
condition of dependence is in itself a source and a form of constraint’.27 Liberty consists 
in more than non-interference; it requires non-dependence on the will of another. To 
this end, Barbeyrac claims that individuals have a duty to preserve and, where 
necessary, violently defend their liberty within a political context because the 
possession of moral liberty is necessary to the fulfilment of their natural duties to God. 
Any attempt by another individual to seek to establish an absolute empire over another 
individual’s life or liberty, that is to say, to deprive him of it completely, therefore 
transgresses upon the authority rightfully possessed by God.  
 
Barbeyrac’s account of the extensive rights and duties possessed by individuals in the 
state of nature – and the juridical relations that therefore exist between them – provides 
the framework for some form of stable society, or at least social relations, prior to the 
institutions of civil society. In arguing that natural law may effectively govern conduct 
in the state of nature, Barbeyrac has to show that its dictates may not only be 
apprehended by individuals but that they may also be enforced.  He does this by making 
use of Locke’s ‘strange Doctrine’ of the natural right of punishment.28 Barbeyrac argues 
                                                
26 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.5.19, Note 2. Cf. Locke, Second Treatise, 4.22-23.  
27 Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, (Cambridge, 1998), p. 84.  
28 Locke, Second Treatise, 2.9. Richard Tuck argues that this doctrine is developed by Locke as a 
response to the colonisation of America and used by Barbeyrac in the hopes of legitimising a European 
war on behalf of Protestants against Catholics, see: The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and 
the International Order from Grotius to Kant, (Oxford, 1999), pp. 181-182. While Barbeyrac allows for 
the possibility that Protestant princes may defend these injustices by force of arms in his 1734 revisions to 
his DNG notes, the general tenor of his thought and his rejection of the use of the right of punishment to 
license an offensive war of religion between nations suggests that he adopts a more ambivalent position 
on this issue than the one that Tuck ascribes to him. See Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.6.3, Note 1.  
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that individuals in the state of nature possess a right to punish violations of the laws of 
nature that harm either themselves or others: 
 
The Laws of Nature, as well as all other laws imposed on Men here-below, 
would be wholly ineffective, if no-one, in the State of Natural Liberty, had 
the power to execute them, to protect the Innocent, and to restrain those 
who insult them.29  
 
The natural right to punish the transgressions of others is developed as a corollary to the 
duty of self-preservation; however, it confers a right of punishment with respect to all 
infractions of the absolute duties of natural law derived from the principles of religion, 
self-love and sociability.  
 
But if the state of nature is characterised by the absence of any relations of authority and 
individuals are all moral equals, where does the authority to inflict such punishments 
derive from? Rejecting Pufendorf’s claim that punishment can only be legitimately 
inflicted by a superior, Barbeyrac claims that while the punishments inflicted by moral 
equals in the state of nature are not exacted ‘with authority’, they are ‘no less real nor 
any less well-founded’ as a result of that.30 The assumption here is that individuals 
possesses the moral capacity to make use of the natural right of punishment to uphold 
the interests of human society and not for more malign purposes. The judgements that 
individuals make of the necessity for and legitimacy of specific punishment ought to 
come from ‘tranquil reason’ and not from unregulated passions. In the absence of a 
common judge, the efficacy of the laws of nature rests on individuals’ recognition of 
their dependency on God and the moral law, and their ability to make appropriate moral 
judgements in his stead by virtue of a well-informed and morally calibrated faculty of 
conscience.31 Without this moral backdrop, there would be nothing to separate 
Barbeyrac from the radical subjectivism that Hobbes attributes to individuals in the state 
of nature nor the juridical impotency that Pufendorf attributes to them. Man’s 
knowledge of his dependency on God and his laws thus produces an account of natural 
man that invests him with considerable moral and juridical authority, in practice if not 
in name.  
                                                
29 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.5.6, Note 3: ‘Les Loix Naturelles, aussi-bien que toutes les autres qu’on impose ici-
bas aux Hommes, seroient entierement inutiles, si personne, dans l’Etat de la Liberté Naturelle, n’avoit le 
pouvoir de les faire executer, de proteger l’Innocent, & de reprimer ceux qui l’insultent’.  
30 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.3.4, Note 3: ‘avec autorité’ and ‘ne... pas moins réelle, ni moins bien fondée’.  
31 On the problem of judgement in a state of natural (and moral) equality, see pp. 175-176 below.  
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For Barbeyrac, this natural right of punishment serves as a foundation for a number of 
related conclusions that he wanted to draw concerning the respective rights of sovereign 
and subjects in the civil state: (i) individuals confer this natural right of punishment on 
the sovereign power in entering the civil state; (ii) individuals in the civil state have 
thereby consented to submit to all punishments inflicted upon them by those possessed 
of sovereign authority; (iii) the authority of the sovereign to inflict punishments on his 
subjects is limited by the original natural right from which it derives, namely to punish 
transgressions of the laws of nature for the purpose of upholding peace and security in 
human society. In sum, Barbeyrac is driving at a conclusion that Pufendorf deliberately 
forestalls. The sovereign power possesses a limited and conditional right of life and 
death over his subjects, comprising life itself, but also limbs, liberty and material 
possessions. By arguing for a stronger account of individual moral authority and the 
juridical relations that pertain in the state of nature, Barbeyrac lays the foundation for 
the translation of his strong account of moral individualism into political individualism 
within the civil state.   
 
III 
The Foundation of the Civil State 
 
Barbeyrac claims that while ‘it is certain that Men naturally love Society’, this is not the 
immediate cause of the formation of civil society.32 For Barbeyrac, this is because the 
term ‘naturally’ does not denote here ‘the actual existence of a quality in the subject, 
with which it is invested by Nature’ but rather ‘the aptitude or disposition to receive, by 
means of culture or education, certain perfections proposed by Nature for its 
enrichment’.33 As there is no natural impetus leading men to form civil societies, 
Barbeyrac argues that the actual origins of civil society as a fact of history must be 
distinguished from the theoretical foundations that confer legitimacy on those who 
possess political authority. While man’s earliest history remains unrecorded, Barbeyrac 
conjectures that his natural desire for society could have been satisfied ‘by the Primitive 
Societies formed by Marriage and Kinship, and by informal commerce with those with 
                                                
32 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.1.2, Note 1: ‘il est certain que les Hommes aiment naturellement la Société’.  
33 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.1.3, Note 3: ‘l’existence actuelle d’une qualité dans un sujet, qui s’en trouve revêtu 
par la Nature’ and ‘l’aptitude ou la disposition à recevoir, moyennant la culture ou l’éducation, certaines 
perfections dont la Nature se propose de l’enrichir’.  
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whom he does not have such an intimate liaison’.34 Loose federations of these primitive 
familial societies would have also satisfied the need for mutual security and protection 
without recourse to the establishment of laws, governments or magistrates. Barbeyrac 
adds that such societies continue to subsist in foreign lands such as Africa without fear 
occasioning the transition to a formal civil state.35 
 
Having rejected Pufendorf’s characterisation of the state of nature as a place of 
insecurity and constant fear of attack, Barbeyrac also rejects the subsequent claim that 
fear ought to be considered the impetus for the creation of political governance amongst 
men. Instead, quoting Bayle, Barbeyrac claims that it is much more likely that force had 
a significant role to play in effecting the transition from primitive to early civil society 
with subsequent societies forming for a diversity of reasons, including but not restricted 
to further acts of force and defensive moves to forestall such acts of force.36 The point 
that Barbeyrac emphasises in his history of the formation of civil societies is that civil 
societies emerged gradually rather than in concert with one another. It follows from this 
that the transition to civil society could not conceivably have involved careful 
deliberation by the heads of different families at one precise moment within history. 
Taking a critical stance towards Pufendorf’s argument here, Barbeyrac insists that in 
reasoning about the historical origins of civil society, there has not been ‘enough 
reflection on the simplicity of the times in which Civil Societies began’.37 Judgement 
has instead been too easily clouded by observations drawn from the civil societies of the 
day. In looking for the historical origins, Barbeyrac concludes that neither necessity nor 
natural impulse leads men to form civil societies, but rather accident, convenience and 
the political will of powerful men.  
 
Barbeyrac argues that while the historical foundations of civil society remain obscured 
by the passage of time, both Scripture and history attest to the free consent of the people 
as the necessary foundation of legitimate political authority distinct from simple 
                                                
34 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.1.3, Note 3: ‘par les Societez Primitives que forme le Mariage ou la Parenté, & par 
un commerce familier avec ceux qui n’ont avec lui aucune liaison si étroite’.  
35 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.1.7, Note 1. Barbeyrac cites Bayle for the example: Continuation des Pensées 
Divserses, Vol. 2, Article 118.  
36 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.1.7, Note 1. Cf. Pierre Bayle, Nouvelles lettres de l’auteur de la critique generale 
de l’histoire du Calvinisme de Mr. Maimbourg, 2 Volumes, (Ville-Franche, 1685), Vol. 2, Letter 17, §2.  
37 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.1.7, Note 1: ‘assez de reflexion à la simplicté des tems ausquels les Societez Civiles 
ont commencé’.  
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political power.38 Consent here supposes both the moral and physical power to consent 
and the free and serious use of both these faculties.39 Barbeyrac’s use of the language of 
consent and concomitant use of the language of contract ties him not only to the natural 
law tradition but also to early Huguenot writers, for whom the ideas of contract and 
consent grounded the reciprocal rights and duties of sovereign and subject.40 As well as 
these overlapping contexts, Barbeyrac’s argument here is notable for the revisions that 
he makes during the course of his scholarly life concerning the precise nature of the 
original civil contract whereby individuals consent to the establishment of legitimate 
civil authority.  
 
In both the 1706 and 1712 editions of Le droit de la nature, Barbeyrac follows Titius to 
argue, pace Pufendorf, that because most civil societies were formed by force, the 
foundation of all legitimate government must comprise a single contract of submission 
between a sovereign and subjects, whether tacit or express.41 In the revised 1734 version 
of this note, Barbeyrac still maintains that force has a significant role to play in the 
actual formation of civil societies but he no longer sees this as a reason to rule out 
Pufendorf’s threefold original contract as a purely theoretical proposition.42 Instead, he 
agrees with Pufendorf that legitimate political authority requires an original contract 
between the people to establish civil society, a decree to settle the form of government 
and a subsequent contract of submission between a sovereign and his subjects.43 
Barbeyrac’s comments suggest that it was his exchanges with Carmichael, that led to 
his change of heart.44 What Carmichael emphasised in his own Pufendorf glosses was 
that ‘both obligations can be formed by one agreement’.45 Thus one single act of 
consent, whether tacit or express, was sufficient to produce Pufendorf’s threefold civil 
contract.46 
 
                                                
38 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.2.8, Note 6.  
39 Barbeyrac, DNG, 3.6.3, Note 1.  
40 H. Höpfl and M.P. Thompson, ‘Contract as a Motif in Political Thought’, in The American Historical 
Review 84:4 (1979), p. 933.  
41 Barbeyrac, DNG [1706], 7.2.8, Note 2. The note remains unchanged in the 1712 edition.  
42 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.2.8, Note 5.  
43 Pufendorf, DNG, 7.2.7-8.  
44 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.2.8, Note 5. 
45 Carmichael, Natural Rights, p. 148. 
46 Cf. Moore and Silverthorne, ‘Gershom Carmichael and Natural Jurisprudence’, p. 84.  
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The reason for this change of heart was that Barbeyrac had come to appreciate how 
Pufendorf’s first contract between individuals to establish a civil society ‘was especially 
necessary, in order that Civil Society would not be presumed to have been dissolved in 
an Interregnum’ or when the order of succession in a hereditary monarchy was 
unclear.47  For Barbeyrac, it followed from this that a ruler who had ceased to 
legitimately hold or exercise the sovereign power could be legitimately succeeded 
without any presumed dissolution of civil society because the contractual bonds that 
hold all members of the civil society together would still subsist. Barbeyrac thus 
acquired from Pufendorf the contractual foundation for legitimate political authority 
that allowed for a change of personnel within the office of the sovereign without 
thereby opening the door to outright rebellion against a legitimate sovereign. What is 
curious here is the timing of Barbeyrac’s revision, given that the point that Pufendorf 
himself was making in defence of the 1688 Glorious Revolution obtained in 1706 and 
1712 just as it did in 1734.48 Having adopted Pufendorf’s notion of the threefold 
contract, however, the difference between Barbeyrac and his author came down to the 
reasons why a ruler could be considered to have ceased to rule as a just and legitimate 
sovereign.  
 
The rights and duties that individuals may voluntarily alienate in consenting to the 
threefold contract determines the limits of legitimate civil authority as wielded by the 
sovereign power. In a further 1734 addition, again in response to Carmichael, Barbeyrac 
claims that while there are diverse reasons why individuals enter into civil society 
together, it is both certain and sufficient to know that in becoming a member of a civil 
society every individual would have ‘tried to conserve, as much as would be possible, 
their Natural Liberty’.49 Permissive natural rights may be alienated to the sovereign, 
including the laws that regulate property, commerce, marriage and a myriad of other 
common social practices. However, inalienable natural rights, principally the rights to 
life, liberty and conscience, in which God always retains his mastery, cannot be the 
subject of voluntary consent by individuals.50  
                                                
47 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.2.8, Note 5: ‘est surtout nécessaire, pour que la Societé Civile ne soit pas censée 
dissoute dans un Interrégne’.  
48 Michael Seidler, ‘‘Turkish Judgement’ and the English Revolution: Pufendorf on the Right of 
Resistance’, in Samuel Pufendorf und die europäische Frühaufklärung.  
49 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.1.7, Note 1: ‘tâché de conserver, autant qu’il seroit possible, de sa Liberté 
Naturelle’. 
50 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.7.17, Note 2. Cf. Chapter 3, p. 95 and p. 109, and Chapter 4, p. 140.  
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The most striking of all rights, or powers, that ought to be alienated to the sovereign 
upon entering civil society is the right of punishment. It is by virtue of having 
transferred this individual right of punishment that the sovereign comes to possess a 
comparable right to punish subjects up to and including the right of life and death 
insofar as the preservation and good order of society requires it.51 The limits of the 
sovereign right of punishment thus mirror the limits of each individual’s natural right of 
punishment in the state of nature. This means that it is neither an absolute nor arbitrary 
right over the lives of one’s subjects. Moreover, since Barbeyrac claims, pace 
Pufendorf, that rights and duties are always reciprocal, subjects are obliged to submit to 
the punishments bestowed upon them by the sovereign having consented to and thus 
recognised the sovereign’s legitimate right to make use of his authority in this way.52 
Even when the punishment in question is the penalty of death, individuals are still 
obliged to submit: ‘since one confers the right of life and death on the Sovereign, or the 
right of the Sword, one also engages not to resist him when he makes use of this right’.53 
The duty to submit to the penalty of death does not extend, however, so far as to prevent 
individuals from escaping or avoiding it by non-violent means, provided that they can 
do so without committing any further sin, nor does it require them to confess their 
crimes in the absence of some further obligation to do so.54 
 
The obligation to submit to the penalty of death at the hands of one’s sovereign also 
requires that one’s sovereign only exercises his right within the natural limits of his 
authority. Beyond this, the sovereign no longer acts rightfully, that is to say, as a 
legitimate sovereign. In such cases where the person occupying the office of sovereign 
allows himself to be carried away by his own furies and ‘acts as though in cold blood’, 
the rights and duties that govern the just defence of oneself by means of force may be 
justly resumed.55 The same is even more true of all those who act in the name of the 
sovereign. Here, Barbeyrac rejects Pufendorf’s claim that individuals ought not to resist 
persons invested with sovereign authority by force for the general good of society. He 
argues instead that the whole of society has much to fear from any person who would 
                                                
51 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.3.4, Note 3.  
52 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.3.4, Note 8. See also Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.3.5, Note 5.  
53 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.3.5, Note 1: ‘pusique l’on confere au Souverain le droit de vie & de mort, ou le 
droit du Glaive, on s’engage aussi à ne pas lui résister lorsqu’il fera usage de ce droit’.  
54 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.3.4, Note 3 and 4.1.20, Note 5.  
55 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.5.5, Note 1: ‘comme s’il agissoit de sang froid’.  
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transgress not only upon the legitimate bounds of their natural authority but also upon 
the authority possessed by God over individuals’ lives, liberties and conscience.56 By 
thus conceiving of the limits of sovereign authority, as well as the obligation to submit 
to its legitimate exercise, Barbeyrac opens the door for the claims of the rights and 
duties attached to natural law – in particular the so-called inalienable natural rights – to 
supersede the rights and duties attached to civil law. 
 
IV 
Civil Law 
 
Before looking in more detail at the natural limits of legitimate sovereignty and the idea 
of the right of resist, it is necessary to understand how Barbeyrac conceives of the 
relationship between natural and civil law.  Civil law is the principal means by which 
the sovereign exercises the civil authority bestowed upon him by the original civil 
contract. It specifies certain civil obligation that all subjects are obliged to adhere to and 
determines the punishments suffered within the civil tribunal from any violations of 
these laws. Rejecting the Hobbesian line of argument, Barbeyrac agrees with Pufendorf 
that civil law does not in itself determine the nature of justice. Instead, civil law 
determines the particular application of the universal maxims of justice, i.e., the 
fundamental precepts of natural law, to a specific people and the circumstances in 
which they find themselves.57 Civil law thus ‘supplements’ natural law. However, civil 
law, as the ‘most arbitrary’ of all laws, also depends upon natural law as the foundation 
of its obligatory force as ‘a consequence of this inviolable Law of Nature: That 
everyone ought to religiously observe his promises’.58   
 
For Barbeyrac, civil law supplements the two different forms of natural law – obligatory 
and permissive – in quite different ways. With respect to the precepts of obligatory 
natural law, civil law ‘confirms them, or rather ought to confirm them by its authority, 
insofar as the Public Good permits or requires it’.59 Civil law does not possess the 
                                                
56 Barbeyrac, DNG, 2.5.19, Note 2.  
57 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.1.1, Note 3. On Barbeyrac’s response to Hobbes: Cf. Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, TPLN, 
Note 6.  
58 Barbeyrac, ‘Préface’, DGP, §16, Note 1: ‘une suite de cette Loi inviolable de la Nature, Que chacun 
doit tenir religieusement ce qu’il promis’.  
59 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.1.1, Note 2: ‘les confirme, ou doit les confirmer par son autorité, autant que le 
permet ou le demande le Bien Public’.  
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authority to amend these universal and indispensable moral precepts in any way. Instead 
the function of civil law is simply to enforce these precepts whenever possible. With 
respect to the rights accorded by permissive natural law, however, civil law possesses 
considerable interpretative powers. Here civil law may ‘limit natural liberty, once the 
Public Good requires it’.60 In practical terms, this means that two civil legislators may 
create different laws to regulate the same thing within their respective states without any 
injustice arising.61 Thus while permissive natural rights provide the original juridical 
foundation for the institution of property, commerce, marriage and other social practices 
prior to the advent of the civil state, these kind of natural rights may be legitimately 
amended and even curtailed by civil law insofar as the public good requires it.62 The 
authority of the civil law in this respect is limited only by the general maxim that it 
ought not to command anything contrary to natural law taken in its entirety.  
 
Even though Barbeyrac conceives of natural law as both anterior and superior to civil 
law, he is reluctant to conclude that individuals are thus dispensed from their obligation 
to submit to any civil laws that are unjust in some way. In fact, Barbeyrac concedes, 
sometimes legislators permit or authorise things manifestly contrary to natural law not 
from individual caprice but because of the greater social and political inconveniences 
that would otherwise arise. He gives as an example the Egyptian law that required 
thieves to register all stolen goods with a captain appointed solely for this purpose.63 In 
‘La permission des loix’, Barbeyrac offers a number of comparable examples of unjust 
civil laws drawn from both pagan and Christian history. The point that he is driving at 
here is that civil law is always an imperfect supplement to natural law. Despite these 
imperfections, he emphasises the gravity of ‘denouncing as unjust the established Laws’ 
of the state and insists that when ‘in doubt, the presumption is in their favour’.64 
Barbeyrac was unwilling to see the peace and security offered by the civil state 
jeopardised for each and every minor injustice perpetuated by its laws.  
 
By emphasising the common imperfection of civil law in contrast to the constant 
rectitude of natural law, Barbeyrac is also emphasising the very different jurisdictions 
                                                
60 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.1.1, Note 2: ‘borne la liberté naturelle, lorsque le Bien Public le demande’.  
61 Barbeyrac, ‘La permission des loix’, p. 139.  
62 Barbeyrac, DHC, 2.12.7, Note 1; Cf. Barbeyrac, DNG [1706], 1.6.16, Note 1.  
63 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.1.3, Note 1.  
64 Barbeyrac, ‘La permission des loix’, p. 138: ‘taxer d’injustice les Loix établies’ and ‘dans un doute, la 
présomption est en leur faveur’.  
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that both forms of law respectively occupy.65 While natural and civil law are mutually 
compatible, unlike natural law, the purpose of civil law is not to make men virtuous but 
simply to constrain their external actions insofar as these actions are harmful to the 
peace and good order of civil society. Barbeyrac thus claims that: 
 
It was necessary, in order to prevent the abuse of Legislative Power, that 
the authority of Legislators did not extended to the point of prohibiting 
under [threat of] some penalty everything that they judged to be contrary to 
some Virtue.66  
 
Even when civil law prescribes the exercise of some particular virtue, ‘it is not as 
something praiseworthy, but as something useful’.67 Likewise, vice is punished because 
of the harmful effects that it may produce, not because it is morally reprehensible in 
itself. Availing itself of the means of force and compulsion alone, civil law is naturally 
limited in its jurisdiction to constraining individuals’ external actions with only 
temporal, civil goods in its sights. Natural law, by contrast, operates within the tribunal 
of conscience to bring men to virtue by inspiring them to willingly fulfil their moral 
duties.  
 
The natural limit placed upon civil authority in this respect determines how one ought to 
interpret the particular civil laws of a state. In his two principal discourses on the 
subject, ‘La permission des loix’ and ‘Le bénéfice des loix’, Barbeyrac argues that 
neither the permission nor the benefits accorded by the civil laws, whether express or 
tacit, imply any kind of moral approbation on the part of the civil legislator and thus the 
sovereign power. These two discourses, originally delivered as public orations and later 
published and subsequently appended to his 1718 edition of Pufendorf’s Les devoirs, 
form an important part of his wider pedagogic enterprise. Speaking to the young men in 
his charge, Barbeyrac expounds the idea that becoming a man of civil and moral 
standing requires more than mere fidelity to the civil laws of one’s state. Barbeyrac’s 
appeal to his audience to be attentive to their comprehensive moral duties rests on the 
belief that while the civil laws and the laws of virtue, i.e., natural law, may unfold 
                                                
65 On the differences between Barbeyrac and Pufendorf in this regard, see the discussion in Chapter 1.  
66 Barbeyrac, ‘La permission des loix’, pp. 143-44: ‘Il étoit même nécessaire, pour prévenir l’abus du 
Pouvoir Législatif, que l’autorité des Législateurs ne s’étendît pas jusqu’à defender sous quelque peine 
tout ce qu’ils jugeroient contraire à quelque Vertu’ 
67 Barbeyrac, ‘La permission des loix’, p. 143: ‘ce n’est pas comme des choses loüables, mais comme des 
choses utiles’.  
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together up to a certain point, beyond this ‘Virtue alone remains, and commands 
absolutely’.68  
 
In ‘La permission des loix’, Barbeyrac argues that the silence of civil law, unlike the 
silence of natural law, implies ‘a simple permission of impunity, and not a permission of 
approbation’.69 Individuals must thus be attentive to their comprehensive moral duties, 
that is, natural law and the dictates of conscience, in taking up liberties left open by the 
silence of civil laws. In ‘Le bénéfice des loix’, Barbeyrac extends his original argument 
to claim that even benefits expressly conferred by civil law ought sometimes to be 
willingly renounced: ‘that which rigorous Justice therefore permits, some other Virtue 
prohibits in certain cases’.70 Here, Barbeyrac supposes that good conscience and sound 
reason require more than adherence to the maxims of strict justice. Instead, individuals 
ought to resolve to uphold all the moral virtues, including those such as ‘Humanity, 
Compassion, Charity’ and so forth.71  
 
Replete with cautionary tales and morally edifying examples, the purpose of these 
discourses is to persuade his audience that each individual has the responsibility to be 
alert to the demands of the moral law within the tribunal of conscience, i.e., as a moral 
being subject to the immutable laws of nature. In addition, Barbeyrac’s pedagogic 
enterprise in these two discourses should also be looked upon more broadly. He is 
aware that the impulsive young men that he is speaking to about moral probity are the 
same young men who will go on to hold civil office in the future. Moreover, his 
audience would also have included a considerable number of incumbent civil 
dignitaries. Just like his discourses on the duties of public ministers of religion, these 
discourses serve as an explicit delineation of how far those in civil office ought to seek 
to extend their authority.  
 
While Barbeyrac cautions his audience against invoking the superior authority of 
natural law against the particular commands of civil law, the conclusion that he 
nonetheless drives towards is that natural law is ‘always the Sovereign Mistress’. No 
                                                
68 Barbeyrac, ‘La permission des loix’, p. 145: ‘la Vertu demeure seule, & commande absolument’.  
69 Barbeyrac, ‘La permission des loix’, p. 143: ‘une simple permission d’impunité, & non pas une 
permission d’approbation’.  
70 Barbeyrac, ‘Le bénéfice des loix’, p. 162: ‘ce que la Justice rigoreuse permet alors, quleque autre Vertu 
le defend en certains cas’.  
71 Barbeyrac, ‘Le bénéfice des loix’, p. 180: ‘l’Humanité, la Compassion, la Charité’.  
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human ordinance can usurp the ‘natural empire that it possesses over Men’.72 This 
principle comes into full force when civil law steps beyond the bounds of its legitimate 
jurisdiction in seeking to prohibit certain actions, including beliefs, deemed to be vices 
but that may in fact be virtues, not least because it is not the task of civil laws to 
prohibit vice nor instil virtue in its subjects. For Barbeyrac, this applies primarily to 
occasions where individuals are prevented from ‘following the light of Conscience, 
above all in matters of Religion’.73 Liberty of conscience, as the cornerstone of all true 
morality and the possibility of individual salvation, is the point at which, for Barbeyrac, 
prudence gives way to principle.74  
 
V 
Sovereignty 
 
Individual subjection to civil authority and civil laws is grounded in the idea of 
legitimate sovereignty. All individuals in the civil state have a duty to submit to the will 
of a legitimate sovereign, whether expressed in the form of civil law or particular 
commands, by virtue of the original civil contract. In other words, individuals do not 
possess the right to resist the legitimate exercise of sovereign power. As the final two 
sections of this chapter make clear, Barbeyrac follows Grotius and Pufendorf in arguing 
that resistance to the person or persons invested with sovereign power may only be 
justified once sovereign power ceases to be exercised legitimately, but develops this 
argument in his own distinctive manner. The basic idea here, shared by all three 
thinkers, is that the person or persons previously invested with sovereign power must 
have either tacitly or expressly renounced any legitimate claim on the office of 
sovereignty. In response to any acts of manifest tyranny committed by such a ruler, 
individuals may legitimately resume their natural right of violent self-defence derived 
from the duty of self-preservation.  
 
Barbeyrac differs from Grotius and Pufendorf, however, in significantly extending the 
scope of this natural law argument for justified resistance. While the numerous 
                                                
72 Barbeyrac, ‘La permission des loix’, p. 145: ‘toûjours la Maîtresse Souveraine’ and ‘l’empire naturel 
qu’elle a sur les Hommes’.  
73 Barbeyrac, ‘La permission des loix’, p. 144: de suivre les lumiéres de sa Conscience, sur tout en 
matiére de Réligion 
74 See Chapter 4, Section V.  
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references between his Pufendorf and Grotius translations make it clear that he intended 
his argument to be read as a whole, it is notable that he develops different aspects of his 
argument in response to the specific context provided by the text that he is translating. 
In response to Grotius’s explicit rejection of a right of resistance while allowing 
considerable scope for justified resistance in the event that sovereignty is first abdicated 
or otherwise renounced, Barbeyrac confidently asserts that Grotius’s arguments do in 
fact entail a right to resist an unjust and illegitimate sovereign.75 Barbeyrac takes this 
argument further by claiming, pace Grotius, that this general right to resist is justified 
not only in accordance with the principles of natural law, but also in accordance with 
Christian moral law as recorded in the Scriptures.76  
 
In response to Pufendorf’s argument for an absolute, unified sovereign power and 
heavily circumscribed right to resist, Barbeyrac argues that sovereignty ought to be 
limited if the excesses of absolute power are to be curtailed. In making this argument, 
Barbeyrac principally draws on notable English political theorists of limited 
sovereignty, above all Locke and Algernon Sidney (1623-1683). Here, Barbeyrac also 
explicitly connects the right to resist the unjust and illegitimate exercise of sovereign 
power to his defence of individual liberty of conscience within the civil sphere. It is in 
light of this concern to protect individual liberty of conscience that we see most clearly 
how Barbeyrac refashions the natural law argument for justified resistance in response 
to his own specific concerns as a Huguenot refugié committed to providing a robust 
defence of tolerationist principles.  
 
Before turning to the question of resistance in more detail, it is necessary to begin with 
Barbeyrac’s argument on the nature and limits of legitimate sovereignty. In his political 
arguments, Barbeyrac makes use of the traditional distinction between sovereignty and 
government. Rejecting the claim that the authority of the civil sovereign comes 
immediately from God, Barbeyrac maintains instead that it is a human institution 
grounded in the principles of natural law. Sovereignty is thus constituted by the original 
compact of subjection, whereby civil authority is conferred for the sole purpose of the 
peace and security of society and its members. Divine approbation confers legitimacy 
                                                
75 Arguing against his fellow Grotius glossator, Johann Friedrich Gronovius, Barbeyrac claims that 
Grotius defended a general right to resist an unjust tyrant: DNG, 7.6.5, Note 2. 
76 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.4.7, Note 22.  
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on this original compact and puts the civil authority in a state of surety.77 Barbeyrac also 
follows Locke here in rejecting patriarchialism; an argument that likens civil 
sovereignty to paternal power, conferring on both an absolute authority to command.78  
 
Barbeyrac regards the civil sovereign as a moral person invested with ‘an assembly of 
various rights or various distinct Powers’ that together constitute the sum of all civil 
authority.79 In the 1734 edition of the text, he employs Locke’s division of the three 
principal powers of sovereignty as legislative, executive and confederative.80 These 
powers may be held either collectively by a single individual or body of individuals, or 
separately by more than one individual or body of individuals. Here, Barbeyrac appeals 
to experience to argue that because sovereigns are not always wise or enlightened, it is 
better that these powers are held separately as a preventative against the excesses of 
absolute sovereignty, above all in a monarchy.81 To this end, Barbeyrac also argues that 
legitimate sovereignty does not necessarily bestow a right of alienation – that is to say, a 
right of property – upon the person or persons upon whom it is conferred.82  
 
Government is the form that the administration of these sovereign powers takes. It may 
be a monarchy, an aristocracy or a democracy, or when the various sovereign powers 
are held separately, it may take the form of a mixed government. While Barbeyrac 
claims that ‘one cannot suppose in general that a certain form of Government would be 
the best in itself, with respect to all kinds of Nations’, he places considerable emphasis 
on forms of government that properly reflect his belief that limited sovereignty is 
almost always preferable.83 Barbeyrac is here arguing against Pufendorf’s claim that 
lasting peace and security is best secured in an absolute, unified monarchy.84 In this 
regard, Barbeyrac also distances himself from the previous generation of Huguenot 
thought typified by Bayle that, broadly speaking, defended the idea of absolute 
                                                
77 Cf. Chapter 2, p. 74.  
78 Barbeyrac, DNG, 6.2.10, Note 2.  
79 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.4.1, Note 1: ‘un assemblage de divers droits ou de divers Pouvoirs distincts’.  
80 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.4.1, Note 3.  
81 Barbeyrac, DHC, 2.7.9, Note 1. 
82 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.3.11, Notes 4 and 6. For further analysis of the context to Barbeyrac’s argument 
here, see Gabriella Silvestrini, ‘Rousseau, Pufendorf and the Eighteenth-Century Natural Law Tradition’, 
in History of European Ideas 36 (2010), p. 291.  
83 Barbeyrac, DHC, 2.8.4, Note 1: ‘on ne sçauroit poser en général qu’une certain forme de 
Gouvernement soit la meilleure par elle-même, eu égard à toute sorte de Nations’.  
84 Pufendorf modified this claim considerably elsewhere: Seidler, ‘‘Turkish Judgement’ and the English 
Revolution’, esp. pp. 92-93.  
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monarchy.85 Hence, while Barbeyrac’s political theory responds to a set of concerns that 
are distinctly Huguenot, he draws eclectically on different traditions of thought to 
develop his own distinctive argument. As such, quoting the English advocate of limited 
government, the radical republican Sidney, Barbeyrac argues that monarchical 
government may easily descend into tyranny if certain limits are not placed on its right 
to exercise sovereign power.86 These limits are determined by the fundamental laws of 
the state.  
 
The fundamental laws of the state specify how far sovereign power may legitimately 
extend and certain formalities necessary for its exercise. While the fundamental laws 
differ between states, the example that Barbeyrac frequently refers to is the constitution 
of English sovereign power and government, where the King of England is required to 
seek the consent of the two chambers of parliament in exercising certain powers. The 
history of England, Barbeyrac claims, demonstrates that ‘inasmuch as the King does not 
appear to have any intention of infringing the Liberties and Privileges of the Nation’, 
this consent may easily be gained.87 He suggests that even monarchs who jealously 
guard their independence, such as Louis XIV of France, recognised that there were 
certain fundamental laws that it was necessary for all monarchs to observe.88 Speaking 
more generally, Barbeyrac claims that the fundamental laws of the state do not diminish 
sovereignty, but they do place certain juridical restrictions on the exercise of its powers. 
For example, as in the English case, the sovereign may be required to seek the consent 
of the people, or their representatives, to ratify all acts relating to taxation, warfare and 
so forth. But ‘once they have consented, it is the King who wages War, and not the 
People’.89  
 
In his concept of limited sovereignty, Barbeyrac thus conceives of the monarch – for he 
is much more concerned about monarchy than any other form of government that 
sovereignty may take – as subject to both the fundamental laws of the state and natural 
                                                
85 Labrousse, ‘The Political Ideas of the Huguenot Diaspora’, p. 238. 
86 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.6.9, Note 1. Cf. Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government [1698], ed. 
T. G. West, (Indianapolis, IN, 1996), 2.30.  
87 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.6.12, Note 4: ‘tant que les Rois ne paroissent avoir aucun dessein d’empieter sur les 
Libertez & Priviléges de la Nation’.  
88 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.6.10, Note 2.  
89 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.3.16, Note 3: ‘quand il a consenti, c’est le Roi qui fait le Guerre, & non pas le 
Peuple’. 
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law in general.90 He agrees with Pufendorf that the sovereign, as the author of all civil 
laws, stands above their dictates and only conforms to them voluntarily as a mark of 
honour. Nonetheless, Barbeyrac distinguishes here between the sovereign as a legal 
person and the actual individual invested with this authority in arguing that when the 
sovereign acts as a private individual, he ought to be ‘held’ to the dictates of civil law.91 
Far from standing over and above the juridical framework of human society, like 
Hobbes’s ‘Leviathan’ or to a lesser extent Pufendorf’s absolute, unified sovereign, 
Barbeyrac’s sovereign is thus deeply enmeshed within it. In the same vein, where 
Pufendorf dissents from the Hobbesian view that the state can cause no injury to a 
subject, Barbeyrac strengthens Pufendorf’s original objection with his assertion that the 
sovereign and his subjects are always in a reciprocal juridical relation. By virtue of this 
reciprocal juridical relationship, the sovereign may cause harm (tort) to his subjects just 
as a master may harm his slave.92 In both cases, possessing authority over other 
individuals does not diminish their basic moral status as ‘human creatures’ nor abrogate 
the moral obligations incumbent upon their superiors.93 
 
VI 
Resistance 
 
While Barbeyrac expends considerable energy specifying the natural limits to legitimate 
sovereign power and arguing that the exercise of legitimate sovereign power ought to be 
further curtailed by the fundamental laws of the state, he also demonstrates considerable 
caution in how far he allows individuals, or the people collectively, the right to 
constrain or resist a sovereign who transgresses the proper limits of his authority. 
Barbeyrac believes that in taking this approach he will be able to establish principles 
that ‘favour neither Tyranny, nor the spirit of Independence and Rebellion’.94 His 
caution in this matter is evidenced in his rejection, like Grotius before him, of the 
republican principle that the people retain any part of sovereignty in the original 
                                                
90 Barbeyrac, DHC, 2.9.3, Note 1.  
91 Barbeyrac, DHC, 2.9.3, Note 2.  
92 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.8.2, Note 1.  
93 Barbeyrac, DNG, 6.3.8, Note 1.  
94 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.3.8, Note 1: ‘ne favorisent ni la Tyrannie, ni l’esprit d’Independance & de 
Rebellion’. 
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compact of subjection.  It is contradictory to suppose, he claims, ‘that one confers a 
Power on someone, and that one nevertheless retains it’.95  
 
But for all that, the transfer of sovereignty is never absolute. The people always tacitly 
reserve the right to resume possession of sovereign power. This right comes into play 
‘when the one upon whom the Power is conferred abuses it in a manner directly and 
conspicuously contrary to the end for which it has been conferred’.96 Barbeyrac justifies 
this tacit reservation by claiming that the prohibition on constraining or resisting the 
person invested with sovereign power only extends as far as ‘he truly remains a King’.97 
The transfer of sovereign power and thus the obligation to submit to a sovereign 
extends, in principle at least, only as far as the power itself legitimately extends. The 
later advocate of republicanism, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), dismissed 
Barbeyrac’s attempt to justify resistance on the basis of his natural law principles as 
unnecessarily convoluted and restrictive.98 But, for Barbeyrac, the complex juridical 
framework out of which his concept of the right to resist emerges was absolutely 
necessary to demarcate the limits of different spheres of authority. The duties of 
sociability, i.e., of preserving society and promoting peace, on the one hand, and the 
duty of self-preservation, on the other, thus specify the natural limits of the authority 
possessed by both the sovereign and the people alike.  
 
Barbeyrac’s heavily circumscribed right to resist is determined by the proper application 
of these fundamental natural law duties to particular circumstances.99 Likewise, 
individuals are also bound by the contractual obligations placed upon them by the 
original pact of submission, itself instituted to uphold these same duties. This original 
pact of submission places certain restrictions on the individuals that thereby become 
civil subjects. First and foremost, Barbeyrac claims,  
 
                                                
95 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.3.8, Note 1: ‘que l’on confére un Pouvoir à quelcun, & que cependant on le retient’.  
96 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.3.8, Note 1: ‘lors que celui à qui on conféré le Pouvoir en abuse d’une maniére 
directement & notablement contraire à la fin pour laquelle il lui a été conféré’.  
97 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.3.9, Note 1: ‘il demeure véritablement Roi’.  
98 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, 2.2.5, in The Social Contract and other Later Political 
Writings, trans. and ed. V. Gourevitch, (Cambridge, 1997). For a more extended analysis of Barbeyrac’s 
‘anti-republican’ political principles and Rousseau’s critique thereof, see Silvestrini, ‘Rousseau, 
Pufendorf and the Eighteenth-Century Natural Law Tradition’, pp. 283-290.  
99 See also discussion above, pp. 155-156.  
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whoever submits to a Human Authority, cannot ignore the fact that the 
person, to whom he surrenders a part of his liberty, is and always will be a 
Man, that is to say, liable to be mistaken and to be lacking in fulfilling his 
duty.100  
 
Subjects are held ‘to recognise him [the sovereign] as their Master on this footing’.101 As 
such, they do not possess a general right to resist the sovereign for every injustice or 
harm committed against them. As we have already seen, this is not to say that the 
sovereign has any legitimate right to commit any injustices against his subjects, but 
rather that individuals are bound by the same obligation as the sovereign himself to 
uphold civil society insofar as it remains the better moral and political state in which to 
realise the fundamental duties of natural law.102  
 
Barbeyrac thus distinguishes between ‘doubtful, or bearable injustices’ and ‘manifest 
and unbearable injustices’.103 The former ought always to be borne, whereas individuals 
are not obliged to suffer the latter kind of injustices except willingly and for the good of 
society. Once the injustice outweighs the risk posed to civil society, however, nothing 
prevents individuals from taking up the rights that they possess against ‘the one who, by 
an excess of fury, has disengaged them from the bond of Subjection, and put himself in 
a state of War with them’.104 In his translation of Cumberland’s Traité philosophique, 
Barbeyrac claims that individuals do not thereby acquire ‘authority’ over the sovereign 
but rather, by his own unjust actions, the person invested with sovereign power deprives 
himself of any legitimate claim to wield civil authority, thus returning both himself and 
his subjects to a ‘state of natural Liberty and Equality’.105 To recall, for Barbeyrac, 
whilst individuals do not possess the right to judge or to punish the sovereign in the 
civil state, they do posses the right to judge or punish other individuals who have 
violated the dictates of natural law in a state of natural liberty and equality. This holds 
true even though the state of natural liberty and equality to which individuals return is 
not exactly same as the original state of nature; the first pact of society whereby 
                                                
100 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.4.2, Note 1: ‘quiconque se soûmet à une Autorité Humaine, ne peut ignorer que 
celui, en faveur duquel il se dépouille d’une partie de sa liberté, est & sera toûjours Homme, c’est-à-dire, 
sujet à se tromper & se manquer en quleque chose à son Devoir’.  
101 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.4.2, Note 1: ‘le reconnoître pour son Maître sur ce pié-là’. 
102 Barbeyrac argues that civil state is not always preferable to the state of natue. Cf. pp. 152-153 above. 
103 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.4.2, Note 1: ‘les injustes douteuses, ou supportables’ and ‘les injustices manifestes 
& insupportables’.  
104 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.4.2 Note 1: ‘celui qui, par un excès de fureur, nous a degagé du lien de la 
Sujettion, & s’est mis avec nous en état de Guerre’. 
105 Barbeyrac, TPLN, 9.8: ‘l’état de la Liberté & de l’Egalité naturelle’.  
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individuals collectively become a people ensuring that when the subsequent pact of 
subjection is ruptured, the political state simply enters an interregnum.106 
 
One of the most substantial problems that Barbeyrac faced with his limited right to 
resist was the problem of judgement. Deprived of the authority to judge the actions of 
the sovereign, how were individuals supposed to determine when it was legitimate to 
resist those invested with civil authority? In Le droit de la guerre, Barbeyrac 
acknowledges that a general right to judge the sovereign would be ‘a perpetual source 
of quarrel and disorder’.107 This much is consistent with his belief that individuals are 
obliged to suffer considerable harm at the hands of the sovereign for the good of society 
in general. But, pace Grotius, he argues that,  
 
it does not follow from this, that the People may never judge of the actions 
of the King, and that they ought to suffer everything. This is contrary to the 
natural end of all Society, and the obligation that the People, as well as all 
Individuals, are naturally under to preserve themselves.108 
 
The qualification made here rests on an implied distinction between private judgement 
and the manifestation of that judgement through actions undertaken within the civil 
sphere. Individuals always posses a private right of judgement against those in 
authority, whether civil or ecclesiastical, but certain conditions must be fulfilled before 
individuals can be certain that their private judgements corresponds to a state of affairs 
within the civil sphere that constitutes a ‘manifest and unbearable’ injustice.  
 
For Barbeyrac, what matters here is that the judgement made by individuals, or by the 
people, is ‘right’. The problem – as he understands it is – is thus essentially one about 
the reliability of individual, private judgement and likelihood of the grave consequences 
for civil society in the event that individuals are in error. Implicit within Barbeyrac’s 
attempt to solve the problem of reliability of judgement is the belief that in those cases 
where this judgement is rightfully made, the problem of authority to judge is effectively 
negated by the return – in terms of moral authority – to a state of natural liberty and 
                                                
106 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.7.7, Note 5.  
107 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.3.9, Note 3: ‘une source perpetuelle de quérelles & de désordres’.  
108 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.3.9, Note 3: ‘il ne s’ensuit point de là, que le Peuple ne puisse jamais juger des 
actions du Roi, & qu’il doive tout souffrir. Cela est contraire au but naturel de toute Société, & à 
l’obligation où les Peuples sont naturellement, aussi bien que les Particuliers, de se conserver eux-
mêmes’. 
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equality. He thus takes up the idea, common within Huguenot traditions of thought but 
rejected by both Grotius and Pufendorf, that it is civil magistrates who are best 
equipped to ‘show the way to others’ in determining when the sovereign has acted 
beyond the limits of his legitimate authority and ought to be resisted in the interests of 
civil society.109 This is because the magistrates, in fulfilling the office of public persons, 
possess greater knowledge of the affairs of the state and are already authorised to 
uphold the general good of society: that is to say, individuals who are more likely to be 
both informed and impartial.  
 
This latter argument is mirrored in Le droit de la nature, where Barbeyrac defines ‘the 
people’ as ‘the greatest and most judicious’ persons within society, distinct from both 
‘the vile populace’ and from a seditious cabal motivated by particular interests.110 
Legitimate resistance thus begins with the judgement of those persons already attuned 
to the complexities of the moral-judicial framework of natural and civil law applied to 
specific circumstances. Barbeyrac makes use of Locke’s argument here that investing 
‘the people’ with a right to resist does not endanger the state because the people cannot 
easily be persuaded to take up this right. Emphasising the proper character of 
sovereignty in his own translation of a passage from Locke’s Second Treatise, 
Barbeyrac alleges that ‘it is impossible for the Sovereign, if he truly has in view the 
good of his People, the conservation of his Subjects, and the maintenance of their Laws, 
not to make them know and feel it’.111 In short, a sovereign who acts within the 
legitimate bounds of civil authority has nothing to fear from the people.  
 
Drawing again on Locke, Barbeyrac concludes that the right possessed by ‘the people’ 
to remedy the illegitimate exercise of sovereign power by changing the legislative or 
executive power is itself the best remedy against rebellion. Barbeyrac thus distinguishes 
here between legitimate resistance against the person invested with sovereign power by 
                                                
109 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.4.6, Note 2: ‘montre le chemin aux autres’. Cf. Skinner, Foundations of Modern 
Political Thought, Vol. 2, pp. 230-233.  
110 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.8.6, Note 1: ‘la plus grande & la plus saine’ and ‘la vile populace’.  
111 Barbeyrac DNG, 7.8.6, Note 1: ‘Il est impossible que le Souverain, s’il n’a veritablement en vûe que le 
bien de son Peuple, la conservation des ses Sujets, & le maintien de leurs Loix, ne le fasse connoître & 
sentir’. Cf. Locke, Second Treatise, 18.209 where Locke uses the English ‘Governor’ which Barbeyrac 
replaces with the French ‘Souverain’. Silvestrini comments on Barbeyrac’s translation of Locke here and 
compares it to the Mazel’s transition of the same term in Du gouvernement civil (1691) as ‘un Prince, ou 
un Magistrat’. See ‘Rousseau, Pufendorf and the Eighteenth-Century Natural Law Tradition’, p. 289.  
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‘the people’ and a general attack on ‘the authority of the laws’ by the populace.112 A 
limited right to resist is thus the best means to hold all parties to their respective spheres 
of authority and subjection.  
 
Moreover, this limited right to resist only comes into play when the sovereign’s acts of 
injustice become so ‘manifest and unbearable’ that he may be looked upon as a tyrant. 
But what constitutes, for Barbeyrac, a manifest and unbearable injustice? In short, all 
immediate and considerable threats to the lives and liberties of individual subjects that 
tend towards the oppression of the people and the ruin of the state.113 To recall, 
individuals are possessed of certain inalienable rights, principally those to life, liberty 
and conscience over which God alone possesses a legitimate authority. In effect, these 
inalienable natural rights define and protect a sphere of individual authority where God 
alone is master. In seeking to extend the reach of sovereign power into this sphere of 
individual authority, the exercise of sovereign power becomes both arbitrary and 
despotic. For Barbeyrac, a tyrant is thus a ruler who acts ‘beyond reason’ in 
transgressing the proper juridical limits that reason tells him that he is necessarily 
subject to. Moreover, any such tyrant puts the good order and tranquillity of the state 
under an immediate and general threat because ‘a man who believes everything is 
permitted with respect to his Inferiors, is capable of everything’.114  
 
This occurs most clearly when the sovereign transgresses upon the rights of individual 
conscience. For Barbeyrac, the authority that the sovereign possesses over the religious 
beliefs of his subjects is limited by the end for which his authority was originally 
instituted, namely the good of society.115 Whatever religion a sovereign may himself 
profess, he thus has ‘no right to prevent every person from serving God peacefully 
according to the light and the movements of his conscience’.116 Moreover, the sovereign 
has no right to deprive any of his subjects of their civil or natural goods for acting in 
accordance with their inalienable right to liberty of conscience.117 And yet, all too often, 
Barbeyrac argues, the sovereign abuses his own legitimate right to examine public 
                                                
112 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.8.6, Note 1: ‘l’autorité des Loix’. Cf. Locke, Second Treatise, 19.226.  
113 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.8.6, Note 1. 
114 Barbeyrac, DGP, 1.4.2, Note 1: ‘Un homme qui se croit tout permis par rapport à ses Inferieurs, est 
capable de tout’.  
115 Cf. Chapter 4, Section VI.  
116 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.2.21, Note 2: ‘ne... aucun droit d’empêcher que chacun serve DIEU paisaiblement 
selon les lumieres & les mouvemens de sa Conscience’.  
117 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.3.11, Note 1.  
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doctrine for the good of society. This happens when he prohibits the wholly legitimate 
and peaceful exercise of individual liberty of conscience, understood here as a religious 
belief to which one freely assents, as harmful to the state.118 By virtue of the fact that 
Barbeyrac numbers liberty of conscience among the inalienable natural rights possessed 
by all individuals, preventing them from peacefully following the light of their 
conscience constitutes a manifest and unbearable injustice and, implicitly, an affront to 
the authority of God.  
 
Barbeyrac claims that as nothing in the principles of natural law nor those of Holy 
Scripture give us any reason to suppose otherwise, it necessarily follows that, 
 
the People have a right as natural as it is incontestable to defend their 
Religion by the force of arms against a Sovereign, who compels them to 
renounce it, or forbids its exercise, as they do to defend their lives, their 
goods and their liberties against the machinations of a tyrant. This right is 
even more allowable than any other; since it regards the greatest of all 
interests, and the strongest of all Obligations, or rather the one that is the 
foundation and source of all others; that is to say the indispensible 
necessity that each person is under to follow the light of conscience.119  
 
Even with all the practical and prudential limitations that the juridical framework of 
natural law places upon this right to resist, Barbeyrac clearly believes that resistance 
may be both legitimate and justifiable in defence of an individual right to liberty of 
conscience.  
 
Yet it should also be borne in mind that, when it comes to the question of political 
resistance, Barbeyrac almost certainly has in mind here the idea of a conscience that is 
‘right’ despite the contrast that this engenders with his tolerationist defence of erroneous 
conscience.120 The difference rests on the fact that any right to resist the authority of the 
civil sovereign only makes sense by virtue of the mastery that God retains over 
individual conscience, which could only legitimately come into play if we suppose that 
                                                
118 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.8.4, Note 1.  
119 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.8.5, Note 5: ‘les Peuples ont un droit aussi naturel & aussi incontestable de 
defender leur Religion par les armes contre un Souverain, qui veut les contraindre d’y renoncer, ou leur 
en interdire l’exercise, que de défendre leurs vies, leurs biens & leurs libertez contre les enterprises d’un 
Tyran. Ce droit est même plus favourable qu’aucun autre puisqu’il regarde le plus grand de tous les 
intérêts, & la plus forte de toutes les Obligations, ou plûtot celle qui est le fondement & la source de 
toutes les autres; je veux dire la nécessite indispensible où chacun est de suivre les lumieres de sa 
Conscience’.  
120 Cf. Chapter 4, pp. 134-137.  
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individual judgement determined by the light of one’s conscience is genuinely right. 
Barbeyrac, however, does not pursue the question of rightful conscience within his 
political arguments.  
 
The passage quoted above also yields more general observations about what kind of 
conclusions Barbeyrac was driving towards in his concept of conscience. Above all, it 
brings us back to the idea introduced in the first chapter that, for Barbeyrac, the juridical 
framework of natural law relies upon his concept of conscience. Conscience again being 
defined as ‘the foundation and source’ of all other genuine interests and obligations. 
Moreover, the fundamental role that Barbeyrac ascribed to the concept of conscience 
throughout his theory of natural law goes a long way towards explaining why it is so 
important to him to enshrine it as an inalienable natural right alongside the more 
traditional ascription of this particular status to life and liberty alone as, for example, in 
Locke’s political thought. Conscience is ‘more allowable’ than any other right precisely 
because individuals’ status as moral beings is predicated on the belief that it is 
necessary to be left at liberty to follow its light with respect to absolute moral duties and 
permissive natural rights, i.e., to uphold the full gamut of rights and duties owed to 
oneself, to others and to God. For Barbeyrac, this is never more true than in upholding 
the first duty of natural law to follow the light of conscience in the sincere worship of 
God. Hence his particular identification of conscience with individual religious belief.  
 
Barbeyrac’s theory of justified resistance also serves as a vindication of the Huguenot 
cause following the persecutions suffered both before and after the Revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes at the command of the French king, Louis XIV. To be sure, Barbeyrac 
should not be read as advocating resistance to the French king by force of arms, but 
rather as laying the foundation for the justification of Huguenot non-obedience in 
response to the command to renounce their religious beliefs. For Barbeyrac, Huguenot 
non-obedience was both legitimate and absolutely necessary according to the principles 
of natural law that he wants to establish. To this end, Barbeyrac agrees with Pufendorf 
but not Grotius that the mass exodus of a considerable part of the people from the civil 
state is also legitimate according to the terms of the original civil contract.121 The 
sovereign possesses no right to prevent his subjects from leaving the state. Again, as a 
                                                
121 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.11.4, Note 1.  
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commentary on the Huguenot experience, Barbeyrac’s natural law principles legitimise 
the mass exodus of the Huguenots despite the prohibition placed on the Huguenots from 
leaving the French state under the terms of the Edict of Fontainebleau. In short, the 
Huguenots were not disloyal subjects in the face of the legitimate exercise of sovereign 
authority but rather they remained faithful to the fundamental duties of natural law in 
resisting the illegitimate exercise of civil power.  
 
Barbeyrac’s commentary on the Huguenot experience also extends to the actions of 
those who carried out the persecutions at the command of the sovereign. Barbeyrac 
argues, pace Pufendorf, that it does not matter whether a subject acts in his own name 
or in the name of his king, in the tribunal of conscience, he will be held accountable for 
all unjust and criminal actions carried out at the command of his sovereign. Speaking of 
the most recent persecutions in France, Barbeyrac questions whether the agents of the 
Huguenot persecutions could be in any doubt about the ‘tyrannical injustice and 
barbaric cruelty of the order that they received’ against fellow subjects whose only 
crime consisted in serving God according to the light of conscience.122  
 
Barbeyrac rejects the defence of necessity, alleging instead that ‘it is not completely 
beyond the resoluteness of the Human Spirit to resolve to die, rather than fail to uphold 
their duty’.123 Neither the civil laws nor the particular commands of the civil sovereign 
can legitimately transgress the fundamental duties of natural law. As such, no subject is 
required to carry out an action that results in a manifest injustice against another 
individual because to so would violate these fundamental duties and thus constitutes a 
manifest injustice against his own conscience too.124 Here, conscience is identified with 
natural law itself in determining the limits of the legitimate exercise of sovereign power 
and the reason for justified resistance to such commands. Thus, in the name of 
individual conscience, both persecutors and persecuted alike can and should resist 
commands that constitute the manifestly unjust exercise of sovereign power.  
 
                                                
122 Barbeyrac, DNG, 8.1.6, Note 4: ‘l’injustice tyrannique & la cruauté barbare des ordres qu’ils 
recevoient’.  
123 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.5.9, Note 5: ‘Il n’est pas absolutement au-dessus de la fermeté de l’Esprit Humain, 
de se resoudre à mourir, plûtôt que de manquer à son devoir’.  
124 Barbeyrac, DNG, 1.5.9, Note 9.  
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Barbeyrac’s eclectic use of other thinkers’ arguments goes to the heart of his project. In 
many ways, Barbeyrac sees Locke as his closest ally here. As we have seen, he draws 
on a series of Lockean arguments to supplement what he takes to be omissions, 
particularly in Pufendorf’s texts, from which he constructs his own arguments 
concerning individual moral and political authority in both the natural and civil state. 
But Barbeyrac was more doing more than simply reiterating the arguments of others, 
even those of Locke. Instead, he ought to be read as a synthesiser, constructing his own 
arguments through this eclecticism and carefully modifying the arguments of those who 
had gone before to this same end. This eclecticism can be clearly seen in his political 
thought. Not only did Barbeyrac link together two aspects of Locke’s thought that 
Locke himself chose to keep separate – namely, his political individualism and his 
limited right of resistance – but he also allied his version of the Lockean argument to 
what he took to be Pufendorf’s comparable defence of toleration in his De habitu 
religionis christianae, a text written in response to the Revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes.125 Like Locke, however, Pufendorf kept his tolerationist arguments distinct from 
his discussion of justified resistance to the illegitimate exercise of sovereign power in 
his natural law treatises. Barbeyrac as synthesiser makes use of the ambiguities in both 
authors’ philosophical and political positions to bring to the foreground an argument for 
justified resistance in the name of liberty of conscience that remained central to his own 
moral and political thought.  
 
What this indicates is that, in his use of Lockean arguments within his notes on 
sovereignty and resistance, Barbeyrac is more than a simple consumer. Instead, he 
offers an early interpretation of his predecessor’s ideas. Barbeyrac’s reading of Locke 
sees the latter provide a robust defence of liberty of conscience that can be explicitly 
                                                
125 Barbeyrac, DNG, 7.4.11, Note 2. Cf. Chapter 4, p. 139, fn. 100. There is not space here to consider 
Pufendorf’s theory of toleration here but for two contrasting interpretations of this issue, see Detlef 
Döring, ‘Samuel von Pufendorf and Toleration’, in Beyond the Persecuting Society, ed. J.C. Laursen and 
C.J. Nederman, (Philadelphia, 1998), pp. 178-196, who argues that Pufendorf’s toleration was only ever a 
pragmatic ‘liberal Lutheranism’ accommodated to specific circumstances and Simone Zurbuchen, 
‘Samuel Pufendorf’s Concept of Toleration’, in Difference and Dissent, ed. J.C. Laursen and C.J. 
Nederman, (London, 1996), pp. 163-184, who argues that while Pufendorf does not succeed in forming a 
coherent concept of toleration, the substance of his arguments is steeped in the languages of natural law 
and reason of state. For an analysis of both Locke’s and Pufendorf’s theory of toleration integrated with 
their respective theories of natural law, see Michael Seidler, ‘The Politics of Self-Preservation: Toleration 
and Identity in Pufendorf and Locke’, in Early Modern Natural Law Theories, ed. T. Hochstrasser and P. 
Schröder, (Dordrecht, 2003), pp. 227-243. Seidler argues, as Barbeyrac himself also wants to, that 
Pufendorf and Locke have more in common with respect to their philosophical ideas than is usually 
acknowledged, whilst highlighting the distinctive nature of each author’s argument.  
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allied to his justification of resistance in cases of extreme political necessity. While 
Barbeyrac may be one of the first to ascribe this view to Locke, the ongoing debate in 
modern scholarship show us that he was certainly not the last to do so.126 These debates 
also remind us that while Barbeyrac and Locke addressed many similar philosophical 
issues within the Republic of Letters, they were each responding to a very different set 
of political events. For Barbeyrac, his Huguenot heritage – both in terms of his religious 
beliefs and his experience of religious persecution – left him with an abiding concern 
for the liberty of individual conscience as a moral and religious faculty. Yet, while his 
political thought may be labelled as ‘Huguenot’, he differs substantially from other 
Huguenot thinkers, such as Bayle, who denied that the same duty to follow one’s 
conscience could be transposed into a claimable political right against the civil 
sovereign.127  
 
Finally, by separating Barbeyrac from both his authors and his intellectual predecessors 
such as Locke, we can see how his own political thought represents a concerted effort 
on his part to enshrine the rights of individual conscience within the civil sphere without 
thereby laying the foundation for political sedition in the name of justified resistance. 
The principles that structure civil and political life are cautious and conservative in their 
reach while at the same time instituting a comprehensive right to liberty of conscience, 
identified both with sincere religious belief and with natural law itself. It is the 
authoritative judgement of conscience that serves as the foundation for Barbeyrac’s 
claims for justified resistance. Taking both this current chapter and the previous 
chapters together as a whole, it is possible to see how Barbeyrac’s theory of natural law 
establishes three distinct spheres of human authority: the moral authority of individual 
                                                
126 In the Second Treatise, Locke does not directly ally his political arguments, including the just defence 
of one’s liberty, to the religious argument for liberty of conscience presented in his Letter on Toleration. 
John Dunn argues, nevertheless, that Locke’s oeuvre ought to be read as a whole and that in this broader 
context the Second Treatise provides an ‘assertion of a countervailing right in the conscience of every 
man to judge the damage inflicted by the strong and wicked on God’s world… [where] the structure of 
political obligation is logically dependent on the structure of individual religious duty’. See The Political 
Thought of John Locke, p. 51 and p. 125. Arguing against Dunn, John Marshall claims that, on the 
contrary, that Locke had good reasons to keep his arguments purely political and thus ‘there were no 
significant arguments in the Two Treatises that men had to defend and establish their religion as well as 
defend their liberties, lives and properties’. See John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility, 
(Cambridge, 1994), p. 289. For the purpose of the present discussion, it is sufficient to note that 
Barbeyrac’s view of Locke is much closer to Dunn’s interpretation than Marshall’s.  
127 Elisabeth Labrousse argues that while Bayle provides a radical and far reaching defence of religious 
toleration predicated on God’s mastery over conscience, he is ‘concerned less with the rights of the 
individual than with those of the Creator who has reserved for Himself the domain of conscience’. 
Liberty of conscience in the religious sphere does not therefore, for Bayle, translate into a right to liberty 
of conscience in the civil sphere: ‘Political Ideas (Bayle and Jurieu)’, p. 263.  
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conscience, the religious authority of ecclesiastics and the civil authority of the 
sovereign. Each of these spheres depends on the juridical framework of natural law and 
thus the approbation of God himself for its legitimacy. As a pedagogic enterprise, in his 
careful exposition of the respective rights and duties possessed by the individuals that 
make up each of these respective spheres of authority, Barbeyrac provides his readers 
with a detailed and nuanced – though not always wholly coherent – model for the whole 
of human, social interaction with man’s relationship to God at its core. 
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Conclusion 
 
Barbeyrac the natural law theorist emerges from this study as a steadfast defender of 
individual liberty of conscience. Responding to the personal and political circumstances 
that shaped his life, he makes a thoughtful attempt to develop his own distinctive 
argument through a remarkable synthesis of the different traditions of thought at his 
disposal. The resulting account of moral, civil and religious authority is deeply rooted in 
the history and philosophy of early modern Europe, above all, in its insistence that all 
forms of human authority ultimately derive from the authority of God. I have tried to 
show that it is precisely because Barbeyrac’s moral framework is grounded in the idea 
of individual dependence on the will of God that he believes himself in a position to 
argue that certain checks to civil and ecclesiastical authority in defence of individual 
liberty of conscience are both legitimate and necessary.  
 
The innovation at the heart of his thought is his considerable extension of the concept of 
conscience beyond its traditional bounds, thus defending conscience not only as a 
religious but as a moral liberty. We have seen how Barbeyrac’s comprehensive concept 
of conscience fulfils a number of conceptually different roles within his argument. 
Conscience is the source of moral knowledge and the faculty of moral judgement, and it 
is the locus of theological understanding as well as religious belief. However, while we 
may separate out some of these strands for the purpose of discussion, it is fundamental 
to Barbeyrac’s argument that conscience is a single, unified concept. It is in these terms 
that his argument has been assessed here with the aim of showing that Barbeyrac’s 
concern to vindicate the breadth and content of his concept of conscience bestows a 
coherence of purpose on his thought as a whole.  
 
This study has also identified some of the difficulties that Barbeyrac faced in his 
attempt to realise his philosophical aims by means of the concept of conscience, above 
all in his theory of permissive natural law that was intended as a complement to his 
theory of moral obligation. It is in the relationship between the moral judgements of 
individual conscience and the sphere of permissive action that we discern in 
Barbeyrac’s thought a nascent sphere of privacy. However, as I have sought to 
demonstrate, the relationship between these two aspects of his thought gives rise to 
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unresolved philosophical tensions even at the end of his scholarly career. The juridical 
character of his moral premises carries into his theory of moral deliberation the idea that 
moral determinants are always at play, but at the same time he insists that individual 
judgements of conscience must be freely undertaken and voluntarily acquiesced to. 
While it has not been possible to resolve these tensions on Barbeyrac’s behalf, it has 
been possible to indicate, where appropriate, the philosophical and theological 
commitments that made them intractable issues for him.  
 
The ambition of the present work has been to go beyond the existing literature on 
Barbeyrac by offering an interpretation that shows the overall coherence of his 
intellectual enterprise despite its apparent complexities and disparate character. It is my 
hope that it also opens up new avenues of research simply by giving serious 
consideration to Barbeyrac and his writings and, in particular, to those works that 
hitherto have been either ignored or studied only in isolation. In fact, through its 
emphasis on the features that lend coherence to his literary activity, this dissertation 
may provide the framework for studies that go in the opposite direction and focus on the 
close context of the particular stages that make up Barbeyrac’s career, tasks that could 
only be gestured at in the course of my argument. A further desideratum that lies in 
obvious extension of the present work is to make more intensive use of the debates that 
Barbeyrac conducted with his contemporaries not only in the interpretation of the 
seminal figures of his time, above all Bayle, Grotius, Locke and Pufendorf, but also in 
his engagement with lesser lights in both the Republic of Letters and the Huguenot 
Diaspora.  
 
To take an obvious example, a contextualised study of Barbeyrac as an early interpreter 
of Locke would require a more detailed account of his engagement with close 
acquaintances, such as Jean Le Clerc, with whom Barbeyrac had a close intellectual 
affinity. It was in fact Le Clerc who made the introduction that enabled Barbeyrac to 
become a correspondent of Locke in the final years of the latter’s life. Such a study 
might lead to work on other interpretations of Locke that emerged during the same 
period, such as the debates that Barbeyrac engaged in with his fellow Pufendorf 
commentator Gershom Carmichael.  
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While it might be tempting to see in Barbeyrac’s theory of moral authority the kernel of 
the Kantian argument for the moral authority of the individual, grounded in self-
legislating human reason, I have resisted such temptations. By seeing Barbeyrac as 
distinctively a man of his time, this dissertation has worked from the premise that much 
of the richness of his thought – and that of his contemporaries – lies in what 
distinguishes it from later ideas, not least those of Kant and his successors, not in what 
might tie them together in some grand narrative. The challenge and the reward of 
studying Barbeyrac’s thought come from the diversity of his writings, his eclecticism 
and the synthesis of ideas that makes up his argument. 
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